C(r)ap and Trade: The Brave New World of Non-Point Source Nutrient Trading and Using Lessons from Greenhouse Gas Markets to Make It Work

V. Flatt
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

After several decades of improvement, water quality in the United States is getting worse, and the problem is primarily caused by run-off from non-point sources, such as farms and urban development. These non-point sources have never had regulatory mandates in the Clean Water Act, and have proven very difficult to control. With little likelihood of comprehensive statutory changes, the EPA and the states that administer the Clean Water Act have looked to other regulatory means to address this problem. One of the most prominent has been the use of markets in pollution (particularly for nutrient pollution from run-off) to provide incentives for control. In short, the agencies and the regulated private sector have latched on to the possibility of highly regulated sources (such as industrial emitters) paying largely unregulated sources (such as agricultural lands) to reduce run-off into the nation’s water bodies. In theory, this is consistent with the regulatory push towards efficiency and using markets as rational arbiters of pollution control. While this theory has been used on many small scales over the last 15 years, recently the EPA and many states have announced a reliance on it at a very large scale in order to reverse water pollution decline, particularly in large water bodies with dead zones, like the Chesapeake Bay. While I believe these markets could work in theory at this scale, I do not believe the administrative agencies have addressed problems with doing so. Because of the similarity in problems concerning environmental integrity and efficiency between non-point agricultural runoff and biological offsets in a carbon trading system, I believe that much of the analysis of addressing these offsets from a series of legislative proposals could provide a regulatory template for dealing with non-point source agricultural pollution. This article proposes such a regulatory template based on these ideas.
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C(r)ap与贸易:非点源营养物交易的美丽新世界和利用温室气体市场的经验使其发挥作用
经过几十年的改善,美国的水质越来越差,这个问题主要是由非点源的径流引起的,比如农场和城市发展。这些非点源在《清洁水法》中从未有过监管规定,而且事实证明很难控制。由于不太可能进行全面的法律改革,环保署和执行《清洁水法》的州已经开始寻求其他监管手段来解决这个问题。其中最突出的是利用污染市场(特别是径流造成的营养物污染)为控制提供激励。简而言之,这些机构和受监管的私营部门已经抓住了这样一种可能性:高度监管的排放源(如工业排放源)向基本上不受监管的排放源(如农业用地)支付费用,以减少流入国家水体的径流。从理论上讲,这与监管机构追求效率和利用市场作为污染控制的理性仲裁者是一致的。虽然这一理论在过去的15年里在许多小范围内得到了应用,但最近美国环保署和许多州宣布,为了扭转水污染的下降趋势,特别是在有死区的大型水体中,比如切萨皮克湾,他们将大规模地依赖这一理论。虽然我相信这些市场在理论上可以在这种规模下运作,但我不认为行政机构已经解决了这样做的问题。由于在碳交易系统中,非点源农业径流和生物补偿在环境完整性和效率方面的问题相似,我相信,从一系列立法提案中解决这些补偿的大部分分析可以为处理非点源农业污染提供监管模板。本文在此基础上提出了这样一个监管模板。
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