{"title":"Robustly Optimal Auction Design under Mean Constraints","authors":"Ethan Che","doi":"10.1145/3490486.3538357","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly asymmetric) means of the marginal distributions of each bidder's valuation and the range. An adversarial nature chooses the worst-case distribution within this ambiguity set along with the worst-case information structure. We find that a second-price auction with a symmetric, random reserve price obtains the optimal revenue guarantee within a broad class of mechanisms we refer to as competitive mechanisms, which include standard auction formats such as the first-price auction. The optimal mechanism possesses two notable characteristics. First, the mechanism treats all bidders identically even in the presence of ex-ante asymmetries. Second, when bidders have identical means and the number of bidders n grows large, the seller's optimal reserve price converges in probability to a non-binding reserve price and the revenue guarantee converges to the mean at rate O(1/n).","PeriodicalId":209859,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538357","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Abstract
We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly asymmetric) means of the marginal distributions of each bidder's valuation and the range. An adversarial nature chooses the worst-case distribution within this ambiguity set along with the worst-case information structure. We find that a second-price auction with a symmetric, random reserve price obtains the optimal revenue guarantee within a broad class of mechanisms we refer to as competitive mechanisms, which include standard auction formats such as the first-price auction. The optimal mechanism possesses two notable characteristics. First, the mechanism treats all bidders identically even in the presence of ex-ante asymmetries. Second, when bidders have identical means and the number of bidders n grows large, the seller's optimal reserve price converges in probability to a non-binding reserve price and the revenue guarantee converges to the mean at rate O(1/n).