{"title":"Rights Protecting Performance of Duties","authors":"Rowan Cruft","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198793366.003.0014","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 14 turns from property to a further class of rights groundable only by how they serve parties beyond the right-holder. Unlike property, the rights of Chapter 14 protect the right-holder’s performance of role-defining duties to serve others: e.g. a bus driver’s or politician’s rights to be unimpeded in performing her duties of office, or a doctor’s to her assistant’s help. The chapter argues that unlike with property, there is little risk of people erroneously conceiving such rights as grounded fundamentally by the right-holder’s good. Nonetheless, such rights distinctively protect the right-holder’s important interest in carrying out her morally justified duties. On this basis, the chapter defends our use of the concept of a ‘right’ in such cases—even though because the right-holder’s interest cannot be the main ground of the duties to assist or to avoid impeding, conceiving such duties as correlating with rights is not conceptually compulsory.","PeriodicalId":441247,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights, Ownership, and the Individual","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Human Rights, Ownership, and the Individual","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198793366.003.0014","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Chapter 14 turns from property to a further class of rights groundable only by how they serve parties beyond the right-holder. Unlike property, the rights of Chapter 14 protect the right-holder’s performance of role-defining duties to serve others: e.g. a bus driver’s or politician’s rights to be unimpeded in performing her duties of office, or a doctor’s to her assistant’s help. The chapter argues that unlike with property, there is little risk of people erroneously conceiving such rights as grounded fundamentally by the right-holder’s good. Nonetheless, such rights distinctively protect the right-holder’s important interest in carrying out her morally justified duties. On this basis, the chapter defends our use of the concept of a ‘right’ in such cases—even though because the right-holder’s interest cannot be the main ground of the duties to assist or to avoid impeding, conceiving such duties as correlating with rights is not conceptually compulsory.