To Win or to Profit: How Rivalry Affects Payoff Decisions in Interdependent Situations

Jeffrey P. Thomas, P. Schiaffino
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Abstract

This paper explores how existing relationships between competitors can shift them from self-focused, reward-maximizing pursuits to peer-focused, competitive pursuits. Building upon recent research on rivalry, we explore the consequences of this unique relationship for decision-making in situations of interdependence. Across three studies involving members of different countries, members of different universities, and coworkers, we found that decisions made by individuals paired with rivals differed significantly from the decisions of individuals paired with non-rivals. Of particular note, we observed that individuals paired with rivals were more willing to sacrifice their absolute outcomes in order to achieve relatively favorable outcomes vis-a-vis their rivals, and to trade off financial value for the opportunity to compete against and potentially defeat their rivals. Importantly, some of these effects of rivalry were eliminated by status affirmation, suggesting a potential intervention that can mitigate the detrimental consequences to rivalry. These findings contribute to literatures on rivalry, decision-making, and social value orientation, and suggest a number of important implications for employees and managers.
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赢还是利:竞争如何影响相互依赖情况下的支付决策
本文探讨了竞争者之间的现有关系如何将他们从以自我为中心、追求回报最大化转变为以同伴为中心、追求竞争。基于最近对竞争的研究,我们探讨了在相互依赖的情况下这种独特关系对决策的影响。在三项涉及不同国家成员、不同大学成员和同事的研究中,我们发现,与竞争对手配对的个体所做的决定与与非竞争对手配对的个体所做的决定有显著差异。特别值得注意的是,我们观察到,与竞争对手配对的个体更愿意牺牲自己的绝对结果,以获得相对于竞争对手的有利结果,并牺牲经济价值来换取与竞争对手竞争并有可能击败对手的机会。重要的是,地位肯定消除了竞争的一些影响,这表明一种潜在的干预可以减轻竞争的有害后果。这些发现有助于研究竞争、决策和社会价值取向,并对员工和管理者提出了一些重要的启示。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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