{"title":"A Principal-Agent Relationship with No Advantage to Commitment","authors":"R. Vohra, F. Espinosa, Debraj Ray","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3798785","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores conditions under which the ability to commit in a principal-agent relationship creates no additional benefit for the principal, over and above simultaneous interaction without commitment. A central assumption is that the principal’s payoff depends only on the payoff to the agent and her type.","PeriodicalId":105430,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Employers & Employees (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Employers & Employees (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3798785","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
This paper explores conditions under which the ability to commit in a principal-agent relationship creates no additional benefit for the principal, over and above simultaneous interaction without commitment. A central assumption is that the principal’s payoff depends only on the payoff to the agent and her type.
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