Fiscal Bicameralism: The Core of a EU Constitution

Abstract

The present approach to what steps to take as a result of the rejection of the proposed European Constitution is almost guaranteed to be a very toilsome process inside the realm of partisan advocacy. Moreover the approach is almost irrelevant in terms of both explanatory content and normative potential. There is another way: fiscal constraints. Instead of streamlining existing EU Treaties, and giving more room for majority voting, it would be better to shift the emphasis to the making of authentic fiscal rules. The paper is based on the idea that the EU is not a benevolent despot but a Leviathan; shifting the grounds of the discussion to the question of within which constitutional framework should the EU’s fiscal powers be exercised. A separation of fiscal powers, fiscal bicameralism and a sharp border between tasks of the EU and its members seems to be required. The method used cannot be empirical. There is a clear difference between our empirical knowledge of decision-making within a given framework and discussions about the framework itself. In the wake of the demise of the Constitution a model fiscal constitution for the EU budget can become an agenda-setting focal point for a new research program and future EU policy.