International investment agreements (IIAs) almost universally define their temporal validity and thus set conditions for States’ exit from these treaties. This study presents the results of the survey of language that determines the temporal validity of 2,061 bilateral investment agreements that the 55 economies participating in the OECD-hosted Freedom of Investment Roundtables have concluded with any other economy. The paper summarises in its first part past and current treaty practice in this regard: how do States design the parameters that define the temporal validity of their treaties and the duration of the obligations contained therein? How has this design evolved over time? Do different kinds of IIAs take different approaches to this matter? Have individual States developed distinct practices or policies? The second part of the paper presents key findings that result from the analysis of treaty practice in a large number of agreements. It highlights characteristics of the provisions on temporal validity employed in IIAs; emphasises the collective engagement that results from the clauses in IIAs and the consequences of country-specific practice; and suggests questions on intriguing policy choices that a large comparative study reveals.
{"title":"Temporal Validity of International Investment Agreements: A Large Sample Survey of Treaty Provisions","authors":"J. Pohl","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2366465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2366465","url":null,"abstract":"International investment agreements (IIAs) almost universally define their temporal validity and thus set conditions for States’ exit from these treaties. This study presents the results of the survey of language that determines the temporal validity of 2,061 bilateral investment agreements that the 55 economies participating in the OECD-hosted Freedom of Investment Roundtables have concluded with any other economy. The paper summarises in its first part past and current treaty practice in this regard: how do States design the parameters that define the temporal validity of their treaties and the duration of the obligations contained therein? How has this design evolved over time? Do different kinds of IIAs take different approaches to this matter? Have individual States developed distinct practices or policies? The second part of the paper presents key findings that result from the analysis of treaty practice in a large number of agreements. It highlights characteristics of the provisions on temporal validity employed in IIAs; emphasises the collective engagement that results from the clauses in IIAs and the consequences of country-specific practice; and suggests questions on intriguing policy choices that a large comparative study reveals.","PeriodicalId":166057,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global & Regional Governance (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116008989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A crucial and outstanding issue for the European economy and democracy.In March 2009, the European Commission recognized the need to put "the interests of European investors, consumers and SMEs at the centre of the financial markets reform”. The Commission therefore announced it will "ensure that the voice of European investors is much more strongly heard on all financial issues." However, three years later, the European Economic and Social Committee still reports that:"One of the reasons for the financial crisis was inadequate and ineffective regulation and supervision of the financial markets. One of the difficulties in financial regulation is how to ensure that differing and contradictory positions are given a balanced hearing. There is no effective counterweight to the legitimate representation of the financial sector's interests. Political debate primarily plays out between the legislator on one side and the financial sector concerned on the other."Despite the creation and the development of EuroFinuse since 2009 and of Finance Watch since 2011 (part 1), and despite the build-up of independent competence (part 2), the organized civil society still faces two major hurdles to become an "effective counterweight" to the financial sector in the European political debate: - resources (part 3),- and equal access (part 4) to the Public Authorities.
{"title":"The Role of Civil Society in EU Financial Regulation","authors":"Guillaume Prache","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2362785","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2362785","url":null,"abstract":"A crucial and outstanding issue for the European economy and democracy.In March 2009, the European Commission recognized the need to put \"the interests of European investors, consumers and SMEs at the centre of the financial markets reform”. The Commission therefore announced it will \"ensure that the voice of European investors is much more strongly heard on all financial issues.\" However, three years later, the European Economic and Social Committee still reports that:\"One of the reasons for the financial crisis was inadequate and ineffective regulation and supervision of the financial markets. One of the difficulties in financial regulation is how to ensure that differing and contradictory positions are given a balanced hearing. There is no effective counterweight to the legitimate representation of the financial sector's interests. Political debate primarily plays out between the legislator on one side and the financial sector concerned on the other.\"Despite the creation and the development of EuroFinuse since 2009 and of Finance Watch since 2011 (part 1), and despite the build-up of independent competence (part 2), the organized civil society still faces two major hurdles to become an \"effective counterweight\" to the financial sector in the European political debate: - resources (part 3),- and equal access (part 4) to the Public Authorities.","PeriodicalId":166057,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global & Regional Governance (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121410851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
European Integration was constructed as a primarily economic project. In its formative phase ordoliberal scholars started to promote the understanding of the ensemble of European economic freedoms togther with a system of undistorted competition as the legal framework and normative core of the EEC, i.e. as Europe’s ‘economic’ constitution. Economic and Monetary Union as institutionalized by the Maastricht Treaty were expected to complete this project. However, the whole edifice started to erode immediately after its establishment. Following the financial and the sovereign debt crises, EMU with its commitments to price stability and its focus on monetary politics is by now widely perceived as a failed construction precisely because of its reliance on inflexible rules. The European crisis management seeks to compensate these failures by regime which disregards the European order of competences, des-empowers national institutions and burdens in particular Southern Europe with austerity measures. This new mode of economic governance establishes pan-European commitments to budgetary discipline and macroeconomic balancing. The ideal of an ordering of the European economy ‘through law’ is thereby abolished while the economic and social prospects of these efforts seem gloomy and the Union’s political legitimacy is eroding.
{"title":"Law and Politics in Europe's Crisis: On the History of the Impact of an Unfortunate Configuration","authors":"C. Joerges","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2293959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2293959","url":null,"abstract":"European Integration was constructed as a primarily economic project. In its formative phase ordoliberal scholars started to promote the understanding of the ensemble of European economic freedoms togther with a system of undistorted competition as the legal framework and normative core of the EEC, i.e. as Europe’s ‘economic’ constitution. Economic and Monetary Union as institutionalized by the Maastricht Treaty were expected to complete this project. However, the whole edifice started to erode immediately after its establishment. Following the financial and the sovereign debt crises, EMU with its commitments to price stability and its focus on monetary politics is by now widely perceived as a failed construction precisely because of its reliance on inflexible rules. The European crisis management seeks to compensate these failures by regime which disregards the European order of competences, des-empowers national institutions and burdens in particular Southern Europe with austerity measures. This new mode of economic governance establishes pan-European commitments to budgetary discipline and macroeconomic balancing. The ideal of an ordering of the European economy ‘through law’ is thereby abolished while the economic and social prospects of these efforts seem gloomy and the Union’s political legitimacy is eroding.","PeriodicalId":166057,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global & Regional Governance (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125667295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We carry out a detailed computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis of the EU Decarbonisation Roadmap 2050 on a macroeconomic and on a sectoral level. Herein, we study a Reference scenario that implements existing EU policies as well as 3 unilateral and 3 global climate action scenarios. We identify global climate action with international emissions trading and the full equalisation of CO2 prices across all (EU) sectors as an economically reasonable policy option to avoid additional costs of the Decarbonisation Roadmap to a large extent. This policy option may include CDM (Clean Development Mechanism in the sense of ‘where’-flexibility) in an extended form if there are countries without emissions caps. Moreover, we identify diverse sectoral effects in terms of output, investment, emissions and international competitiveness. We conclude that the successful realisation of the EU Decarbonisation Roadmap probably requires a wise and joint consideration of technology, policy design and sectoral aspects.
{"title":"The EU Decarbonisation Roadmap 2050: What Way to Walk?","authors":"Michael Hübler, A. Löschel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2141955","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2141955","url":null,"abstract":"We carry out a detailed computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis of the EU Decarbonisation Roadmap 2050 on a macroeconomic and on a sectoral level. Herein, we study a Reference scenario that implements existing EU policies as well as 3 unilateral and 3 global climate action scenarios. We identify global climate action with international emissions trading and the full equalisation of CO2 prices across all (EU) sectors as an economically reasonable policy option to avoid additional costs of the Decarbonisation Roadmap to a large extent. This policy option may include CDM (Clean Development Mechanism in the sense of ‘where’-flexibility) in an extended form if there are countries without emissions caps. Moreover, we identify diverse sectoral effects in terms of output, investment, emissions and international competitiveness. We conclude that the successful realisation of the EU Decarbonisation Roadmap probably requires a wise and joint consideration of technology, policy design and sectoral aspects.","PeriodicalId":166057,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global & Regional Governance (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115199718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The present approach to what steps to take as a result of the rejection of the proposed European Constitution is almost guaranteed to be a very toilsome process inside the realm of partisan advocacy. Moreover the approach is almost irrelevant in terms of both explanatory content and normative potential. There is another way: fiscal constraints. Instead of streamlining existing EU Treaties, and giving more room for majority voting, it would be better to shift the emphasis to the making of authentic fiscal rules. The paper is based on the idea that the EU is not a benevolent despot but a Leviathan; shifting the grounds of the discussion to the question of within which constitutional framework should the EU’s fiscal powers be exercised. A separation of fiscal powers, fiscal bicameralism and a sharp border between tasks of the EU and its members seems to be required. The method used cannot be empirical. There is a clear difference between our empirical knowledge of decision-making within a given framework and discussions about the framework itself. In the wake of the demise of the Constitution a model fiscal constitution for the EU budget can become an agenda-setting focal point for a new research program and future EU policy.
{"title":"Fiscal Bicameralism: The Core of a EU Constitution","authors":"A. Leen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2238647","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2238647","url":null,"abstract":"The present approach to what steps to take as a result of the rejection of the proposed European Constitution is almost guaranteed to be a very toilsome process inside the realm of partisan advocacy. Moreover the approach is almost irrelevant in terms of both explanatory content and normative potential. There is another way: fiscal constraints. Instead of streamlining existing EU Treaties, and giving more room for majority voting, it would be better to shift the emphasis to the making of authentic fiscal rules. The paper is based on the idea that the EU is not a benevolent despot but a Leviathan; shifting the grounds of the discussion to the question of within which constitutional framework should the EU’s fiscal powers be exercised. A separation of fiscal powers, fiscal bicameralism and a sharp border between tasks of the EU and its members seems to be required. The method used cannot be empirical. There is a clear difference between our empirical knowledge of decision-making within a given framework and discussions about the framework itself. In the wake of the demise of the Constitution a model fiscal constitution for the EU budget can become an agenda-setting focal point for a new research program and future EU policy.","PeriodicalId":166057,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global & Regional Governance (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129260843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During tumultuous fiscal years of the past few decades, the World Bank, acting in its capacity as lender of last resort, granted unsecured loans to debt-ridden sovereigns. Instead of taking a lien over the state's assets, the World Bank protected its interests via a broadly-worded Negative Pledge Clause. This clause ensures that any lien created on any public assets as security for external debt which results in a priority for a third-party creditor equally and ratably secures all amounts payable by the borrowing state. In short, should such a lien be granted, the World Bank shares in the amounts paid out to the third party creditor, thus preventing the creditor from enjoying senior creditor status and undermining the value of any later-granted lien. Including the Negative Pledge Clause in the World Bank loan agreements helps mitigate the World Bank's risk of providing unsecured loans by ensuring that a developing nation will not give a later creditor priority over its assets. In theory, such a pledge protects both the World Bank, as a creditor, and the sovereign nation, as debtor. However, the barrier that the Negative Pledge Clause constructs around a state's ability to engage with other creditors is so formidable that the clause ends up preventing the state from attracting commercial investment for project financings. As currently drafted, the Negative Pledge Clause dissuades commercial lenders from investing in exactly the kinds of projects that might further development and enrich a nation (thus strengthening the nation's ability to pay back its debts). This is not only unfortunate for the developing countries involved, but also challenge the raison d'etre of the World Bank, a multilateral institution designed to promote development. This article proposes reforming the Negative Pledge Clause by clarifying the language of the text and the consequences of a breach in the way which narrows the breadth of the clause. This article also argues that the World Bank would better achieve its overall purpose of promoting development by including a project finance exception to the Negative Pledge Clause to attract investors to projects that help expand national infrastructure.
{"title":"Getting the World Bank Out of Development's Way: The Case for a Project Finance Exception to the World Bank Negative Pledge Clause","authors":"K. Barth","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2235308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2235308","url":null,"abstract":"During tumultuous fiscal years of the past few decades, the World Bank, acting in its capacity as lender of last resort, granted unsecured loans to debt-ridden sovereigns. Instead of taking a lien over the state's assets, the World Bank protected its interests via a broadly-worded Negative Pledge Clause. This clause ensures that any lien created on any public assets as security for external debt which results in a priority for a third-party creditor equally and ratably secures all amounts payable by the borrowing state. In short, should such a lien be granted, the World Bank shares in the amounts paid out to the third party creditor, thus preventing the creditor from enjoying senior creditor status and undermining the value of any later-granted lien. Including the Negative Pledge Clause in the World Bank loan agreements helps mitigate the World Bank's risk of providing unsecured loans by ensuring that a developing nation will not give a later creditor priority over its assets. In theory, such a pledge protects both the World Bank, as a creditor, and the sovereign nation, as debtor. However, the barrier that the Negative Pledge Clause constructs around a state's ability to engage with other creditors is so formidable that the clause ends up preventing the state from attracting commercial investment for project financings. As currently drafted, the Negative Pledge Clause dissuades commercial lenders from investing in exactly the kinds of projects that might further development and enrich a nation (thus strengthening the nation's ability to pay back its debts). This is not only unfortunate for the developing countries involved, but also challenge the raison d'etre of the World Bank, a multilateral institution designed to promote development. This article proposes reforming the Negative Pledge Clause by clarifying the language of the text and the consequences of a breach in the way which narrows the breadth of the clause. This article also argues that the World Bank would better achieve its overall purpose of promoting development by including a project finance exception to the Negative Pledge Clause to attract investors to projects that help expand national infrastructure.","PeriodicalId":166057,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global & Regional Governance (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134613401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dieses Papier untersucht Veranderungen in der Beschaftigungs- und Sozialpolitik der Europaischen Union nach der Vertiefung der wirtschaftspolitischen Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Dabei wird die These vertreten, dass die Veranderungen in der wirtschaftspolitischen Zusammenarbeit zu einer Zunahme verbindlicher Element in den weichen Koordinierungszyklen der Beschaftigungs- und Sozialpolitik gefuhrt haben. Das Papier zeichnet zwei Wege des Aushartens der Beschaftigungs- und Sozialpolitik nach. Erstens wurden neue Instrumente in die Koordinierungszyklen von Europa 2020 (Wachstumsstrategie fur das kommende Jahrzehnt) und in den Stabilitats- und Wahrungspakt eingebaut und uber den Euro-Plus-Pakt und die Uberwachung makrookonomischer Ungleichgewichte implementiert. Zweitens schafft die Integration der beiden Politikfelder Wirtschaft und Soziales Unsicherheit, welcher Koordinierungsmethode eine konkrete Politik zuzuordnen ist. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden in dem Papier zunachst die seit 2010 eingefuhrten Koordinierungselemente analysiert und auf einem Kontinuum verortet, das von verbindlicher zu weicher Koordinierung reicht. Dann wird herausgearbeitet, wo Unsicherheit uber die Angemessenheit der einen oder anderen Koordinierungsmethode besteht und wie eben diese Unsicherheiten zu einer Unterordnung der Sozial- und Beschaftigungspolitik unter die verbindlichen Uberwachungsinstrumente fuhrt. Schlieslich wird die Interaktion zwischen EU und vier Mitgliedstaaten (Deutschland, Grosbritannien, Polen & Spanien) anhand von Landerberichten und Antworten der EU-Ebene in 2009 und 2011 untersucht. Ungeachtet der Tatsache, dass unter dem Einfluss der vertieften wirtschaftspolitischen Zusammenarbeit die Prazision der weichen Steuerungsinstrumente und hybriden Koordinierungsmethoden zugenommen haben und Unsicherheit uber die angemessene Koordinierungsmethode potentiell zu einer Beurteilung der Beschaftigungs- und Sozialpolitik im Rahmen der verbindlichen Wirtschaftskoordinierung fuhrt, zeigt sich hier, dass Mitgliedstaaten immer noch grosen Spielraum bei der Erreichung der EU-Ziele in der Beschaftigungs- und Sozialpolitik haben.
{"title":"The EU's Stricter Economic Governance: A Step Towards More Binding Coordination of Social Policies?","authors":"S. Bekker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2229161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2229161","url":null,"abstract":"Dieses Papier untersucht Veranderungen in der Beschaftigungs- und Sozialpolitik der Europaischen Union nach der Vertiefung der wirtschaftspolitischen Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Dabei wird die These vertreten, dass die Veranderungen in der wirtschaftspolitischen Zusammenarbeit zu einer Zunahme verbindlicher Element in den weichen Koordinierungszyklen der Beschaftigungs- und Sozialpolitik gefuhrt haben. Das Papier zeichnet zwei Wege des Aushartens der Beschaftigungs- und Sozialpolitik nach. Erstens wurden neue Instrumente in die Koordinierungszyklen von Europa 2020 (Wachstumsstrategie fur das kommende Jahrzehnt) und in den Stabilitats- und Wahrungspakt eingebaut und uber den Euro-Plus-Pakt und die Uberwachung makrookonomischer Ungleichgewichte implementiert. Zweitens schafft die Integration der beiden Politikfelder Wirtschaft und Soziales Unsicherheit, welcher Koordinierungsmethode eine konkrete Politik zuzuordnen ist. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden in dem Papier zunachst die seit 2010 eingefuhrten Koordinierungselemente analysiert und auf einem Kontinuum verortet, das von verbindlicher zu weicher Koordinierung reicht. Dann wird herausgearbeitet, wo Unsicherheit uber die Angemessenheit der einen oder anderen Koordinierungsmethode besteht und wie eben diese Unsicherheiten zu einer Unterordnung der Sozial- und Beschaftigungspolitik unter die verbindlichen Uberwachungsinstrumente fuhrt. Schlieslich wird die Interaktion zwischen EU und vier Mitgliedstaaten (Deutschland, Grosbritannien, Polen & Spanien) anhand von Landerberichten und Antworten der EU-Ebene in 2009 und 2011 untersucht. Ungeachtet der Tatsache, dass unter dem Einfluss der vertieften wirtschaftspolitischen Zusammenarbeit die Prazision der weichen Steuerungsinstrumente und hybriden Koordinierungsmethoden zugenommen haben und Unsicherheit uber die angemessene Koordinierungsmethode potentiell zu einer Beurteilung der Beschaftigungs- und Sozialpolitik im Rahmen der verbindlichen Wirtschaftskoordinierung fuhrt, zeigt sich hier, dass Mitgliedstaaten immer noch grosen Spielraum bei der Erreichung der EU-Ziele in der Beschaftigungs- und Sozialpolitik haben.","PeriodicalId":166057,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global & Regional Governance (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131025492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-01-01DOI: 10.5089/9781475528251.001.A001
Mike Seiferling
The demand for high quality detailed public finance statistics covering a globally representative sample of countries has increased dramatically during the recent financial crisis. Due to the complexity of public finance statistics, however, such data tend to be either available in oversimplified high level aggregates and lacking in methodological transparency, or, available with a great level of detail and a unified methodological approach yet overly complicated to understand. The IMF's Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (GFSY) withdata over an almost 40 year period for almost 140 countries is a valuable database but with a complex structure requiring some specialty knowledge that most data users do not have. The IMF's Statistics Department embarked on several initiatives to improve its accessibility. The purpose of this paper is to provide a non-technical overview of the methodology and advantages of the GFSY database and discussion of how the database is improving to better meet the needs of the user community.
{"title":"Recent Improvements to the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook Database in Response to Analytical Needs","authors":"Mike Seiferling","doi":"10.5089/9781475528251.001.A001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475528251.001.A001","url":null,"abstract":"The demand for high quality detailed public finance statistics covering a globally representative sample of countries has increased dramatically during the recent financial crisis. Due to the complexity of public finance statistics, however, such data tend to be either available in oversimplified high level aggregates and lacking in methodological transparency, or, available with a great level of detail and a unified methodological approach yet overly complicated to understand. The IMF's Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (GFSY) withdata over an almost 40 year period for almost 140 countries is a valuable database but with a complex structure requiring some specialty knowledge that most data users do not have. The IMF's Statistics Department embarked on several initiatives to improve its accessibility. The purpose of this paper is to provide a non-technical overview of the methodology and advantages of the GFSY database and discussion of how the database is improving to better meet the needs of the user community.","PeriodicalId":166057,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global & Regional Governance (Topic)","volume":"2013 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128136271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yoo-Duk Kang, Kyuntae Kim, Tae Hyun Oh, Cheol-Won Lee, Hyun Jean Lee
본 연구는 유럽 재정위기의 원인을 분석하고, 이를 배경으로 유로존이 추진해온 개혁과 유로존의 향후 변화 전망을 목적으로 한다. 2010년 초 그리스의 구제금융 신청으로 시작된 유럽 재정위기는 지난 3년간 각국의 강도 높은 재정긴축과 유로존의 공동대응에도 불구하고 확대되어 왔다. 위기가 확산되면서 유로존의 공동대응은 가속화되었고 수많은 논의를 거친 대책들이 쏟아져 나왔다. 유로존의 대응은 단기적으로 금융시장을 안정시켰으나, 그 효과는 일시적인 경우가 대부분이었고 유로존 자체의 구조적인 결함으로 해체 또는 일부 해체가 불가피할 것이라는 비관론이 점차 득세하여 왔다. 유럽 재정위기는 개별 국가의 경제위기를 넘어서 유럽 통합의 근본 틀에 대한 대대적인 개혁을 요구하는 전환기적 사건으로 볼 수 있다. 이로 인해 2010년 이후 유럽경제통합의 틀을 대대적으로 개편하기 위한 대규모의 개혁조치들이 진행되고 있다. 유럽 재정위기의 원인은 개별회원국의 거시경제적 원인과 유로존 내부의 구조적 원인, 그리고 정치적 원인으로 구분하여 살펴볼 수 있다. 글로벌 금융위기에 따른 대규모의 경기부양조치는 각국의 재정건전성을 심각하게 손상시켰으나, 개별 국가 차원에서의 거버넌스 실패, 차입과 자산거품에 의존한 왜곡된 성장전략도 위기의 직접적인 원인이 되었다. 재정위기 발생 이후 금융시장은 유로존의 통합성(integrity)에 대해 신뢰를 보이지 않고 있는데, 이는 회원국 간 국채금리의 격차로 나타나고 있다. 재정정책에 대한 철저한 조율 없이 추진된 통화통합과 역내불균형에 대한 조정장치의 부재, 유럽중앙은행의 모호한 역할 등이 유로존의 구조적 문제점으로 지적된다. 정치적 원인도 경제적·구조적 원인 못지않게 중요하다. 재정위기 해결에 있어서 독일과 프랑스가 전통적인 견해 차이를 좁히지 못하고 대립한 점, 회원국 내의 냉담한 여론, EU/유로존의 복잡한 정책결정 절차는 유로존의 위기 대응이 사후적 차원에 머무를 수밖에 없는 배경이 되었다. 위기에 대한 인식을 바탕으로 운영체제 개혁을 위한 유로존의 과제는 재정규율의 강화, 역내불균형의 해소, 정책조율 체계의 확립 및 재정통합의 강화라고 판단된다. 재정규율의 강화는 독일이 주도하고 있다. 독일정부는 과도한 재정지출과 민간부문의 경쟁력 상실이 재정위기의 원인이라는 인식에 따라 무엇보다 엄격한 재정규율의 확립을 위기 해결의 우선과제로 제시하였다. 2012년 3월 25개국이 서명한 ｢신재정협약｣은 재정규율 강화를 위한 대표적 조치라 할 것이다. 그러나 재정건전성 회복을 위한 긴축조치가 경기침체를 가중시키고 있으며, 세수의 감소로 재정건전성이 오히려 악화될 가능성을 배제할 수 없다. 역내불균형은 단일통화를 사용하는 가운데, 유로존 회원국들이 서로 다른 성장모델을 추구하는 과정에서 나타난 결과로 볼 수 있다. 역내불균형의 대표적인 형태인 경상수지 격차는 유로존을 북부유럽과 남부유럽의 이중 구조로 양분하는 결과를 가져오고 있다. 경상수지 적자의 확대는 글로벌 금융위기 이후에는 국채금리의 상승과 밀접한 상관관계가 있는 것으로 나타나 재정위기의 원인이 되고 있다. 시뮬레이션 결과 재정지출의 확대가 경상수지 적자를 심화시키는 현상도 확인할 수 있어 재정위기와 경상수지 적자 간에는 밀접한 관계가 있음이 확인된다. 역내불균형 축소를 위해 EU 집행위원회는 스코어보드를 발표하여 모니터링을 강화하고 있으며, EU는 과도한 불균형이 발생하는 국가에 대해서는 제재를 위한 법적절차까지 마련하였다. 그러나 역내불균형은 주로 민간부문에서 발생하는바, 교정수단이 매우 적은 것이 현실적인 한계이다. 긴밀한 정책조율에 관한 EU/유로존 내의 논의는 오래전부터 시작되었다. 그러나 ‘보조성의 원칙’에 의거, 경제정책의 상당부분을 개별회원국 소관으로 규정하는 현 EU/유로존의 체제에서는 강제적인 정책조율은 불가능하다. 재정위기 발생 이후 보다 긴밀한 정책조율에 대해서는 공감대가 형성되고 있으나, 진전은 느린 편이다. 많은 경제학자들은 유로존이 장기적으로 존속하기 위해서는 일정 수준의 재정통합이 필요할 것으로 인식하고 있으나, 획기적인 제도개편 없이는 매우 어려운 과제로 판단된다. 지금까지 유로존의 공동 대응과정은 [재정준칙의 확립: 지출 측면의 재정동맹]→[경제 전반에 걸친 구조개혁: 경쟁력 회복]→[재정통합]의 순서로 독일주도의 암묵적 로드맵하에서 이루어져 왔다. 이 로드맵은 ‘힘겹게 헤쳐나가기(muddling through)’의 형태로 전개될 가능성이 높다. 경기침체가 가속화되면서 자국중심주의적인 성향이 극대화되고, 이로 인해 유로존 차원의 대응능력이 마비될 경우 일부 국가의 유로존 탈퇴 가능성이 현실화될 수 있다. 따라서 힘겨운 개혁의 과정에서 정치적 갈등과 불필요한 시간 소요를 최소화하는 것이 성공의 관건이다. 유럽 재정위기는 정책적 관심에 따라 다양하게 해석되었다. 유럽의 사례는 향후 복지재정수요와 관련된 논의에서 반면교사의 예로 많이 소개되었다. 한편 남부 유럽보다 복지지출 비중이 더 높은 북부유럽의 재정이 건전한 점을 지적하며, 남유럽의 위기는 복지와 성장 간의 선순환 관계를 구축하는 데 실패한 데서 비롯됐다는 견해도 있다. 위기의 원인을 어떤 각도에서 보든 유럽 재정위기를 통해 도출할 수 있는 정책적 시사점은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 향후 복지정책의 설계 시 재정여건을 감안해야 한다. 복지확충은 세율인상을 전제로 진행해야 할 필요가 있으며, 국가모델(큰 정부 vs. 작은 정부)에 대한 인식의 전환에서부터 논의를 시작해야 한다. 둘째, 스페인과 아일랜드의 사례에서 볼 수 있듯이 과도한 민간채무의 증가에 대해 경계해야 한다. 경제위기가 고조될수록 시장은 안전자산을 선호하는 현상을 보이며, 경제 건전성에 대해 보다 엄격한 평가를 하는 경향이 있다. 특히 국가신용도 판단 시 민간채무의 수준에 보다 민감한 반응을 보이므로 이에 대한 유의가 필요하다. 셋째, 수출과 내수의 적절한 조화를 추구해야 한다. 한국경제는 제조업 중심, 수출주도형 성장모델에 가깝다고 볼 수 있으나, 이 성장모델의 유지를 위해서는 제조업의 경쟁력 유지에 각별한 주의를 기울여야 한다. 한편 제조업·수출 중심 경제는 자칫 내수기반이
{"title":"유럽 재정위기의 원인과 유로존의 개혁과제 (Causes of the European Debt Crisis and Reform of the European Governance)","authors":"Yoo-Duk Kang, Kyuntae Kim, Tae Hyun Oh, Cheol-Won Lee, Hyun Jean Lee","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2319780","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2319780","url":null,"abstract":"본 연구는 유럽 재정위기의 원인을 분석하고, 이를 배경으로 유로존이 추진해온 개혁과 유로존의 향후 변화 전망을 목적으로 한다. 2010년 초 그리스의 구제금융 신청으로 시작된 유럽 재정위기는 지난 3년간 각국의 강도 높은 재정긴축과 유로존의 공동대응에도 불구하고 확대되어 왔다. 위기가 확산되면서 유로존의 공동대응은 가속화되었고 수많은 논의를 거친 대책들이 쏟아져 나왔다. 유로존의 대응은 단기적으로 금융시장을 안정시켰으나, 그 효과는 일시적인 경우가 대부분이었고 유로존 자체의 구조적인 결함으로 해체 또는 일부 해체가 불가피할 것이라는 비관론이 점차 득세하여 왔다. 유럽 재정위기는 개별 국가의 경제위기를 넘어서 유럽 통합의 근본 틀에 대한 대대적인 개혁을 요구하는 전환기적 사건으로 볼 수 있다. 이로 인해 2010년 이후 유럽경제통합의 틀을 대대적으로 개편하기 위한 대규모의 개혁조치들이 진행되고 있다. 유럽 재정위기의 원인은 개별회원국의 거시경제적 원인과 유로존 내부의 구조적 원인, 그리고 정치적 원인으로 구분하여 살펴볼 수 있다. 글로벌 금융위기에 따른 대규모의 경기부양조치는 각국의 재정건전성을 심각하게 손상시켰으나, 개별 국가 차원에서의 거버넌스 실패, 차입과 자산거품에 의존한 왜곡된 성장전략도 위기의 직접적인 원인이 되었다. 재정위기 발생 이후 금융시장은 유로존의 통합성(integrity)에 대해 신뢰를 보이지 않고 있는데, 이는 회원국 간 국채금리의 격차로 나타나고 있다. 재정정책에 대한 철저한 조율 없이 추진된 통화통합과 역내불균형에 대한 조정장치의 부재, 유럽중앙은행의 모호한 역할 등이 유로존의 구조적 문제점으로 지적된다. 정치적 원인도 경제적·구조적 원인 못지않게 중요하다. 재정위기 해결에 있어서 독일과 프랑스가 전통적인 견해 차이를 좁히지 못하고 대립한 점, 회원국 내의 냉담한 여론, EU/유로존의 복잡한 정책결정 절차는 유로존의 위기 대응이 사후적 차원에 머무를 수밖에 없는 배경이 되었다. 위기에 대한 인식을 바탕으로 운영체제 개혁을 위한 유로존의 과제는 재정규율의 강화, 역내불균형의 해소, 정책조율 체계의 확립 및 재정통합의 강화라고 판단된다. 재정규율의 강화는 독일이 주도하고 있다. 독일정부는 과도한 재정지출과 민간부문의 경쟁력 상실이 재정위기의 원인이라는 인식에 따라 무엇보다 엄격한 재정규율의 확립을 위기 해결의 우선과제로 제시하였다. 2012년 3월 25개국이 서명한 ｢신재정협약｣은 재정규율 강화를 위한 대표적 조치라 할 것이다. 그러나 재정건전성 회복을 위한 긴축조치가 경기침체를 가중시키고 있으며, 세수의 감소로 재정건전성이 오히려 악화될 가능성을 배제할 수 없다. 역내불균형은 단일통화를 사용하는 가운데, 유로존 회원국들이 서로 다른 성장모델을 추구하는 과정에서 나타난 결과로 볼 수 있다. 역내불균형의 대표적인 형태인 경상수지 격차는 유로존을 북부유럽과 남부유럽의 이중 구조로 양분하는 결과를 가져오고 있다. 경상수지 적자의 확대는 글로벌 금융위기 이후에는 국채금리의 상승과 밀접한 상관관계가 있는 것으로 나타나 재정위기의 원인이 되고 있다. 시뮬레이션 결과 재정지출의 확대가 경상수지 적자를 심화시키는 현상도 확인할 수 있어 재정위기와 경상수지 적자 간에는 밀접한 관계가 있음이 확인된다. 역내불균형 축소를 위해 EU 집행위원회는 스코어보드를 발표하여 모니터링을 강화하고 있으며, EU는 과도한 불균형이 발생하는 국가에 대해서는 제재를 위한 법적절차까지 마련하였다. 그러나 역내불균형은 주로 민간부문에서 발생하는바, 교정수단이 매우 적은 것이 현실적인 한계이다. 긴밀한 정책조율에 관한 EU/유로존 내의 논의는 오래전부터 시작되었다. 그러나 ‘보조성의 원칙’에 의거, 경제정책의 상당부분을 개별회원국 소관으로 규정하는 현 EU/유로존의 체제에서는 강제적인 정책조율은 불가능하다. 재정위기 발생 이후 보다 긴밀한 정책조율에 대해서는 공감대가 형성되고 있으나, 진전은 느린 편이다. 많은 경제학자들은 유로존이 장기적으로 존속하기 위해서는 일정 수준의 재정통합이 필요할 것으로 인식하고 있으나, 획기적인 제도개편 없이는 매우 어려운 과제로 판단된다. 지금까지 유로존의 공동 대응과정은 [재정준칙의 확립: 지출 측면의 재정동맹]→[경제 전반에 걸친 구조개혁: 경쟁력 회복]→[재정통합]의 순서로 독일주도의 암묵적 로드맵하에서 이루어져 왔다. 이 로드맵은 ‘힘겹게 헤쳐나가기(muddling through)’의 형태로 전개될 가능성이 높다. 경기침체가 가속화되면서 자국중심주의적인 성향이 극대화되고, 이로 인해 유로존 차원의 대응능력이 마비될 경우 일부 국가의 유로존 탈퇴 가능성이 현실화될 수 있다. 따라서 힘겨운 개혁의 과정에서 정치적 갈등과 불필요한 시간 소요를 최소화하는 것이 성공의 관건이다. 유럽 재정위기는 정책적 관심에 따라 다양하게 해석되었다. 유럽의 사례는 향후 복지재정수요와 관련된 논의에서 반면교사의 예로 많이 소개되었다. 한편 남부 유럽보다 복지지출 비중이 더 높은 북부유럽의 재정이 건전한 점을 지적하며, 남유럽의 위기는 복지와 성장 간의 선순환 관계를 구축하는 데 실패한 데서 비롯됐다는 견해도 있다. 위기의 원인을 어떤 각도에서 보든 유럽 재정위기를 통해 도출할 수 있는 정책적 시사점은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 향후 복지정책의 설계 시 재정여건을 감안해야 한다. 복지확충은 세율인상을 전제로 진행해야 할 필요가 있으며, 국가모델(큰 정부 vs. 작은 정부)에 대한 인식의 전환에서부터 논의를 시작해야 한다. 둘째, 스페인과 아일랜드의 사례에서 볼 수 있듯이 과도한 민간채무의 증가에 대해 경계해야 한다. 경제위기가 고조될수록 시장은 안전자산을 선호하는 현상을 보이며, 경제 건전성에 대해 보다 엄격한 평가를 하는 경향이 있다. 특히 국가신용도 판단 시 민간채무의 수준에 보다 민감한 반응을 보이므로 이에 대한 유의가 필요하다. 셋째, 수출과 내수의 적절한 조화를 추구해야 한다. 한국경제는 제조업 중심, 수출주도형 성장모델에 가깝다고 볼 수 있으나, 이 성장모델의 유지를 위해서는 제조업의 경쟁력 유지에 각별한 주의를 기울여야 한다. 한편 제조업·수출 중심 경제는 자칫 내수기반이","PeriodicalId":166057,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global & Regional Governance (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130716395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-09-17DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701170.003.0002
V. Chetail
The present chapter questions the multifaceted interactions between international refugee law and human rights law. It argues that, contrary to prevailing professional wisdom, the Geneva Convention is not a human rights treaty in the orthodox sense, for both historical and legal reasons. However, human rights law has radically informed and transformed the distinctive tenets of the Geneva Convention to such an extent that the normative frame of forced migration has been displaced from refugee law to human rights law. As a result of this systemic evolution, the terms of the debate should be inversed: human rights law is the primary source of refugee protection, while the Geneva Convention is bound to play a complementary and secondary role. This assertion is grounded on a comparative assessment of refugee law and human rights law. This normative inquiry into their respective scope and content is centred on the three major pillars of the refugee protection regime, namely (1) the access to international protection (primarily determined by the refugee definition and the principle of non-refoulement), (2) the content of international protection (as defined by the refugee status and reinforced by human rights) and (3) its implementation scheme at both the domestic and international levels.
{"title":"Are Refugee Rights Human Rights? An Unorthodox Questioning of the Relations between Refugee Law and Human Rights Law","authors":"V. Chetail","doi":"10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701170.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701170.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"The present chapter questions the multifaceted interactions between international refugee law and human rights law. It argues that, contrary to prevailing professional wisdom, the Geneva Convention is not a human rights treaty in the orthodox sense, for both historical and legal reasons. However, human rights law has radically informed and transformed the distinctive tenets of the Geneva Convention to such an extent that the normative frame of forced migration has been displaced from refugee law to human rights law. As a result of this systemic evolution, the terms of the debate should be inversed: human rights law is the primary source of refugee protection, while the Geneva Convention is bound to play a complementary and secondary role. This assertion is grounded on a comparative assessment of refugee law and human rights law. This normative inquiry into their respective scope and content is centred on the three major pillars of the refugee protection regime, namely (1) the access to international protection (primarily determined by the refugee definition and the principle of non-refoulement), (2) the content of international protection (as defined by the refugee status and reinforced by human rights) and (3) its implementation scheme at both the domestic and international levels.","PeriodicalId":166057,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global & Regional Governance (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125693634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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