Achieving Economic and Environmental Sustainability: Minimum Transport Quantity, Contracts, and Emissions Regulation

Dong Li, Chuanwen Dong, S. Benjaafar
{"title":"Achieving Economic and Environmental Sustainability: Minimum Transport Quantity, Contracts, and Emissions Regulation","authors":"Dong Li, Chuanwen Dong, S. Benjaafar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3652728","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Problem Definition: We study the strategic interactions between a supplier and a retailer under demand uncertainty when the supplier has two options for how to ship a product: (i) road transport, which is expensive, high-emission and flexible, and (ii) rail transport, which is cheap, green, and is constrained by a minimum transport quantity (MTQ). \n \nAcademic / Practical Relevance: Rail transport has been regarded as one of the most practical ways to increase supply chain sustainability. However, the volume shifted from road to rail has remained modest during the last decades. One of the reasons is that rail transport lacks flexibility in its delivery quantity and often requires an MTQ. \n \nMethodology: The supplier and the policymaker prefer rail transport because of the advantages of low cost and low emission. However, the shipment quantity, which is determined by the retailer, may not reach the MTQ. The supplier and the policymaker can design incentives (contracts and emission tax) to encourage the use of rail transport. In this work, we build a game-theoretic model for this setting and investigate the impact of the MTQ on the economic and environmental performance of the supply chain and the effect of a tax on emissions. \n \nResults: We find that, although MTQ is operationally constraining and can lead to overproduction, it can be turned into a beneficial factor through proper decisions, which would lead to several merits as follows. (1) The MTQ can significantly improve the efficiency of simple supply chain contracts (e.g., price-only contracts). (2) The MTQ does not hurt the efficiency of coordinating contracts (e.g., buy-back contracts) and can increase the supplier’s Pareto-optimal profit. (3) The MTQ can enable coordinating contracts to achieve a higher supply chain profit and fewer total emissions simultaneously, which is not possible without the MTQ. Moreover, we show that, although it can lead to fewer total emissions, an emission tax is more likely to be ineffective in encouraging the use of the green transport mode when firms use coordinating contracts compared to price-only contracts. \n \nManagerial Implications: We provide suggestions to firms on how to make optimal decisions and make the best use of different transport modes when dealing with demand risk. Also, we provide suggestions to policymakers on how to design the proper emission tax to promote green logistics.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3652728","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

Problem Definition: We study the strategic interactions between a supplier and a retailer under demand uncertainty when the supplier has two options for how to ship a product: (i) road transport, which is expensive, high-emission and flexible, and (ii) rail transport, which is cheap, green, and is constrained by a minimum transport quantity (MTQ). Academic / Practical Relevance: Rail transport has been regarded as one of the most practical ways to increase supply chain sustainability. However, the volume shifted from road to rail has remained modest during the last decades. One of the reasons is that rail transport lacks flexibility in its delivery quantity and often requires an MTQ. Methodology: The supplier and the policymaker prefer rail transport because of the advantages of low cost and low emission. However, the shipment quantity, which is determined by the retailer, may not reach the MTQ. The supplier and the policymaker can design incentives (contracts and emission tax) to encourage the use of rail transport. In this work, we build a game-theoretic model for this setting and investigate the impact of the MTQ on the economic and environmental performance of the supply chain and the effect of a tax on emissions. Results: We find that, although MTQ is operationally constraining and can lead to overproduction, it can be turned into a beneficial factor through proper decisions, which would lead to several merits as follows. (1) The MTQ can significantly improve the efficiency of simple supply chain contracts (e.g., price-only contracts). (2) The MTQ does not hurt the efficiency of coordinating contracts (e.g., buy-back contracts) and can increase the supplier’s Pareto-optimal profit. (3) The MTQ can enable coordinating contracts to achieve a higher supply chain profit and fewer total emissions simultaneously, which is not possible without the MTQ. Moreover, we show that, although it can lead to fewer total emissions, an emission tax is more likely to be ineffective in encouraging the use of the green transport mode when firms use coordinating contracts compared to price-only contracts. Managerial Implications: We provide suggestions to firms on how to make optimal decisions and make the best use of different transport modes when dealing with demand risk. Also, we provide suggestions to policymakers on how to design the proper emission tax to promote green logistics.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
实现经济和环境可持续性:最低运输量、合同和排放法规
问题定义:我们研究了需求不确定性下供应商和零售商之间的战略互动,当供应商有两种运输方式:(i)昂贵、高排放和灵活的公路运输,以及(ii)廉价、绿色、受最小运输量(MTQ)约束的铁路运输。学术/实际意义:铁路运输被认为是提高供应链可持续性的最实际方法之一。然而,在过去的几十年里,从公路转向铁路的数量仍然不大。其中一个原因是铁路运输在交货数量上缺乏灵活性,通常需要一个MTQ。研究方法:铁路运输具有低成本和低排放的优势,供应商和政策制定者都倾向于铁路运输。但是,由零售商决定的出货数量可能达不到MTQ。供应商和政策制定者可以设计激励措施(合同和排放税)来鼓励使用铁路运输。在这项工作中,我们为此建立了一个博弈论模型,并研究了MTQ对供应链经济和环境绩效的影响以及排放税的影响。结果:我们发现,虽然MTQ是操作上的约束,可能导致生产过剩,但通过适当的决策,它可以变成一个有利的因素,这将导致以下几点优点。(1) MTQ可以显著提高简单供应链合同(如纯价格合同)的效率。(2) MTQ不影响协调契约(如回购契约)的效率,并能提高供应商的帕累托最优利润。(3) MTQ可以使协调合同同时获得更高的供应链利润和更少的总排放量,这是没有MTQ无法实现的。此外,我们表明,虽然排放税可以减少总排放量,但与价格合同相比,当企业使用协调合同时,排放税在鼓励使用绿色运输方式方面更可能无效。管理启示:我们为企业在应对需求风险时如何做出最佳决策和充分利用不同的运输方式提供建议。此外,本文还就如何设计合理的排放税以促进绿色物流提出了政策建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Expected Returns Swings and Roundabouts: How Multitasking Local Officials Respond to Environmental Regulation Achieving Economic and Environmental Sustainability: Minimum Transport Quantity, Contracts, and Emissions Regulation Markets for Goods with Externalities What about Private Options?
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1