We examine how company-level greenhouse gas emissions have been related to company financials as well as the expected returns of the companies’ stocks and bonds from 2009 to 2018. Examining the US, developed ex US, and emerging markets, we do not find emission intensity, emission level, or change in emission level to provide additional information about future profitability beyond what is contained in current profitability. In addition, we do not detect a reliable empirical relation between these emission metrics and average stock returns. Similarly, our analysis of US corporate bonds finds no compelling empirical evidence linking the issuers’ emission metrics to average bond returns. While a growing demand for investing in securities of companies with lower emissions should push their prices up and their expected returns down, the lack of strong empirical evidence of such an effect could be due to small changes in demand over the time period examined or noise in the security returns realized over a relatively short sample period.
{"title":"Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Expected Returns","authors":"Wei Dai, Philipp Meyer-Brauns","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3714874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3714874","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how company-level greenhouse gas emissions have been related to company financials as well as the expected returns of the companies’ stocks and bonds from 2009 to 2018. Examining the US, developed ex US, and emerging markets, we do not find emission intensity, emission level, or change in emission level to provide additional information about future profitability beyond what is contained in current profitability. In addition, we do not detect a reliable empirical relation between these emission metrics and average stock returns. Similarly, our analysis of US corporate bonds finds no compelling empirical evidence linking the issuers’ emission metrics to average bond returns. While a growing demand for investing in securities of companies with lower emissions should push their prices up and their expected returns down, the lack of strong empirical evidence of such an effect could be due to small changes in demand over the time period examined or noise in the security returns realized over a relatively short sample period.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133825939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We exploit how local officials respond to environmental regulation as economic growth remains the top priority in China. Chinese central government implemented a strict environmental regulation on both air and water pollution since 2006. However, water pollution control is only valid for some riverside cities, not like the commonly applied air pollution control. We find that the additional water pollution control crowds out the effort of local officials on air pollution control and damages the health of residents in riverside cities.
{"title":"Swings and Roundabouts: How Multitasking Local Officials Respond to Environmental Regulation","authors":"Chuanyong Zhang, Li Zhang, Daxuan Zhao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3683575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3683575","url":null,"abstract":"We exploit how local officials respond to environmental regulation as economic growth remains the top priority in China. Chinese central government implemented a strict environmental regulation on both air and water pollution since 2006. However, water pollution control is only valid for some riverside cities, not like the commonly applied air pollution control. We find that the additional water pollution control crowds out the effort of local officials on air pollution control and damages the health of residents in riverside cities.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129625721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Problem Definition: We study the strategic interactions between a supplier and a retailer under demand uncertainty when the supplier has two options for how to ship a product: (i) road transport, which is expensive, high-emission and flexible, and (ii) rail transport, which is cheap, green, and is constrained by a minimum transport quantity (MTQ). Academic / Practical Relevance: Rail transport has been regarded as one of the most practical ways to increase supply chain sustainability. However, the volume shifted from road to rail has remained modest during the last decades. One of the reasons is that rail transport lacks flexibility in its delivery quantity and often requires an MTQ. Methodology: The supplier and the policymaker prefer rail transport because of the advantages of low cost and low emission. However, the shipment quantity, which is determined by the retailer, may not reach the MTQ. The supplier and the policymaker can design incentives (contracts and emission tax) to encourage the use of rail transport. In this work, we build a game-theoretic model for this setting and investigate the impact of the MTQ on the economic and environmental performance of the supply chain and the effect of a tax on emissions. Results: We find that, although MTQ is operationally constraining and can lead to overproduction, it can be turned into a beneficial factor through proper decisions, which would lead to several merits as follows. (1) The MTQ can significantly improve the efficiency of simple supply chain contracts (e.g., price-only contracts). (2) The MTQ does not hurt the efficiency of coordinating contracts (e.g., buy-back contracts) and can increase the supplier’s Pareto-optimal profit. (3) The MTQ can enable coordinating contracts to achieve a higher supply chain profit and fewer total emissions simultaneously, which is not possible without the MTQ. Moreover, we show that, although it can lead to fewer total emissions, an emission tax is more likely to be ineffective in encouraging the use of the green transport mode when firms use coordinating contracts compared to price-only contracts. Managerial Implications: We provide suggestions to firms on how to make optimal decisions and make the best use of different transport modes when dealing with demand risk. Also, we provide suggestions to policymakers on how to design the proper emission tax to promote green logistics.
{"title":"Achieving Economic and Environmental Sustainability: Minimum Transport Quantity, Contracts, and Emissions Regulation","authors":"Dong Li, Chuanwen Dong, S. Benjaafar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3652728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3652728","url":null,"abstract":"Problem Definition: We study the strategic interactions between a supplier and a retailer under demand uncertainty when the supplier has two options for how to ship a product: (i) road transport, which is expensive, high-emission and flexible, and (ii) rail transport, which is cheap, green, and is constrained by a minimum transport quantity (MTQ). \u0000 \u0000Academic / Practical Relevance: Rail transport has been regarded as one of the most practical ways to increase supply chain sustainability. However, the volume shifted from road to rail has remained modest during the last decades. One of the reasons is that rail transport lacks flexibility in its delivery quantity and often requires an MTQ. \u0000 \u0000Methodology: The supplier and the policymaker prefer rail transport because of the advantages of low cost and low emission. However, the shipment quantity, which is determined by the retailer, may not reach the MTQ. The supplier and the policymaker can design incentives (contracts and emission tax) to encourage the use of rail transport. In this work, we build a game-theoretic model for this setting and investigate the impact of the MTQ on the economic and environmental performance of the supply chain and the effect of a tax on emissions. \u0000 \u0000Results: We find that, although MTQ is operationally constraining and can lead to overproduction, it can be turned into a beneficial factor through proper decisions, which would lead to several merits as follows. (1) The MTQ can significantly improve the efficiency of simple supply chain contracts (e.g., price-only contracts). (2) The MTQ does not hurt the efficiency of coordinating contracts (e.g., buy-back contracts) and can increase the supplier’s Pareto-optimal profit. (3) The MTQ can enable coordinating contracts to achieve a higher supply chain profit and fewer total emissions simultaneously, which is not possible without the MTQ. Moreover, we show that, although it can lead to fewer total emissions, an emission tax is more likely to be ineffective in encouraging the use of the green transport mode when firms use coordinating contracts compared to price-only contracts. \u0000 \u0000Managerial Implications: We provide suggestions to firms on how to make optimal decisions and make the best use of different transport modes when dealing with demand risk. Also, we provide suggestions to policymakers on how to design the proper emission tax to promote green logistics.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129419012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I consider the welfare and profit maximization problems in markets with externalities. I show that when externalities depend generally on allocation, a Pigouvian tax is often suboptimal. Instead, the optimal mechanism has a simple form: a finite menu of rationing options with corresponding prices. I derive sufficient conditions for a single price to be optimal. I show that a monopolist may ration less relative to a social planner when externalities are present, in contrast to the standard intuition that non-competitive pricing is indicative of market power. My characterization of optimal mechanisms uses a new methodological tool—the constrained maximum principle—which leverages the combined mathematical theorems of Bauer (1958) and Szapiel (1975). This tool generalizes the concavification technique of Aumann and Maschler (1995) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), and has broad applications in economics.
我考虑具有外部性的市场中的福利和利润最大化问题。我表明，当外部性通常取决于分配时，庇古税通常是次优的。相反，最优机制有一种简单的形式:限量配给选项的有限菜单和相应的价格。我导出了单个价格为最优的充分条件。我表明，当外部性存在时，垄断者可能会比社会计划者配给更少，这与非竞争性定价表明市场力量的标准直觉相反。我对最优机制的描述使用了一种新的方法工具——约束最大原理——它利用了Bauer(1958)和Szapiel(1975)的组合数学定理。该工具概括了Aumann and Maschler(1995)和Kamenica and Gentzkow(2011)的凹化技术，在经济学中有着广泛的应用。
{"title":"Markets for Goods with Externalities","authors":"Zi Yang Kang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3586050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3586050","url":null,"abstract":"I consider the welfare and profit maximization problems in markets with externalities. I show that when externalities depend generally on allocation, a Pigouvian tax is often suboptimal. Instead, the optimal mechanism has a simple form: a finite menu of rationing options with corresponding prices. I derive sufficient conditions for a single price to be optimal. I show that a monopolist may ration less relative to a social planner when externalities are present, in contrast to the standard intuition that non-competitive pricing is indicative of market power. My characterization of optimal mechanisms uses a new methodological tool—the constrained maximum principle—which leverages the combined mathematical theorems of Bauer (1958) and Szapiel (1975). This tool generalizes the concavification technique of Aumann and Maschler (1995) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), and has broad applications in economics.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127306733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is considerable enthusiasm today for public options, particularly in the health care and banking sectors. A compromise between entirely private commercial provision and wholly bureaucratic, tax-and-transfer government provision, public options are designed to offer citizen-consumers greater choice and protection. In blending (rather than choosing between) market ordering and state welfare, government agencies experimenting with public options are stepping out of their sovereign lane, forgoing legislative and regulatory tools in favor of commercial ones. Plenty of thoughtful work on public options already exists. For that reason, this Essay turns its attention to the converse phenomenon—namely, private options. Just as public options involve governments using commercial—not sovereign—pathways to remedy market failures, private options involve firms (or groups of employees) adopting sovereign—not commercial—postures to remedy government failures. Private, sovereign-like interventions refer to one or more of the following: private actors (1) utilizing democratic pathways and deliberative procedures in furtherance of some public policy; (2) taking on substantive responsibilities that modern liberal democracies are no longer willing or able to direct or fund; or (3) providing principally for the general welfare in ways that suggest they may be voluntarily internalizing externalities, at some profit loss or legal risk, and reducing rather than exploiting power and information asymmetries. Private options of this quasi-sovereign variety include such things as Facebook’s proposed digital currency and its self-styled supreme court tasked with rendering adjudicatory decisions as to user and advertiser content. They also include Apple and Google’s planned stewardship over what are in many respects twenty-first century reboots of old-school company towns. We may even look beyond the C-suite and consider workforces that are fashioning their own private options, and thus functioning as commercial analogs to the body politic. Specifically, worker strikes over their companies’ participation in politically and legally questionable government programs may likewise constitute private options. These workers are not protesting to augment their own wages and benefits. To the contrary, they are risking their own financial security to stand in for the American electorate when that electorate is (for structural reasons) unable to democratically influence U.S. immigration or defense policy. This Essay drills down on private options, identifying their defining characteristics, explaining how they respond to today’s serious government failures, and contextualizing their role within the larger ecosystem of government and market institutions and actors.
{"title":"What about Private Options?","authors":"Jon D. Michaels","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3582415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3582415","url":null,"abstract":"There is considerable enthusiasm today for public options, particularly in the health care and banking sectors. A compromise between entirely private commercial provision and wholly bureaucratic, tax-and-transfer government provision, public options are designed to offer citizen-consumers greater choice and protection. In blending (rather than choosing between) market ordering and state welfare, government agencies experimenting with public options are stepping out of their sovereign lane, forgoing legislative and regulatory tools in favor of commercial ones. \u0000 \u0000Plenty of thoughtful work on public options already exists. For that reason, this Essay turns its attention to the converse phenomenon—namely, private options. Just as public options involve governments using commercial—not sovereign—pathways to remedy market failures, private options involve firms (or groups of employees) adopting sovereign—not commercial—postures to remedy government failures. \u0000 \u0000Private, sovereign-like interventions refer to one or more of the following: private actors (1) utilizing democratic pathways and deliberative procedures in furtherance of some public policy; (2) taking on substantive responsibilities that modern liberal democracies are no longer willing or able to direct or fund; or (3) providing principally for the general welfare in ways that suggest they may be voluntarily internalizing externalities, at some profit loss or legal risk, and reducing rather than exploiting power and information asymmetries. \u0000 \u0000Private options of this quasi-sovereign variety include such things as Facebook’s proposed digital currency and its self-styled supreme court tasked with rendering adjudicatory decisions as to user and advertiser content. They also include Apple and Google’s planned stewardship over what are in many respects twenty-first century reboots of old-school company towns. We may even look beyond the C-suite and consider workforces that are fashioning their own private options, and thus functioning as commercial analogs to the body politic. Specifically, worker strikes over their companies’ participation in politically and legally questionable government programs may likewise constitute private options. These workers are not protesting to augment their own wages and benefits. To the contrary, they are risking their own financial security to stand in for the American electorate when that electorate is (for structural reasons) unable to democratically influence U.S. immigration or defense policy. \u0000 \u0000This Essay drills down on private options, identifying their defining characteristics, explaining how they respond to today’s serious government failures, and contextualizing their role within the larger ecosystem of government and market institutions and actors.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114146337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Politicians and international organisations advocate for increased regulation and government control of industry in order to handle climate change and reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions. However, it remains an open question how economic freedom is associated with environmental damage and whether deregulation is harmful to the environment or incentivises the use of green technology. On one hand, more government control and regulation may force firms and individuals to reduce their emissions. On the other hand, more economic freedom is likely to enable innovation and the adoption of green technological development. In this paper, I therefore combine data on growth in greenhouse gas emissions and GDP per capita with the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World indices in order to test if economic freedom affects emissions. I do so in the context of estimating a standard Environmental Kuznets Curve in which economic freedom can both reduce overall levels as well as shift the shape of the curve. The results suggest that economic freedom reduces greenhouse gas emissions but also shifts the top point of the Kuznets Curve to the left. Part of this effect may be due to the effect of economic freedom on the adoption of renewable energy.
{"title":"Economic Freedom and the CO2 Kuznets Curve","authors":"C. Bjørnskov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3508271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3508271","url":null,"abstract":"Politicians and international organisations advocate for increased regulation and government control of industry in order to handle climate change and reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions. However, it remains an open question how economic freedom is associated with environmental damage and whether deregulation is harmful to the environment or incentivises the use of green technology. On one hand, more government control and regulation may force firms and individuals to reduce their emissions. On the other hand, more economic freedom is likely to enable innovation and the adoption of green technological development. In this paper, I therefore combine data on growth in greenhouse gas emissions and GDP per capita with the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World indices in order to test if economic freedom affects emissions. I do so in the context of estimating a standard Environmental Kuznets Curve in which economic freedom can both reduce overall levels as well as shift the shape of the curve. The results suggest that economic freedom reduces greenhouse gas emissions but also shifts the top point of the Kuznets Curve to the left. Part of this effect may be due to the effect of economic freedom on the adoption of renewable energy.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125390266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
German Abstract: Gegenwartig sind die verschiedenen Energietrager in Deutschland unterschiedlich stark mit Abgaben und Umlagen belastet. Um die energie- und klimapolitischen Ziele der Bundesregierung zu erreichen, mussen fossile Heiz- und Kraftstoffe starker bepreist werden (Kemfert et al. 2019; Dertinger und Schill 2019, SRU 2019). Zugleich herrscht in der energiepolitischen Debatte Uneinigkeit uber die die Ausgestaltung einer CO2-Bepreisung. Eine Moglichkeit besteht darin, den EU-Emissionshandels (EUETS) auf die bislang nicht abgedeckten Sektoren Verkehr und Warme europaweit, fur eine Gruppe von EU-Mitgliedstaaten oder national auszuweiten. Eine weitere Option ist ein separates nationales Emissionshandelssystem fur diese Sektoren einzufuhren und eine dritte die Besteuerung zu reformieren, indem eine CO2-basierte Komponente in der Energiesteuer eingefuhrt wird. Der Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (SVR) empfiehlt, den EU-ETS europaweit bis zum Jahr 2030 auf die Sektoren Verkehr und Gebaude auszuweiten sowie einen nationalen Emissionshandel oder eine CO2-Steuer als Ubergangslosung zu etablieren (SVR 2019). Auch der Wissenschaftliche Beirat des Bundesministeriums fur Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi) spricht sich dafur aus, den Zertifikatehandel auszuweiten: Die Preiskorridore fur die verschiedenen Sektoren sollen sich zunachst unterscheiden und mittelfristig in einem einheitlichen europaischen Emissionsmarkt zusammengefuhrt werden (BMWi 2019). Mit folgendem Beitrag werden unterschiedliche Optionen fur eine CO2-Bepreisung beschrieben und bewertet. Dabei werden neben der okonomischen Perspektive (statische und dynamische Effizienz sowie okologische Effektivitat) auch die juristische und politische Durchsetzbarkeit berucksichtigt. English Abstract: At present, the different energy sources in Germany are burdened with varying levels of taxes and levies. In order to achieve the energy and climate policy targets of the Federal Government, fossil fuels must be priced more strongly (Kemfert et al. 2019; Dertinger and Schill 2019, SRU 2019). At the same time, there is disagreement in the policy debate about the design of a carbon pricing system. One possibility is to extend the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to the transport and heating sectors across the whole European Union (EU), for a group of EU member states or on a national level. Another option is to introduce a separate national emissions trading system for these sectors and a third to reform taxation by introducing a carbon-based component in the energy tax. The German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung - SVR) recommends to extend the EU ETS to the transport and heating sectors Europe-wide by 2030, and to establish a national emissions trading scheme or a carbon tax as a transitional solution (SVR 2019). The Board of Academic Advisors of the Federal Ministry for Eco
德国不同的航空公司面对相同的税费和损失。要想实现联邦政府在能源和气候政策上的目标，就必须大力推广化石燃料和燃料的价格(已推荐自2019年以来)。Dertinger和schll 2019, SRU 2019)。与此同时，能源政策争论中存在着不同意见，如设计合理的碳定价。有一种方法就是把欧盟成员国和国家之间至今所不属于的其他领域和温暖的欧洲各国扩大欧盟贸易。另外一种选择是制定国家对这些部门排放权交易计划，第三项选择是通过在能源税中引入以碳为基础的部分来改革税收。宏观经济评估专门知识委员会(sgr)建议，到2030年扩大全欧洲范围的交通和不动产行业，建立一个全国性的排放交易或碳排放税作为“走运”方案(车主2019)。联邦经济和能源部门的科学委员会(bwi)也建议强化破坏协议的贸易:各种部门的价格壁垒应该有所不同，并在欧洲单一的排放市场内中期形成(bwi 2019)。以下文章描述并评估了碳定价的不同选择。它包括静态和动态效率和玄机效应，以及法律和政治效力。英国抽象:在德国，使用不同的能源储备《德国联邦政府的能源和气候政策目标》不容置疑口渴2019,SRU 2019)。从某个时候开始，你知道在“政策审核”中车子的设计失败了欧洲联盟贸易代表一个国家层面的欧盟成员集团在运输和通风方面做出贡献。另外一个选项是根据能源低碳创建一个单独的国家排放系统和三次根据碳而建立的能源税。德国队Sachverstandigenrat (Council of Economic Experts)送回总体经济SVR) recommends《债务欧盟一个《运输和heating sectors Europe-wide 2030年赞助,and to establish a national emissions scheme打过交道到碳税运营过渡行政法~ 2019答案(SVR) .联邦经济事务与能源委员会(b伦i)——全然不同于另一种担忧:为不同的经济政策和发行准备比较直接的理由，在工业部门中是存在统一欧洲发行市场(b伦i 2019)的必要条件。法律和政治需求变得单纯
{"title":"CO2-Bepreisung im Wärme- und Verkehrssektor: Erweiterung des Emissionshandels löst aktuelles Klimaschutzproblem nicht (Carbon Pricing in the Heating and Transport Sectors: Expansion of Emissions Trading Does Not Solve Current Climate Protection Problems)","authors":"C. Kemfert, Sophie Schmalz, Nicole Wägner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3450508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3450508","url":null,"abstract":"German Abstract: Gegenwartig sind die verschiedenen Energietrager in Deutschland unterschiedlich stark mit Abgaben und Umlagen belastet. Um die energie- und klimapolitischen Ziele der Bundesregierung zu erreichen, mussen fossile Heiz- und Kraftstoffe starker bepreist werden (Kemfert et al. 2019; Dertinger und Schill 2019, SRU 2019). Zugleich herrscht in der energiepolitischen Debatte Uneinigkeit uber die die Ausgestaltung einer CO2-Bepreisung. Eine Moglichkeit besteht darin, den EU-Emissionshandels (EUETS) auf die bislang nicht abgedeckten Sektoren Verkehr und Warme europaweit, fur eine Gruppe von EU-Mitgliedstaaten oder national auszuweiten. Eine weitere Option ist ein separates nationales Emissionshandelssystem fur diese Sektoren einzufuhren und eine dritte die Besteuerung zu reformieren, indem eine CO2-basierte Komponente in der Energiesteuer eingefuhrt wird. Der Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (SVR) empfiehlt, den EU-ETS europaweit bis zum Jahr 2030 auf die Sektoren Verkehr und Gebaude auszuweiten sowie einen nationalen Emissionshandel oder eine CO2-Steuer als Ubergangslosung zu etablieren (SVR 2019). Auch der Wissenschaftliche Beirat des Bundesministeriums fur Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi) spricht sich dafur aus, den Zertifikatehandel auszuweiten: Die Preiskorridore fur die verschiedenen Sektoren sollen sich zunachst unterscheiden und mittelfristig in einem einheitlichen europaischen Emissionsmarkt zusammengefuhrt werden (BMWi 2019). Mit folgendem Beitrag werden unterschiedliche Optionen fur eine CO2-Bepreisung beschrieben und bewertet. Dabei werden neben der okonomischen Perspektive (statische und dynamische Effizienz sowie okologische Effektivitat) auch die juristische und politische Durchsetzbarkeit berucksichtigt. \u0000 \u0000English Abstract: At present, the different energy sources in Germany are burdened with varying levels of taxes and levies. In order to achieve the energy and climate policy targets of the Federal Government, fossil fuels must be priced more strongly (Kemfert et al. 2019; Dertinger and Schill 2019, SRU 2019). At the same time, there is disagreement in the policy debate about the design of a carbon pricing system. One possibility is to extend the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to the transport and heating sectors across the whole European Union (EU), for a group of EU member states or on a national level. Another option is to introduce a separate national emissions trading system for these sectors and a third to reform taxation by introducing a carbon-based component in the energy tax. \u0000 \u0000The German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung - SVR) recommends to extend the EU ETS to the transport and heating sectors Europe-wide by 2030, and to establish a national emissions trading scheme or a carbon tax as a transitional solution (SVR 2019). The Board of Academic Advisors of the Federal Ministry for Eco","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130700144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alexis Arrigoni, Wei-Liang Lu, A. Swishchuk, Stéphane Goutte
The Paris agreement in 2016 marks a global effort to limit the increase in temperature. In that spirit, the Federal Government of Canada introduced a carbon tax to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The main goal of this paper is to define the correct approach to carbon pricing. Following the method, introduce by Goutte and Chevalier (2015), we define the carbon price as the necessary tax to incite electricity producers to switch from coal to natural gas. The novelty of this paper is that we use this method for Alberta and North America. In addition, we consider the case of switching from natural gas to wind as a potential new approach to carbon pricing. After reviewing the two methods, we model prices under three stochastic procedures: Levy Normal Inverse Gaussian (NIG), Levy Normal and Heston model. Finally, we generalize our empirical technique to oil, natural gas and coal individually. The main finding of this article is that the Levy NIG outperforms the Levy Normal and Heston as it is able to take into account the jumpy and volatile nature of energy prices.
{"title":"Energy-Switching Using Lévy Processes - An Application to Canadian and North American Data","authors":"Alexis Arrigoni, Wei-Liang Lu, A. Swishchuk, Stéphane Goutte","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3408174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3408174","url":null,"abstract":"The Paris agreement in 2016 marks a global effort to limit the increase in temperature. In that spirit, the Federal Government of Canada introduced a carbon tax to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The main goal of this paper is to define the correct approach to carbon pricing. Following the method, introduce by Goutte and Chevalier (2015), we define the carbon price as the necessary tax to incite electricity producers to switch from coal to natural gas. The novelty of this paper is that we use this method for Alberta and North America. In addition, we consider the case of switching from natural gas to wind as a potential new approach to carbon pricing. After reviewing the two methods, we model prices under three stochastic procedures: Levy Normal Inverse Gaussian (NIG), Levy Normal and Heston model. Finally, we generalize our empirical technique to oil, natural gas and coal individually. The main finding of this article is that the Levy NIG outperforms the Levy Normal and Heston as it is able to take into account the jumpy and volatile nature of energy prices.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125772273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Carbon taxes are commonly seen as a rational policy response to climate change, but little is known about their performance from an ex-post perspective. This paper analyzes the emissions and cost impacts of the UK CPS, a carbon tax levied on all fossil-fired power plants. To overcome the problem of a missing control group, we propose a novel approach for policy evaluation which leverages economic theory and machine learning techniques for counterfactual prediction. Our results indicate that in the period 2013-2016 the CPS lowered emissions by 6.2 percent at an average cost of € 18 per ton. We find substantial temporal heterogeneity in tax-induced impacts which stems from variation in relative fuel prices. An important implication for climate policy is that a higher carbon tax does not necessarily lead to higher emissions reductions or higher costs.
{"title":"How Effective Was the UK Carbon Tax? - A Machine Learning Approach to Policy Evaluation","authors":"J. Abrell, Mirjam Kosch, S. Rausch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3372388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3372388","url":null,"abstract":"Carbon taxes are commonly seen as a rational policy response to climate change, but little is known about their performance from an ex-post perspective. This paper analyzes the emissions and cost impacts of the UK CPS, a carbon tax levied on all fossil-fired power plants. To overcome the problem of a missing control group, we propose a novel approach for policy evaluation which leverages economic theory and machine learning techniques for counterfactual prediction. Our results indicate that in the period 2013-2016 the CPS lowered emissions by 6.2 percent at an average cost of € 18 per ton. We find substantial temporal heterogeneity in tax-induced impacts which stems from variation in relative fuel prices. An important implication for climate policy is that a higher carbon tax does not necessarily lead to higher emissions reductions or higher costs.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129982904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Leakage occurs when partial regulation of consumer products results in increased consumption of these products in unregulated domains. This article quantifies plastic leakage from the banning of plastic carryout bags. Using quasi-random policy variation in California, I find the elimination of 40 million pounds of plastic carryout bags is offset by a 12 million pound increase in trash bag purchases—with small, medium, and tall trash bag sales increasing by 120%, 64%, and 6%, respectively. The results further reveal 12–22% of plastic carryout bags were reused as trash bags pre-regulation and show bag bans shift consumers towards fewer but heavier bags. With a substantial proportion of carryout bags already reused in a way that avoided the manufacture and purchase of another plastic bag, policy evaluations that ignore leakage effects overstate the regulation's welfare gains.
{"title":"Bag 'Leakage': The Effect of Disposable Carryout Bag Regulations on Unregulated Bags","authors":"Rebecca L. C. Taylor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2964036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2964036","url":null,"abstract":"Leakage occurs when partial regulation of consumer products results in increased consumption of these products in unregulated domains. This article quantifies plastic leakage from the banning of plastic carryout bags. Using quasi-random policy variation in California, I find the elimination of 40 million pounds of plastic carryout bags is offset by a 12 million pound increase in trash bag purchases—with small, medium, and tall trash bag sales increasing by 120%, 64%, and 6%, respectively. The results further reveal 12–22% of plastic carryout bags were reused as trash bags pre-regulation and show bag bans shift consumers towards fewer but heavier bags. With a substantial proportion of carryout bags already reused in a way that avoided the manufacture and purchase of another plastic bag, policy evaluations that ignore leakage effects overstate the regulation's welfare gains.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132568866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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