{"title":"Locke’s Succeeding Ideas","authors":"Matthew Stuart","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198829294.003.0005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Locke holds that there is a constant succession of ideas in the mind of each waking person. Section 1 asks whether Locke thinks of each succeeding idea as something that might persist for a while. The evidence pulls in two directions, and the puzzle is solved by distinguishing claims about idea tokens from claims about idea types. Section 2 unearths Locke’s fascinating account of why the rate at which our ideas succeed one another keeps us from seeing slow motions. Section 3 considers his views about our knowledge of the rate of idea succession. Finally, section 4 looks at Locke’s claim that we get the idea of succession by attending to the succession of our ideas and takes issue with Gideon Yaffe’s account of this.","PeriodicalId":322394,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Volume VIII","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Volume VIII","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198829294.003.0005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Locke holds that there is a constant succession of ideas in the mind of each waking person. Section 1 asks whether Locke thinks of each succeeding idea as something that might persist for a while. The evidence pulls in two directions, and the puzzle is solved by distinguishing claims about idea tokens from claims about idea types. Section 2 unearths Locke’s fascinating account of why the rate at which our ideas succeed one another keeps us from seeing slow motions. Section 3 considers his views about our knowledge of the rate of idea succession. Finally, section 4 looks at Locke’s claim that we get the idea of succession by attending to the succession of our ideas and takes issue with Gideon Yaffe’s account of this.