Locke’s Succeeding Ideas

Matthew Stuart
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Abstract

Locke holds that there is a constant succession of ideas in the mind of each waking person. Section 1 asks whether Locke thinks of each succeeding idea as something that might persist for a while. The evidence pulls in two directions, and the puzzle is solved by distinguishing claims about idea tokens from claims about idea types. Section 2 unearths Locke’s fascinating account of why the rate at which our ideas succeed one another keeps us from seeing slow motions. Section 3 considers his views about our knowledge of the rate of idea succession. Finally, section 4 looks at Locke’s claim that we get the idea of succession by attending to the succession of our ideas and takes issue with Gideon Yaffe’s account of this.
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洛克的后续思想
洛克认为,在每一个清醒的人的头脑中,都有一个持续不断的思想序列。第一节问洛克是否认为每一个后续的观点都可能持续一段时间。证据有两个方向,通过区分关于想法符号的主张和关于想法类型的主张,这个难题就解决了。第二节揭示了洛克关于为什么我们的想法彼此成功的速度使我们看不到缓慢运动的迷人描述。第三节考虑了他关于我们对思想继承速度的认识的观点。最后,第四部分探讨了洛克的观点,即我们通过关注思想的继承来获得继承的概念,并对吉迪恩·亚菲对此的解释提出了异议。
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