Board Independence and the Regulatory Framework for Appointing Independent Directors on the Boards of Listed Companies in India

S. Pande, V. Ansari
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Abstract

Worldwide, the presence of independent directors on the board of listed companies is seen as an integral element of a company’s corporate governance process and has become a pre requisite for good governance. Consequently, in the recent years, governance reforms in India have increasingly pinned hope, as well as responsibility, on independent directors to achieve higher standards of governance in organizations.Unlike the Anglo Saxon world, where the key corporate governance challenge is disciplining the management and making it accountable to the distributed shareholders, the central challenge in corporate governance in India is that of disciplining the dominant shareholder(s) and protecting the interest of the minority shareholders. Therefore independent directors, in Indian business organizations, can become effective only when their appointment process is outside the influence of the dominant shareholders.This paper examines the current state of corporate boards among the S&P CNX 500 companies in India and reviews the impact of the changes that have been introduced in the recently amended Companies Act, 2013 and the revisions, by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) to clause 49 of the Listing agreement dealing with corporate governance. While, with the recent changes, significant steps have been taken to strengthen the role of independent directors on the board of listed companies, the process for the appointment of independent directors needs to be further strengthened so as to truly improve the independence of the board in listed Indian companies.
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董事会独立性与印度上市公司董事会任命独立董事的监管框架
在世界范围内,上市公司董事会中独立董事的存在被视为公司治理过程的一个组成部分,并已成为良好治理的先决条件。因此,近年来,印度的治理改革越来越多地将希望和责任寄托在独立董事身上,以实现更高的组织治理标准。在盎格鲁-撒克逊世界,关键的公司治理挑战是约束管理层,并使其对分散的股东负责。而在印度,公司治理的核心挑战是约束占主导地位的股东,并保护少数股东的利益。因此,在印度的商业组织中,独立董事只有在其任命过程不受主要股东影响的情况下才能发挥作用。本文考察了印度标准普尔CNX 500公司中公司董事会的现状,并回顾了最近修订的2013年公司法以及印度证券交易委员会(SEBI)对上市协议中涉及公司治理的第49条的修订所带来的影响。然而,随着最近的变化,独立董事在上市公司董事会中的作用已经采取了重大措施,独立董事的任命程序需要进一步加强,才能真正提高印度上市公司董事会的独立性。
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