The Game Analysis on the Asymmetrical Competition between UnionPay and Allinpay & Open-Union

Shuai Qinghong, Jia Wang
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Abstract

This paper considers Allinpay & Open-union as the potential entrant bank card organizations, and builds two Game models which are Cournot model and Stackelberg model to analyze the asymmetrical competition between Union Pay and Allinpay & Open-union. From the analysis, this paper gives follow conclusions: (1) The first-mover advantage makes Union Pay to decide the equilibrium output and gain the maximum profit; (2) Union Pay as the incumbent bank card organization will announce a big production to prevent Allinpay & Open-union from accessing to markets. Therefore, Allinpay & Open-union should take to the rapid establishment of networks to successfully enter the market.
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银联与Allinpay不对称竞争的博弈分析&开放联盟
本文将Allinpay & Open-union作为潜在的进入者银行卡组织,建立了Cournot模型和Stackelberg模型来分析银联与Allinpay & Open-union之间的不对称竞争。通过分析,本文得出以下结论:(1)先发优势使银联决定均衡产出并获得最大利润;(2)银联作为现有的银行卡组织,将宣布一个大动作,阻止Allinpay和Open-union进入市场。因此,Allinpay和Open-union应该采取快速建立网络的方式来成功进入市场。
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