Luca Cassano, Stefano Di Mascio, A. Palumbo, A. Menicucci, G. Furano, Giuseppe Bianchi, M. Ottavi
{"title":"Is RISC-V ready for Space? A Security Perspective","authors":"Luca Cassano, Stefano Di Mascio, A. Palumbo, A. Menicucci, G. Furano, Giuseppe Bianchi, M. Ottavi","doi":"10.1109/DFT56152.2022.9962352","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Integrated circuits employed in space applications generally have very low-volume production and high performance requirements. Therefore, the adoption of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components and Third Party Intellectual Property cores (3PIPs) is of extreme interest to make system design, implementation and deployment cost-effective and viable w.r.t. performance. On the other hand, this design paradigm exposes the system to a number of security threats both at design-time and at runtime. In this paper, we discuss the security issues related to space applications mainly focusing on threats that come from the adoption of the well-known RISCV microprocessor. We highlight how Hardware Trojan horses (HTHs) and Microarchitectural Side-Channel Attacks (MSCAs) may compromise the overall system operation by either altering its nominal behavior or by stealing secret information. We discuss the security extensions provided by the RISC-V architecture as well as their limitations. The paper is concluded by an overview of the issues that are still open regarding the security of such microprocessor in the space domain.","PeriodicalId":411011,"journal":{"name":"2022 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems (DFT)","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2022 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems (DFT)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DFT56152.2022.9962352","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Abstract
Integrated circuits employed in space applications generally have very low-volume production and high performance requirements. Therefore, the adoption of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components and Third Party Intellectual Property cores (3PIPs) is of extreme interest to make system design, implementation and deployment cost-effective and viable w.r.t. performance. On the other hand, this design paradigm exposes the system to a number of security threats both at design-time and at runtime. In this paper, we discuss the security issues related to space applications mainly focusing on threats that come from the adoption of the well-known RISCV microprocessor. We highlight how Hardware Trojan horses (HTHs) and Microarchitectural Side-Channel Attacks (MSCAs) may compromise the overall system operation by either altering its nominal behavior or by stealing secret information. We discuss the security extensions provided by the RISC-V architecture as well as their limitations. The paper is concluded by an overview of the issues that are still open regarding the security of such microprocessor in the space domain.