Null-hypothesis testing using distance metrics for verification of arms-control treaties

Abstract

We investigate the feasibility of constructing a data-driven distance metric for use in null-hypothesis testing in the context of arms-control treaty verification. The distance metric is used in testing the hypothesis that the available data are representative of a certain object or otherwise, as opposed to binary-classification tasks studied previously. The metric, being of strictly quadratic form, is essentially computed using projections of the data onto a set of optimal vectors. These projections can be accumulated in list mode. The relatively low number of projections hampers the possible reconstruction of the object and subsequently the access to sensitive information. The projection vectors that channelize the data are optimal in capturing the Mahalanobis squared distance of the data associated with a given object under varying nuisance parameters. The vectors are also chosen such that the resulting metric is insensitive to the difference between the trusted object and another object that is deemed to contain sensitive information. Data used in this study were generated using the GEANT4 toolkit to model gamma transport using a Monte Carlo method. For numerical illustration, the methodology is applied to synthetic data obtained using custom models for plutonium inspection objects. The resulting metric based on a relatively low number of channels shows moderate agreement with the Mahalanobis distance metric for the trusted object but enabling a capability to obscure sensitive information.