Nose to Tail: Using the Whole Employment Relationship to Link Worker Participation to Operational Performance

A. S. Litwin
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引用次数: 8

Abstract

Abstract Although many employers continue to adopt various forms of worker participation or employee involvement, expected positive gains often fail to materialize. One explanation for the weak or altogether missing performance effects is that researchers rely on frameworks that focus almost exclusively on contingencies related to the workers themselves or to the set of tasks subject to participatory processes. This study is premised on the notion that a broader examination of the employment relationship within which a worker participation program is embedded reveals a wider array of factors impinging upon its success. I integrate labor relations theory into existing insights from the strategic human resource management literature to advance an alternative framework that additionally accounts for structures and processes above the workplace level – namely, the (potentially implicit) contract linking employees to the organization and the business strategies enacted by the latter. The resulting propositions suggest that the performance-enhancing impact of worker participation hinges on the presence of participatory or participation-supporting structures at all three levels of the employment relationship. I conclude with implications for participation research.
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从头到尾:利用整个雇佣关系将工人参与与经营绩效联系起来
尽管许多雇主继续采用各种形式的工人参与或员工参与,预期的积极收益往往未能实现。对绩效效应微弱或完全缺失的一种解释是,研究人员所依赖的框架几乎只关注与工人本身或参与过程的一系列任务相关的偶发事件。这项研究的前提是,对嵌入工人参与计划的雇佣关系进行更广泛的检查,揭示了影响其成功的更广泛的因素。我将劳动关系理论与战略人力资源管理文献中的现有见解结合起来,提出了另一种框架,该框架额外考虑了工作场所层面之上的结构和流程,即将员工与组织联系起来的(潜在隐含的)合同以及后者制定的业务战略。由此产生的命题表明,工人参与的绩效增强影响取决于在雇佣关系的所有三个层面上存在参与性或参与性支持结构。最后,我提出了参与性研究的启示。
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