The Unseen Elephant: What Blocks Judicial System Improvement?

Robert M. Sherwood
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引用次数: 9

Abstract

The contribution of judicial system performance to economic development has been actively probed in recent years. Yet efforts to improve judicial systems have faltered. This paper offers an explanation. It proposes that transacting within social networks has provided a seemingly workable substitute for reliance on judicial systems in Brazil and many countries. This prompts public indifference to judicial system improvement. At the same time, where social network transacting is widespread and dominant, it presents numerous obstacles to economic development. Transactions costs economics provides tools for better understanding the characteristics, costs and extent of social network transacting. Relatively low costs are found for intra-network transacting, but trans-network transacting suffers. Constraints inherent in both social network transacting and in judicial dysfunction are reviewed for their negative impacts on both domestic activity and regional integration. Selected transactions costs economics literature is reviewed for a closer look at firm size and corporate governance in the context of countries like Brazil where judicial system dysfunction is found and where social network transacting is prominent. A recently completed project inside the 400 state courthouses of the Sao Paulo regional tribunal is reported. It shows how close attention to administrative details can significantly improve judicial system performance. The paper mixes real world observation with theoretical insights. It suggests that current explanations for sluggish economic development would be better served by increased awareness of social network transacting. It suggests that research within courthouses at a deeper level of detail will advance understanding of the negative consequences of judicial system dysfunction on specific aspects of economic development.
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看不见的大象:是什么阻碍了司法系统的改善?
近年来,人们积极探讨司法系统绩效对经济发展的贡献。然而,改善司法系统的努力却步履蹒跚。本文给出了一个解释。它提出,在巴西和许多国家,在社交网络内进行交易似乎为依赖司法系统提供了一个可行的替代方案。这促使公众对司法制度的改善漠不关心。与此同时,在社交网络交易广泛且占主导地位的地方,它给经济发展带来了许多障碍。交易成本经济学为更好地理解社会网络交易的特征、成本和范围提供了工具。网络内交易成本相对较低,而跨网络交易成本较低。本文回顾了社会网络交易和司法功能障碍中固有的制约因素对国内活动和区域一体化的负面影响。本文回顾了选定的交易成本经济学文献,以便在巴西等司法系统功能失调和社会网络交易突出的国家的背景下,更仔细地研究公司规模和公司治理。据报道,最近在圣保罗地区法庭的400个州法院内完成了一个项目。它显示了密切关注行政细节如何能够显著提高司法系统的绩效。这篇论文结合了对现实世界的观察和理论见解。研究表明,提高对社交网络交易的认识,可以更好地解释目前对经济发展缓慢的解释。它表明,在法院内部进行更深入细致的研究,将有助于理解司法系统功能失调对经济发展具体方面的负面影响。
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