In a paper published some years ago, Cass R. Sunstein and Richard Thaler argue for a sort of soft paternalism referred to as “libertarian paternalism.” Relying on cognitive findings regarding the status quo bias, one of Sunstein and Thaler’s central claims is that default rules can be used for paternalistic purposes, given people’s proneness to adhere to what is established by these rules. This strategy is also called ‘libertarian’, since parties remain free to contract around the paternalistic rule if they wish. Considering the influence of default rules on parties’ behavior, Sunstein and Thaler affirm that soft paternalism is not just defensible but inevitable, inasmuch as any adopted rule will affect people’s choices. This is an audacious conclusion, which surprisingly has attracted little attention from critics of the paternalism of behavioral law and economics The aim of this paper is to assess the alleged inevitability of paternalism. After examining the distinction between hard and soft paternalism, it sustains that, in order to validate Sunstein and Thaler’s claim, paternalism has to be broadly equated to “influencing behavior”. A more restricted definition of paternalism, according to which an act or norm is paternalistic only if it tries to advance someone else’s objective wellbeing, leads to the conclusion that default rules, whose end is not necessarily to protect parties’ interests, are not paternalistic by definition. Taking into account the potential, but not inherent, paternalism of default rules, the last Section of the paper comments on three criticisms regarding the interventionist character of behavioral law and economics. The first criticism refers to the fact that public authorities are vulnerable to the same cognitive pitfalls of the individuals whose activity is regulated; the second concerns the redistributive effects of paternalism involving rational and irrational people; and the third one warns against the “slippery slope” consequences of soft paternalism, i.e., the risk that milder paternalistic measures, as those supported by Sunstein and Thaler, give rise to more intrusive forms of state intervention.
在几年前发表的一篇论文中，卡斯·r·桑斯坦(Cass R. Sunstein)和理查德·塞勒(Richard Thaler)主张一种被称为“自由意志式家长制”的软家长制。基于对现状偏见的认知发现，桑斯坦和塞勒的核心主张之一是，鉴于人们倾向于遵守这些规则所建立的东西，默认规则可以被用于家长式的目的。这种策略也被称为“自由意志主义”，因为如果各方愿意，他们仍然可以自由地围绕家长式统治达成协议。考虑到默认规则对当事人行为的影响，桑斯坦和塞勒断言，软家长制不仅是可辩护的，而且是不可避免的，因为任何采用的规则都会影响人们的选择。这是一个大胆的结论，令人惊讶的是，它几乎没有引起行为法学和经济学中家长制的批评者的注意。本文的目的是评估所谓的家长制的必然性。在研究了硬家长制和软家长制之间的区别之后，它坚持认为，为了验证桑斯坦和塞勒的说法，家长制必须大致等同于“影响行为”。家长式作风的一个更严格的定义是，只有当一项行为或规范试图促进他人的客观福祉时，它才是家长式作风。根据这种定义，默认规则的目的不一定是保护各方的利益，从定义上讲，它不是家长式作风。考虑到默认规则的潜在而非固有的家长式作风，本文的最后一节对关于行为法和经济学的干预主义特征的三种批评进行了评论。第一种批评指的是这样一个事实，即公共当局容易受到与活动受管制的个人相同的认知陷阱的影响;第二个是关于家长制的再分配效应，涉及理性和非理性的人;第三篇则对软家长制的“滑坡效应”提出了警告，即桑斯坦和塞勒支持的温和家长制措施有可能导致更具侵入性的国家干预形式。
{"title":"Default Rules and the Inevitability of Paternalism","authors":"L. Zanitelli","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1346497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1346497","url":null,"abstract":"In a paper published some years ago, Cass R. Sunstein and Richard Thaler argue for a sort of soft paternalism referred to as “libertarian paternalism.” Relying on cognitive findings regarding the status quo bias, one of Sunstein and Thaler’s central claims is that default rules can be used for paternalistic purposes, given people’s proneness to adhere to what is established by these rules. This strategy is also called ‘libertarian’, since parties remain free to contract around the paternalistic rule if they wish. Considering the influence of default rules on parties’ behavior, Sunstein and Thaler affirm that soft paternalism is not just defensible but inevitable, inasmuch as any adopted rule will affect people’s choices. This is an audacious conclusion, which surprisingly has attracted little attention from critics of the paternalism of behavioral law and economics The aim of this paper is to assess the alleged inevitability of paternalism. After examining the distinction between hard and soft paternalism, it sustains that, in order to validate Sunstein and Thaler’s claim, paternalism has to be broadly equated to “influencing behavior”. A more restricted definition of paternalism, according to which an act or norm is paternalistic only if it tries to advance someone else’s objective wellbeing, leads to the conclusion that default rules, whose end is not necessarily to protect parties’ interests, are not paternalistic by definition. Taking into account the potential, but not inherent, paternalism of default rules, the last Section of the paper comments on three criticisms regarding the interventionist character of behavioral law and economics. The first criticism refers to the fact that public authorities are vulnerable to the same cognitive pitfalls of the individuals whose activity is regulated; the second concerns the redistributive effects of paternalism involving rational and irrational people; and the third one warns against the “slippery slope” consequences of soft paternalism, i.e., the risk that milder paternalistic measures, as those supported by Sunstein and Thaler, give rise to more intrusive forms of state intervention.","PeriodicalId":393808,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Program in Law & Economics","volume":"365 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132740261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The contribution of judicial system performance to economic development has been actively probed in recent years. Yet efforts to improve judicial systems have faltered. This paper offers an explanation. It proposes that transacting within social networks has provided a seemingly workable substitute for reliance on judicial systems in Brazil and many countries. This prompts public indifference to judicial system improvement. At the same time, where social network transacting is widespread and dominant, it presents numerous obstacles to economic development. Transactions costs economics provides tools for better understanding the characteristics, costs and extent of social network transacting. Relatively low costs are found for intra-network transacting, but trans-network transacting suffers. Constraints inherent in both social network transacting and in judicial dysfunction are reviewed for their negative impacts on both domestic activity and regional integration. Selected transactions costs economics literature is reviewed for a closer look at firm size and corporate governance in the context of countries like Brazil where judicial system dysfunction is found and where social network transacting is prominent. A recently completed project inside the 400 state courthouses of the Sao Paulo regional tribunal is reported. It shows how close attention to administrative details can significantly improve judicial system performance. The paper mixes real world observation with theoretical insights. It suggests that current explanations for sluggish economic development would be better served by increased awareness of social network transacting. It suggests that research within courthouses at a deeper level of detail will advance understanding of the negative consequences of judicial system dysfunction on specific aspects of economic development.
{"title":"The Unseen Elephant: What Blocks Judicial System Improvement?","authors":"Robert M. Sherwood","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1351082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1351082","url":null,"abstract":"The contribution of judicial system performance to economic development has been actively probed in recent years. Yet efforts to improve judicial systems have faltered. This paper offers an explanation. It proposes that transacting within social networks has provided a seemingly workable substitute for reliance on judicial systems in Brazil and many countries. This prompts public indifference to judicial system improvement. At the same time, where social network transacting is widespread and dominant, it presents numerous obstacles to economic development. Transactions costs economics provides tools for better understanding the characteristics, costs and extent of social network transacting. Relatively low costs are found for intra-network transacting, but trans-network transacting suffers. Constraints inherent in both social network transacting and in judicial dysfunction are reviewed for their negative impacts on both domestic activity and regional integration. Selected transactions costs economics literature is reviewed for a closer look at firm size and corporate governance in the context of countries like Brazil where judicial system dysfunction is found and where social network transacting is prominent. A recently completed project inside the 400 state courthouses of the Sao Paulo regional tribunal is reported. It shows how close attention to administrative details can significantly improve judicial system performance. The paper mixes real world observation with theoretical insights. It suggests that current explanations for sluggish economic development would be better served by increased awareness of social network transacting. It suggests that research within courthouses at a deeper level of detail will advance understanding of the negative consequences of judicial system dysfunction on specific aspects of economic development.","PeriodicalId":393808,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Program in Law & Economics","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132444030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-05-03DOI: 10.1590/S0103-20032008000300009
A. Araújo, Cláudio Djissey Shikida, Patrícia Silva Alvarenga
The article analyzes the determinants of the probability of dispute over land conflicts, occupations and settlement projects) in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais. Through the use of a logic model, we found that the main influences are political and economical ones. Apparently, the behavior of the agrarian reform’s supporters follows the political incentive, with fewer occurrences of conflicts in towns governed by political allies. By other hand, the economical determinants - degree of poverty and the economic growth - have negative impacts on it.
{"title":"Economia Política da Disputa por Terras em Minas Gerais","authors":"A. Araújo, Cláudio Djissey Shikida, Patrícia Silva Alvarenga","doi":"10.1590/S0103-20032008000300009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/S0103-20032008000300009","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes the determinants of the probability of dispute over land conflicts, occupations and settlement projects) in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais. Through the use of a logic model, we found that the main influences are political and economical ones. Apparently, the behavior of the agrarian reform’s supporters follows the political incentive, with fewer occurrences of conflicts in towns governed by political allies. By other hand, the economical determinants - degree of poverty and the economic growth - have negative impacts on it.","PeriodicalId":393808,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Program in Law & Economics","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132438234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-04-30DOI: 10.5040/9781472564948.ch-002
Santiago Montt
This paper presents a new theory that explains why developing countries have been entering into Bilateral Investment Treaties in the last 50 years. It disputes Andrew Guzman’s account which depicts the BIT generation as a result of a prisoner’s dilemma among developing countries. As explained here, the BIT “game” differs from a prisoner’s dilemma in two key ways. First, the BIT game has a sequential/evolutionary nature, stemming from the fact that developing countries have been joining (and rejecting) the network at various times since 1959. Second, unlike the prisoner’s dilemma, the BIT system demonstrates the positive externalities or network effects of having one system of treaties defined in closely similar terms. Taking into account those two differences leads to the emergence of a new theory: the BIT generation as a virtual network.
{"title":"THE BIT GENERATION’S EMERGENCE AS A COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM: Prisoner's dilemma or network effects?","authors":"Santiago Montt","doi":"10.5040/9781472564948.ch-002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472564948.ch-002","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a new theory that explains why developing countries have been entering into Bilateral Investment Treaties in the last 50 years. It disputes Andrew Guzman’s account which depicts the BIT generation as a result of a prisoner’s dilemma among developing countries. As explained here, the BIT “game” differs from a prisoner’s dilemma in two key ways. First, the BIT game has a sequential/evolutionary nature, stemming from the fact that developing countries have been joining (and rejecting) the network at various times since 1959. Second, unlike the prisoner’s dilemma, the BIT system demonstrates the positive externalities or network effects of having one system of treaties defined in closely similar terms. Taking into account those two differences leads to the emergence of a new theory: the BIT generation as a virtual network.","PeriodicalId":393808,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Program in Law & Economics","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116654907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article discusses two opposed hypotheses to predict the behavior of judges when they have to decide a claim between parties with asymmetrical economic and political power. The first, which has broad acceptance among policy makers in Brazil, is the jurisdictional uncertainty hypothesis (Arida et al, 2005) that suggests that Brazilian judges tend to favor the weak party in the claim as a form of social justice and redistribution of income in favor of the poor. Glaeser et al. (2003) stated the second hypothesis. They suggest that the operation of legal, political and regulatory institutions is subverted by the wealthy and politically powerful for their own benefit, a situation they call King John redistribution. An empirical test was conducted analyzing judicial decisions from 16 Brazilian states, showing that a) judges favor the strongest party, b) a local powerful party has more chance to be favored than a national or foreign big company, a effect we named parochial subversion of justice and c) in Brazilian states where we have more social inequality there is higher probability that a discussed contract clause will not be maintained.
本文讨论了两种对立的假设，以预测法官在经济和政治权力不对称的当事人之间裁决索赔时的行为。第一个是巴西政策制定者广泛接受的司法不确定性假设(Arida等人，2005年)，该假设表明，巴西法官倾向于在主张中偏袒弱势一方，作为一种社会正义和有利于穷人的收入再分配形式。Glaeser et al.(2003)提出了第二个假设。他们认为，法律、政治和监管机构的运作被富人和政治权势者为了自己的利益而颠覆，他们称之为“约翰国王再分配”(King John redistribution)。我们对巴西16个州的司法判决进行了实证检验，结果表明:a)法官倾向于最强大的一方;b)当地强大的一方比国内或外国大公司更有机会受到青睐，我们将这种效应命名为“局部颠覆正义”;c)在社会不平等程度较高的巴西各州，所讨论的合同条款不被维持的可能性更高。
{"title":"Robin Hood Vs. King John Redistribution: How Do Local Judges Decide Cases in Brazil?","authors":"I. Ribeiro","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.938174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.938174","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses two opposed hypotheses to predict the behavior of judges when they have to decide a claim between parties with asymmetrical economic and political power. The first, which has broad acceptance among policy makers in Brazil, is the jurisdictional uncertainty hypothesis (Arida et al, 2005) that suggests that Brazilian judges tend to favor the weak party in the claim as a form of social justice and redistribution of income in favor of the poor. Glaeser et al. (2003) stated the second hypothesis. They suggest that the operation of legal, political and regulatory institutions is subverted by the wealthy and politically powerful for their own benefit, a situation they call King John redistribution. An empirical test was conducted analyzing judicial decisions from 16 Brazilian states, showing that a) judges favor the strongest party, b) a local powerful party has more chance to be favored than a national or foreign big company, a effect we named parochial subversion of justice and c) in Brazilian states where we have more social inequality there is higher probability that a discussed contract clause will not be maintained.","PeriodicalId":393808,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Program in Law & Economics","volume":"118 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131277803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-05-15DOI: 10.12660/RDA.V244.2007.42428
Brisa Lopes de Mello Ferrão, I. C. Ribeiro
This article discusses the microeconomic foundations of the concept of jurisdictional uncertainty. According to Arida et al (2005), Brazilian judges tend to favor the weak part in the claim, not the just, as a form of social justice. A utility function is discussed, taking into account the advantages the judge could gain from this behavior, outweighed by the penalties such as professional criticism and the reversal by a higher court. An empirical test is conducted, analyzing 181 judicial decisions, and the results are supportive to the main ideas, showing that a contract has 45% more of chances of being maintained if it is beneficial to the richer.
{"title":"Os Juízes Brasileiros Favorecem a Parte Mais Fraca","authors":"Brisa Lopes de Mello Ferrão, I. C. Ribeiro","doi":"10.12660/RDA.V244.2007.42428","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12660/RDA.V244.2007.42428","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses the microeconomic foundations of the concept of jurisdictional uncertainty. According to Arida et al (2005), Brazilian judges tend to favor the weak part in the claim, not the just, as a form of social justice. A utility function is discussed, taking into account the advantages the judge could gain from this behavior, outweighed by the penalties such as professional criticism and the reversal by a higher court. An empirical test is conducted, analyzing 181 judicial decisions, and the results are supportive to the main ideas, showing that a contract has 45% more of chances of being maintained if it is beneficial to the richer.","PeriodicalId":393808,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Program in Law & Economics","volume":"2006 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125619326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although a punishment can be applied only once, the threat to punish (also referred to as stick) can be reiterated several times, because when parties obey, the punishment is not applied and thus the threat can be repeated. The same is not possible with promises to reward (also known as carrots), since they need to be carried on every time a party complies, and hence at each round a new reward is needed. We show that the multipliability of sticks has pervasive consequences in economics and law and provides a unified explanation for seemingly unrelated phenomena such as the dynamics of riots and revolutions, the divide-and-conquer strategy, comparative negligence, the anticommons problem, the use of property rules in markets, the most-favored nation clause, legal restrictions on penalties in employment contracts, and legal aid.
{"title":"Carrots, Sticks and the Multiplication Effect","authors":"G. Dari‐Mattiacci, G. Geest","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWN026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWN026","url":null,"abstract":"Although a punishment can be applied only once, the threat to punish (also referred to as stick) can be reiterated several times, because when parties obey, the punishment is not applied and thus the threat can be repeated. The same is not possible with promises to reward (also known as carrots), since they need to be carried on every time a party complies, and hence at each round a new reward is needed. We show that the multipliability of sticks has pervasive consequences in economics and law and provides a unified explanation for seemingly unrelated phenomena such as the dynamics of riots and revolutions, the divide-and-conquer strategy, comparative negligence, the anticommons problem, the use of property rules in markets, the most-favored nation clause, legal restrictions on penalties in employment contracts, and legal aid.","PeriodicalId":393808,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Program in Law & Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134299042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find little evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock markets.
{"title":"What Works in Securities Law","authors":"Florencio López‐de‐Silanes","doi":"10.3386/w9882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w9882","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find little evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock markets.","PeriodicalId":393808,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Program in Law & Economics","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121458677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-04-22DOI: 10.5354/0719-7462.2004.41892
R. Barcia
This article analyzes the legal regulation of ISAPREs from the vantage point of law and economics and makes a case for passing some amendments to this private health system based on market failures. The private health system of ISAPREs has not been able to satisfy the expectations of third age people who are discriminated against by an adverse selection. This article explains how this adverse selection works and accounts for the inability of ISAPREs to efectively compete in that market segment. In addition, it puts forward a solution to this problem consisting in a new market of indefinite health contracts which creates a new value and gives confidence to risk adverse individuals. This new market shall also create incentives for ISAPREs to compete in the segment of third age people and obtain important scale economies in their costs, besides giving them leverage to negotiate under equal conditions on behalf of their affiliates in the market of catastrophic diseases, in which there is a truly monopoly at the hand of the medical profession.
{"title":"El Sistema Privado de Salud Desde La Perspectiva del Analisis Economico","authors":"R. Barcia","doi":"10.5354/0719-7462.2004.41892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-7462.2004.41892","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes the legal regulation of ISAPREs from the vantage point of law and economics and makes a case for passing some amendments to this private health system based on market failures. The private health system of ISAPREs has not been able to satisfy the expectations of third age people who are discriminated against by an adverse selection. This article explains how this adverse selection works and accounts for the inability of ISAPREs to efectively compete in that market segment. In addition, it puts forward a solution to this problem consisting in a new market of indefinite health contracts which creates a new value and gives confidence to risk adverse individuals. This new market shall also create incentives for ISAPREs to compete in the segment of third age people and obtain important scale economies in their costs, besides giving them leverage to negotiate under equal conditions on behalf of their affiliates in the market of catastrophic diseases, in which there is a truly monopoly at the hand of the medical profession.","PeriodicalId":393808,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Program in Law & Economics","volume":"488 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131419897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay answers the question about the nature and the concept of corruption and tries to justify the ethical and juridical framework from which it is possible to conceive the different institutional barriers necessary to restrain it: the democratic State, the Rule of Law and, specifically, the accountability of the public officers. Regarding the latter, this essay analyses some principles such as public access to information and official publicity or transparency.
{"title":"Corrupción política y responsabilidad de los servidores públicos","authors":"Rodolfo Vázquez","doi":"10.14198/DOXA2007.30.30","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14198/DOXA2007.30.30","url":null,"abstract":"This essay answers the question about the nature and the concept of corruption and tries to justify the ethical and juridical framework from which it is possible to conceive the different institutional barriers necessary to restrain it: the democratic State, the Rule of Law and, specifically, the accountability of the public officers. Regarding the latter, this essay analyses some principles such as public access to information and official publicity or transparency.","PeriodicalId":393808,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Program in Law & Economics","volume":"145 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116377413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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