Representing Representations

Abstract

This chapter champions the priority of objectual representations and reference to the world over fine-grained “inner” mental representations. The main argument rests upon demonstrating that our attitude ascriptions practices give priority to de re ascriptions of mental contents over de dicto ascriptions of mental contents. The argument thereby advances a rejection of the Fregean tradition that construes modes of presentations of objects as essential to the characterization of mental contents within attitude ascriptions. A novel argument is advanced invoking the evaluative commitments expressed with embedded referential slurring terms in argument position, showing them to reveal derogatory attitudes of the ascriber, not the ascribee, and then showing by analogy that the same obtains for existential and referential commitments: they do not typically invoke Fregean modes of presentation by which the ascribee cognizes the world. The chapter ends by reexamining substitution puzzles and the nature of de re belief.