Pub Date : 2014-08-14DOI: 10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780199647057.003.0008
K. Taylor
This chapter undertakes to apply the previously developed theory of objective representational content to our thought and talk about apparently non-existent objects. It aims to show that we need not construe the referents of singular terms within fiction and within mathematics as possessing bona fide existence (or non-existence) while also providing a robust understanding of our singular representations when we think with such terms. The arguments depend on the trio of distinctions between merely objectual and fully objective linguistic and mental representations; non-veridical and veridical language games; and truth-similitude and literal truth. With these distinctions, the chapter exhibits the explanatory power of a theory on which empty singular terms are merely objectual yet are fundamental to our non-veridical language and thought games, possessing truth-similitude while falling short of literal truth.
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780195144741.003.0006
K. Taylor
This chapter champions the priority of objectual representations and reference to the world over fine-grained “inner” mental representations. The main argument rests upon demonstrating that our attitude ascriptions practices give priority to de re ascriptions of mental contents over de dicto ascriptions of mental contents. The argument thereby advances a rejection of the Fregean tradition that construes modes of presentations of objects as essential to the characterization of mental contents within attitude ascriptions. A novel argument is advanced invoking the evaluative commitments expressed with embedded referential slurring terms in argument position, showing them to reveal derogatory attitudes of the ascriber, not the ascribee, and then showing by analogy that the same obtains for existential and referential commitments: they do not typically invoke Fregean modes of presentation by which the ascribee cognizes the world. The chapter ends by reexamining substitution puzzles and the nature of de re belief.
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