{"title":"Effects of Suppression Policy in a Market for Heroin: A Natural Quasi-Experiment","authors":"Norman Braun, R. Berger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1754637","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on the observable market effects of a more severe suppression of hard drug supply by the police. After surveying 624 regular heroin users in the Swiss cities of Bern and Zurich in a standardized way, the suppression policy had been intensified in Bern. To study the consequences of the policy change, the survey was repeated in both cities which resulted in another 419 standardized interviews. The results of this natural quasi experiment suggest that a more repressive practice of law enforcement agencies does not necessarily have the intended effects for central variables (e.g., price and quality of drugs, number of drug dealers) at the retail level of the illicit market.","PeriodicalId":350529,"journal":{"name":"Criminology eJournal","volume":"211 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Criminology eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1754637","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper focuses on the observable market effects of a more severe suppression of hard drug supply by the police. After surveying 624 regular heroin users in the Swiss cities of Bern and Zurich in a standardized way, the suppression policy had been intensified in Bern. To study the consequences of the policy change, the survey was repeated in both cities which resulted in another 419 standardized interviews. The results of this natural quasi experiment suggest that a more repressive practice of law enforcement agencies does not necessarily have the intended effects for central variables (e.g., price and quality of drugs, number of drug dealers) at the retail level of the illicit market.