The Information-Forcing Dilemma in Damages Law

Tun-Jen Chiang
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引用次数: 16

Abstract

Courts assessing compensatory damages awards often lack adequate information to determine the value of a victim’s loss. A central reason for this problem, which the literature has thus far overlooked, is that courts face a dilemma when applying their standard information-forcing tool to the context of damages. Specifically, the standard method by which courts obtain information is through a burden of proof. In the context of assessing damages, this means a rule requiring plaintiffs to prove the value of a loss with precision. But courts will often face a situation where it is clear that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, but where the plaintiff cannot prove the exact amount of the loss. A court that strictly enforces the burden of proof would award zero damages in such a case, producing a harsh result. But a court that avoids this result by instead awarding its best guess at the correct amount — effectively forgiving the inadequacy of plaintiff’s proof — then undermines future incentives for plaintiffs to produce rigorous evidence.The result of this dilemma is that courts oscillate between strict and forgiving approaches, causing much confusion. Explaining the dilemma helps alleviate the confusion and points to a solution. In principle, courts should require a party to produce damages evidence if, and only if, the party is the lower cost provider of that evidence, and the benefit of having the evidence outweighs the cost of collecting it. The messy legal standards for calculating damages in various fields can be understood as clumsy attempts by courts to arrive at this unifying principle. Interpreting the vague and messy doctrine in light of this “cheaper cost-effective producer” principle thus helps make damages law more coherent.
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损害赔偿法中的信息强制困境
评估补偿性损害赔偿的法院往往缺乏足够的信息来确定受害者损失的价值。造成这一问题的一个核心原因是,法院在将其标准的信息强制工具应用于损害赔偿时面临两难境地,而这一问题迄今为止一直被文献所忽视。具体来说,法院获取信息的标准方法是通过举证责任。在评估损害赔偿的背景下,这意味着一条规则要求原告准确地证明损失的价值。但是,法院经常会遇到这样的情况:原告显然遭受了损失,但原告无法证明损失的确切数额。在这种情况下,严格执行举证责任的法院会判零损害赔偿,从而产生严厉的结果。但是,如果法院避免了这一结果,而是在正确的数额上给予最佳猜测——实际上是原谅了原告证据的不足——那么就会削弱原告未来提供严格证据的动力。这种困境的结果是法院在严格和宽容的方法之间摇摆不定,造成了很多混乱。解释这种困境有助于减轻困惑,并指出解决办法。原则上,法院应要求一方提供损害证据,当且仅当该方提供证据的成本较低,且获得证据的利益超过收集证据的成本。在不同领域计算损害赔偿的法律标准混乱不堪,这可以理解为法院试图达成统一原则的笨拙尝试。因此,根据这种“成本更低、成本更低的生产者”原则来解释模糊而混乱的原则,有助于使损害赔偿法更加连贯。
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