Hardware Attack and Assurance with Machine Learning: A Security Threat to Circuits and Systems

B. Gwee
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Abstract

Summary form only given, as follows. The complete presentation was not made available for publication as part of the conference proceedings. Banking, defence applications and cryptosystems often demand security features, including cryptography, tamper resistance, stealth, and etc., by means of hardware approaches and/or software approaches to prevent data leakages. The hardware physical attacks or commonly known as side channel attacks have been employed to extract the secret keys of the encrypted algorithms implemented in hardware devices by analyzing their physical parameters such as power dissipation, electromagnetic interference and timing information. Altered functions or unauthorized modules may be added to the circuit design during the shipping and manufacturing process, bringing in security threats to the deployed systems. In this presentation, we will discuss hardware assurance from both device level and circuit level, and present how machine learning techniques can be utilized. At the device level, we will first provide an overview of the different cryptography algorithms and present the side channel attacks, particularly the powerful Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) and Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis (CEMA) with a leakage model that can be used to reveal the secret keys of the cryptosystems. We will then discuss several countermeasure techniques and present how highly secured microchips can be designed based on these techniques. At the circuit level, we will provide an overview of manufactured IC circuit analysis through invasive IC delayering and imaging. We then present several machine learning techniques that can be efficiently applied to the retrieval of circuit contact points and connections for further netlist/functional analysis.
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机器学习的硬件攻击和保证:对电路和系统的安全威胁
仅给出摘要形式,如下。完整的报告没有作为会议记录的一部分提供出版。银行、国防应用和密码系统通常需要安全特性,包括加密、防篡改、隐身等,通过硬件方法和/或软件方法来防止数据泄露。硬件物理攻击通常被称为侧信道攻击,通过分析硬件设备的物理参数,如功耗、电磁干扰和时序信息,来提取硬件设备中实现的加密算法的秘钥。在运输和制造过程中,可能会在电路设计中添加更改的功能或未经授权的模块,从而给部署的系统带来安全威胁。在本次演讲中,我们将从设备级和电路级讨论硬件保证,并介绍如何利用机器学习技术。在设备级,我们将首先概述不同的加密算法,并介绍侧信道攻击,特别是功能强大的相关功率分析(CPA)和相关电磁分析(CEMA),其泄漏模型可用于揭示密码系统的密钥。然后,我们将讨论几种对策技术,并介绍如何基于这些技术设计高度安全的微芯片。在电路层面,我们将通过侵入式IC分层和成像提供制造IC电路分析的概述。然后,我们提出了几种机器学习技术,可以有效地应用于电路接触点和连接的检索,以进一步进行网表/功能分析。
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