{"title":"Chris Armstrong on Global Equality and Special Claims to Resources","authors":"Kim Angell","doi":"10.21248/GJN.13.01.184","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In ‘Justice and Natural Resources,’ Chris Armstrong offers a rich and sophisticated egalitarian theory of resource justice, according to which the benefits and burdens flowing from natural (and non-natural) resources are ideally distributed with a view to equalize people’s access to wellbeing, unless there are compelling reasons that justify departures from that egalitarian default. Armstrong discusses two such reasons: special claims from ‘improvement’ and ‘attachment.’ In this paper, I critically assess the account he gives of these potential constraints on global equality. I argue that his recognition of them has implications that Armstrong does not anticipate, and which challenge some important theses in his book. First, special claims from improvement will justify larger departures from the egalitarian default than Armstrong believes. Second, a consistent application of Armstrong’s life plan-foundation for special claims from attachment implies that nation-states may move closer to justify ‘permanent sovereignty’ over the resources within their territories than what his analysis suggests.","PeriodicalId":117351,"journal":{"name":"Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.21248/GJN.13.01.184","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In ‘Justice and Natural Resources,’ Chris Armstrong offers a rich and sophisticated egalitarian theory of resource justice, according to which the benefits and burdens flowing from natural (and non-natural) resources are ideally distributed with a view to equalize people’s access to wellbeing, unless there are compelling reasons that justify departures from that egalitarian default. Armstrong discusses two such reasons: special claims from ‘improvement’ and ‘attachment.’ In this paper, I critically assess the account he gives of these potential constraints on global equality. I argue that his recognition of them has implications that Armstrong does not anticipate, and which challenge some important theses in his book. First, special claims from improvement will justify larger departures from the egalitarian default than Armstrong believes. Second, a consistent application of Armstrong’s life plan-foundation for special claims from attachment implies that nation-states may move closer to justify ‘permanent sovereignty’ over the resources within their territories than what his analysis suggests.
在《正义与自然资源》(Justice and Natural Resources)一书中,克里斯•阿姆斯特朗(Chris Armstrong)提出了丰富而复杂的资源正义平等主义理论。根据这一理论,自然(和非自然)资源带来的利益和负担应该得到理想的分配,以使人们获得幸福的机会均等,除非有令人信服的理由证明偏离这种平等主义的默认值是合理的。阿姆斯特朗讨论了两个这样的原因:来自“改进”和“依恋”的特殊要求。在本文中,我批判性地评估了他对全球平等的这些潜在制约因素的描述。我认为,他对他们的认识有阿姆斯特朗没有预料到的含义,这对他书中的一些重要论点提出了挑战。首先,改进的特殊主张将证明比阿姆斯特朗认为的更大程度地偏离平均主义的默认。其次,阿姆斯特朗的生命计划基础对依恋的特殊要求的一贯应用意味着,民族国家可能会比他的分析所暗示的更接近于证明对其领土内资源的“永久主权”。