Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Samuel Estreicher in Support of Defendants-Appellees in Chamber of Commerce of United States v. City of Seattle, No. 17-35640 (9th Circuit)

S. Estreicher
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Abstract

Companies like Uber and Lyft contend that, because drivers are independent contractors and not employees under the U.S.'s various labor and employment laws, any attempt to form unions or bargain collectively for higher wages violates antitrust laws. Until now, that assumption has been widely shared -- but it's based on a failure to understand why concerted activity by workers is protected against antitrust liability. Labor’s antitrust shield was established by the 1914 Clayton Act, in which Congress determined that “the labor of a human being is not an article in commerce.” Conventionally, only workers defined as “employees” are viewed as having the right to organize without violating antitrust laws. Individuals are considered employees only if their boss can control when and how they do their work – what is called the common law’s “right to control” test. Under this view, people who provide their products or services directly to the public are prohibited from banding together with peers to try to raise wages and improve working conditions. For all intents and purposes, these independent contractors are considered business owners. They can form associations to share information and lobby for their interests -- like the American Bar Association or the so-called Freelancers Union -- but cannot form an organization that insists on collective bargaining. Allowing businesses to join together with competitors to fix prices or carve up markets, the argument goes, represents a combination against the welfare of consumers. A Seattle ordinance, passed in 2015, would protect drivers from being fired for engaging in joint action. Given the prevailing “right to control” test, Uber and Lyft drivers may not be protected by all employment laws. But at the very least, they are entitled to engage in collective action without risk of antitrust liability. This is because of the Clayton Act, which preceded by two decades the affirmative legislation of the 1930s. In 1941, the Supreme Court confirmed that the Clayton Act, coupled with a latter statute broadening the scope of a protected “labor dispute,” established the right of workers to organize in their own interests free of civil and criminal liability under the antitrust laws. The antitrust exemption applies to workers who sell only their services, without any significant capital investment. Individuals who are principally engaged in selling goods are not covered by the exemption. Neither are those whose services involve investments in an office space and equipment, hiring staff, and advertising themselves as a business. The only investment that Uber and Lyft drivers make to their "businesses" is to supply their own vehicles. These drivers are “laborers” or “workers” under the Clayton Act exemption from the antitrust laws. Seattle’s involvement in setting a framework for collective bargaining and protection from retaliation does not alter the availability of the exemption for the drivers in seeking to improve their collective situation.
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法庭之友Samuel Estreicher教授在美国商会诉西雅图市案(第17-35640号)中支持被告和被上诉人的摘要(第九巡回法院)
优步和Lyft等公司则辩称,因为司机是独立的承包商,而不是美国政府的雇员在美国的各种劳工和就业法中,任何组建工会或集体谈判提高工资的企图都违反了反垄断法。到目前为止,这一假设得到了广泛认同,但它是基于未能理解为什么工人的协同活动可以免受反垄断责任的保护。劳工的反垄断保护是由1914年的《克莱顿法案》(Clayton Act)建立的,在该法案中,国会确定“人类的劳动不属于商业商品”。传统上,只有被定义为“雇员”的工人才被视为在不违反反垄断法的情况下有权组织起来。个人只有在老板能够控制他们何时以及如何工作的情况下才被视为雇员——这就是所谓的普通法的“控制权”测试。在这种观点下,直接向公众提供产品或服务的人被禁止与同行联合起来试图提高工资和改善工作条件。出于所有的意图和目的,这些独立的承包商被认为是企业主。他们可以成立协会,分享信息,为自己的利益游说——比如美国律师协会(American Bar Association)或所谓的自由职业者联盟(Freelancers Union)——但不能成立一个坚持集体谈判的组织。这种观点认为,允许企业与竞争对手联合起来定价或瓜分市场,是一种不利于消费者福利的结合。西雅图2015年通过的一项法令将保护司机不会因参与联合行动而被解雇。鉴于目前盛行的“控制权”测试,优步和Lyft司机可能不会受到所有就业法的保护。但至少,它们有权采取集体行动,而不必承担反垄断责任的风险。这是因为《克莱顿法案》(Clayton Act),它比20世纪30年代的平权立法早了20年。1941年,最高法院确认,《克莱顿法》和后来的一项法令扩大了受保护的“劳资纠纷”的范围,确立了工人为自己的利益组织起来的权利,而不受反垄断法规定的民事和刑事责任的约束。反垄断豁免适用于只销售服务,没有任何重大资本投资的工人。主要从事销售货物的个人不包括在豁免范围内。那些服务涉及投资办公空间和设备、雇佣员工和宣传自己是一家企业的人也不例外。优步和Lyft司机对其“业务”的唯一投资是提供自己的车辆。这些司机是“劳动者”或“工人”根据克莱顿法豁免反垄断法。西雅图参与制定集体谈判和保护免受报复的框架,并不会改变司机在寻求改善集体状况时获得豁免的可能性。
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A Modest Blueprint for Representing Working People and Labor Unions in Fraught Times Economic Democracy in the 21st Century: The Vote in Labour, Capital and Public Services Trade Unions’ Rights, Work Councils’ Functions and the Legal Framework for Governing European Corporations: A Spanish Perspective Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Samuel Estreicher in Support of Defendants-Appellees in Chamber of Commerce of United States v. City of Seattle, No. 17-35640 (9th Circuit) 2020 Supreme Court Commentary: Employment Law
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