Eleganse og empiri: Et innsideperspektiv på Ine Eriksen Søreide og konflikten mellom Israel og palestinerne

Abstract

Ine Eriksen Søreides var Norges utenriksminister i en usedvanlig krevende periode i konflikten mellom Israel og palestinerne. Som alle andre stater, fastholdt Norge det overordnede synet om at bare tostatsløsningen kan gi varig fred mellom Israel og palestinerne og ledet giversamarbeidet for å fortsette statsbyggingen og bevare det institusjonelle fundamentet for en slik løsning. Arbeidet ble forankret i FNs sikkerhetsråd, hvor Norge høstet ros for innsatsen. Hvis man undersøker hva Norge gjorde i giverlandssamarbeidet (AHLC) i forhold til den direkte konteksten for de ulike tiltakene, vil man finne at den norske politikken lyktes. Jørgen Jensehaugens elegante spissformuleringer om at utenriksminister Søreide var et godt posisjonert vitne til at tostatsløsningen døde og at hun sikret at bistanden til palestinerne gjorde at denne politiske løsningens endelikt var så smertefri som mulig, strider mot empiriske fakta. Det er ikke riktig at sentrale bærebjelker i tostatsløsningen ble utradert. Og når tostatsløsningens død faktisk ikke kunne konstateres på den tiden, faller også kritikken for at Søreide ikke skiftet politisk kurs. Abstract in EnglishElegance and Empiricism: An Insider’s Perspective on Ine Eriksen Søreide and the Conflict Between Israel and the PalestiniansIne Eriksen Søreide was Norway’s foreign minister during an exceptionally challenging period in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Like all other countries, Norway maintained the overarching view that only a two-state solution can provide lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians and led donor cooperation to continue state-building and preserve the institutional foundation for such a solution. The work was anchored in the UN Security Council where Norway received praise for its efforts. If one examines what Norway did in the donor cooperation (the AHLC) in relation to the direct context of the various measures, one will find that Norwegian policy was successful. Jørgen Jensehaugen’s elegant formulations that Foreign Minister Søreide was a well-positioned witness to the death of the two-state solution and that she ensured that aid to the Palestinians made this political solution’s demise as painless as possible are contrary to empirical facts. It is not correct that central pillars of the two-state solution were eradicated at the time. And as the two-state solution was not dead, the criticism that Søreide did not change her political course becomes irrelevant.