Management Centrality in Sequential Bargaining: Implications for Strategic Delegation, Welfare, and Stakeholder Conflict

IF 0.3 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-18 DOI:10.1515/bejte-2022-0076

Domenico Buccella, Nicola Meccheri

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Abstract

Abstract This paper investigates the issue of strategic delegation by considering the role of management centrality in contracting with different stakeholders. In a sequential negotiation unionized duopoly model, the results obtained by profit-maximizing entrepreneurial firms (where strategic choices are taken by firm owners and wage bargaining involves owners and unions) are compared against those of managerial firms (where strategic choices are delegated to managers who are also involved in wage bargaining vis-à-vis unions). Differences in the relative bargaining power among stakeholders (owners, managers and unions) play a key role in determining optimal delegation contracts, as well as the endogenous choice by firm owners to delegate strategic decisions to the management. Moreover, the distribution of stakeholders’ relative bargaining power affects firms’ profitability and overall welfare. In particular, to minimize potential conflict of interests between firm owners and the overall society, regulation directed to soften the managers’ bargaining strength vis-à-vis shareholders must be designed and implemented.

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序贯议价中的管理中心性:对战略授权、福利和利益相关者冲突的影响

摘要本文通过考虑管理中心性在与不同利益相关者订立契约中的作用来研究战略授权问题。在顺序谈判工会化的双寡头垄断模型中，将利润最大化的创业型企业(战略选择由企业所有者做出，工资谈判涉及所有者和工会)与管理型企业(战略选择委托给经理，经理也参与与-à-vis工会的工资谈判)获得的结果进行比较。利益相关者(所有者、管理者和工会)之间的相对议价能力差异在确定最优委托合同以及企业所有者将战略决策委托给管理层的内生选择方面发挥了关键作用。此外，利益相关者的相对议价能力分布影响着企业的盈利能力和整体福利。特别是，为了最大限度地减少公司所有者与整个社会之间潜在的利益冲突，必须设计和实施旨在软化经理与-à-vis股东讨价还价能力的法规。

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来源期刊

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

25.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.