Abstract The existing literature on bankruptcy division either ignores creditor type or focuses on secured and unsecured creditors, subsuming operational creditors in the latter category. Further, implications for the debtor and the economy as a whole are under-emphasized. We build a general equilibrium model with default using three game-theoretic division rules to examine the appropriate adjudication of the claims of financial and operational creditors for optimum output and firm profits as well as creditor welfare. Our paper extends and enriches the normative discussion on these game-theoretic division rules. The analysis indicates that the proportion of claims held by financial and operational creditors is a key determinant of overall outcomes, and that interests of the corporate debtor represent common ground that could soften creditor competition. Using a dataset of bankruptcy resolution cases from India, we identify the specific rules that approximate actual payout for different claim proportions and deduce the overriding power of financial creditors. Institutional changes that would result in better long-term outcomes are proposed.
{"title":"Financial and Operational Creditors in Bankruptcy Resolution: A General Equilibrium Approach Under Three Game-Theoretic Division Rules with an Application to India","authors":"Rohit Prasad, S. Veena Iyer","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2023-0031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2023-0031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The existing literature on bankruptcy division either ignores creditor type or focuses on secured and unsecured creditors, subsuming operational creditors in the latter category. Further, implications for the debtor and the economy as a whole are under-emphasized. We build a general equilibrium model with default using three game-theoretic division rules to examine the appropriate adjudication of the claims of financial and operational creditors for optimum output and firm profits as well as creditor welfare. Our paper extends and enriches the normative discussion on these game-theoretic division rules. The analysis indicates that the proportion of claims held by financial and operational creditors is a key determinant of overall outcomes, and that interests of the corporate debtor represent common ground that could soften creditor competition. Using a dataset of bankruptcy resolution cases from India, we identify the specific rules that approximate actual payout for different claim proportions and deduce the overriding power of financial creditors. Institutional changes that would result in better long-term outcomes are proposed.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134885157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Using Chebyshev’s sum inequality, we generalize E[X2] ≥ E2[X] into a moment inequality with a general combination of moments that compares E[Xr+s] and E[X r ]E[X s ]. We also provide its economic application.
{"title":"A Note on a Moment Inequality","authors":"Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3576627","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3576627","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Using Chebyshev’s sum inequality, we generalize E[X2] ≥ E2[X] into a moment inequality with a general combination of moments that compares E[Xr+s] and E[X r ]E[X s ]. We also provide its economic application.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44555299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Using Chebyshev’s sum inequality, we generalize E [ X 2 ] ≥ E 2 [ X ] into a moment inequality with a general combination of moments that compares E [ X r + s ] and E [ X r ] E [ X s ]. We also provide its economic application.
摘要利用Chebyshev和不等式，将E [x2]≥e2 [X]推广为E [X r + s]与E [X r] E [X s]比较的矩的一般组合的矩不等式。我们还提供了它的经济应用。
{"title":"A Note on a Moment Inequality","authors":"Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2023-0045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2023-0045","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Using Chebyshev’s sum inequality, we generalize E [ X 2 ] ≥ E 2 [ X ] into a moment inequality with a general combination of moments that compares E [ X r + s ] and E [ X r ] E [ X s ]. We also provide its economic application.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136235370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper shows that, in the presence of negative production external effects (e.g., waste, pollution), market-driven technology adoption is socially inefficient. Two distinct market structures are considered within the neoclassical framework: perfect competition and monopoly. In both cases, there is a range of cost structures under which firms prefer the adoption of inferior technologies. A number of policy instruments are considered in terms of their welfare enhancing properties.
{"title":"Technology Adoption under Negative External Effects","authors":"Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2022-0089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2022-0089","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper shows that, in the presence of negative production external effects (e.g., waste, pollution), market-driven technology adoption is socially inefficient. Two distinct market structures are considered within the neoclassical framework: perfect competition and monopoly. In both cases, there is a range of cost structures under which firms prefer the adoption of inferior technologies. A number of policy instruments are considered in terms of their welfare enhancing properties.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136235374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper investigates the issue of strategic delegation by considering the role of management centrality in contracting with different stakeholders. In a sequential negotiation unionized duopoly model, the results obtained by profit-maximizing entrepreneurial firms (where strategic choices are taken by firm owners and wage bargaining involves owners and unions) are compared against those of managerial firms (where strategic choices are delegated to managers who are also involved in wage bargaining vis-à-vis unions). Differences in the relative bargaining power among stakeholders (owners, managers and unions) play a key role in determining optimal delegation contracts, as well as the endogenous choice by firm owners to delegate strategic decisions to the management. Moreover, the distribution of stakeholders’ relative bargaining power affects firms’ profitability and overall welfare. In particular, to minimize potential conflict of interests between firm owners and the overall society, regulation directed to soften the managers’ bargaining strength vis-à-vis shareholders must be designed and implemented.
{"title":"Management Centrality in Sequential Bargaining: Implications for Strategic Delegation, Welfare, and Stakeholder Conflict","authors":"Domenico Buccella, Nicola Meccheri","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2022-0076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2022-0076","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper investigates the issue of strategic delegation by considering the role of management centrality in contracting with different stakeholders. In a sequential negotiation unionized duopoly model, the results obtained by profit-maximizing entrepreneurial firms (where strategic choices are taken by firm owners and wage bargaining involves owners and unions) are compared against those of managerial firms (where strategic choices are delegated to managers who are also involved in wage bargaining vis-à-vis unions). Differences in the relative bargaining power among stakeholders (owners, managers and unions) play a key role in determining optimal delegation contracts, as well as the endogenous choice by firm owners to delegate strategic decisions to the management. Moreover, the distribution of stakeholders’ relative bargaining power affects firms’ profitability and overall welfare. In particular, to minimize potential conflict of interests between firm owners and the overall society, regulation directed to soften the managers’ bargaining strength vis-à-vis shareholders must be designed and implemented.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"213 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135109526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We study how decentralized transfers, originated by a selfish motive to preserve direct links, affect the resilience of a network against a shock. Well-off agents transfer resources to other agents in order to prevent the shock from reaching their neighbors. We show that the connectivity of a well-defined portion of the network, specifically, the propagation network, determines the resilience of the entire network. We also show how, although transfers are allocated to a subset of agents, the resilience effect of these transfers is amplified. Lastly, we show that the wealth distribution impacts resilience by determining the incentives of the agents to transfers resources.
{"title":"Transfers and Resilience in Economic Networks","authors":"Alejandro A. Montecinos-Pearce, Francisco Parro","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2021-0152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2021-0152","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study how decentralized transfers, originated by a selfish motive to preserve direct links, affect the resilience of a network against a shock. Well-off agents transfer resources to other agents in order to prevent the shock from reaching their neighbors. We show that the connectivity of a well-defined portion of the network, specifically, the propagation network, determines the resilience of the entire network. We also show how, although transfers are allocated to a subset of agents, the resilience effect of these transfers is amplified. Lastly, we show that the wealth distribution impacts resilience by determining the incentives of the agents to transfers resources.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"0 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42555960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper adopts a green managerial delegation model in a polluting network industry wherein consumers form fulfilled rational expectations of network externalities. We show that firms are consistently incentivized to undertake ECSR (environmental corporate social responsibility) under price competition, while positive network externalities can increase the strategic level of ECSR. We also show that product substitutability between network products can play an important role in determining a firm’s strategic level of ECSR and resulting profits. Finally, ECSR is conducive to increasing environmental quality and social welfare in a high-polluting network industry. Therefore, the strategic adoption of ECSR in a network industry is Pareto-improving as environmental damage becomes serious.
{"title":"The Strategic Adoption of Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility with Network Externalities","authors":"Mingqing Xing, S. Lee","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2022-0136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2022-0136","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper adopts a green managerial delegation model in a polluting network industry wherein consumers form fulfilled rational expectations of network externalities. We show that firms are consistently incentivized to undertake ECSR (environmental corporate social responsibility) under price competition, while positive network externalities can increase the strategic level of ECSR. We also show that product substitutability between network products can play an important role in determining a firm’s strategic level of ECSR and resulting profits. Finally, ECSR is conducive to increasing environmental quality and social welfare in a high-polluting network industry. Therefore, the strategic adoption of ECSR in a network industry is Pareto-improving as environmental damage becomes serious.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49579700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract I study how private information on the evolution of preference interacts with the dynamic screening contracts in a principal-agent framework with short-term commitment. Privacy on the evolution of preference preserves the agent’s future information advantage, even following truthful revelation of preference. This relaxes the ratchet effects if the consumer’s initial preference is skewedly distributed and the evolution of preference is distributed sufficiently evenly, while it strengthens the ratchet effects if otherwise. Through its relaxation or strengthening of the ratchet effects, privacy on (im)persistency implies an improvement or distortion in the equilibrium revelation of preference. I also characterize the respective implications on the optimal contracts. Such privacy is not welcomed by all types of the agent, for it redistributes the information rent among different types. Privacy on the evolution of preference sustains in equilibrium, as it is not optimal for the principal to perfectly screen the (im)persistency per se.
{"title":"Screening with Privacy on (Im)persistency","authors":"A. Su","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2022-0118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2022-0118","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I study how private information on the evolution of preference interacts with the dynamic screening contracts in a principal-agent framework with short-term commitment. Privacy on the evolution of preference preserves the agent’s future information advantage, even following truthful revelation of preference. This relaxes the ratchet effects if the consumer’s initial preference is skewedly distributed and the evolution of preference is distributed sufficiently evenly, while it strengthens the ratchet effects if otherwise. Through its relaxation or strengthening of the ratchet effects, privacy on (im)persistency implies an improvement or distortion in the equilibrium revelation of preference. I also characterize the respective implications on the optimal contracts. Such privacy is not welcomed by all types of the agent, for it redistributes the information rent among different types. Privacy on the evolution of preference sustains in equilibrium, as it is not optimal for the principal to perfectly screen the (im)persistency per se.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42783506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper studies a monopolist’s choices of quality and shelf life of a perishable good in the presence of demand uncertainty and sunk production cost. It shows that, in response to demand uncertainty, the firm typically produces multiple products which differ in quality and shelf life; under certain conditions, products with a longer shelf life are of lower quality; a probability distribution of demand which first-order (second-order) stochastically dominates another induces more (more or fewer) product varieties. It also provides conditions under which a higher quality product has a higher absolute profit margin but a lower percentage margin.
{"title":"Quality, Shelf Life, and Demand Uncertainty","authors":"Anzhou Zhang","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2023-0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2023-0013","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper studies a monopolist’s choices of quality and shelf life of a perishable good in the presence of demand uncertainty and sunk production cost. It shows that, in response to demand uncertainty, the firm typically produces multiple products which differ in quality and shelf life; under certain conditions, products with a longer shelf life are of lower quality; a probability distribution of demand which first-order (second-order) stochastically dominates another induces more (more or fewer) product varieties. It also provides conditions under which a higher quality product has a higher absolute profit margin but a lower percentage margin.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49113135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2023-frontmatter2
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2023-frontmatter2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2023-frontmatter2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136161429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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