Heidegger's fundamental ontology and the human good in Aristotelian ethics

IF 0.8 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-31 DOI:10.1111/sjp.12545
John Hacker‐Wright
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Abstract

Abstract Neo‐Aristotelian ethical naturalists take the concept “human” to be central to practical philosophy. According to this view, practical philosophy aims at a distinctive human good that defines its subject matter. Hence, practical philosophy can survive neither the elimination of the concept nor its subsumption under a more general concept, such as that of the rational agent. The challenge central to properly formulating Aristotelian naturalism is: How can the concept of the human be specified in a way that captures the distinctive role that it is supposed to play in practical philosophy? For the view to be sustained, the concept “human” as it figures in practical philosophy must not designate rationality plus a set of facts that we learn empirically about ourselves and then consider from a detached standpoint of reason. Heidegger's existential analytic offers an approach to addressing the challenge to neo‐Aristotelian naturalism and, therefore, a way of capturing the sui generis human good. I aim to show that concepts of the existential analytic in Being and Time have their origin or parallels in readings of Aristotle and that they capture the distinctive character of the being that we are, exclusively, completely, and as a unity. I argue that fundamental ontology offers a way to grasp the integral unity and irreplaceability of the human that lies at the heart of the neo‐Aristotelian project.
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海德格尔的基本本体论与亚里士多德伦理学中的人的善
新亚里士多德伦理自然主义者将“人”的概念作为实践哲学的核心。根据这种观点,实践哲学的目标是定义其主题的独特的人类善。因此,实践哲学既不能消除概念,也不能将其纳入更一般的概念,如理性主体的概念。正确表述亚里士多德自然主义的核心挑战是:人类的概念如何以一种能够捕捉到它在实践哲学中应该扮演的独特角色的方式被指定?为了使这一观点站得住脚,实践哲学中的“人”这个概念不能把理性加上一系列我们从经验中了解到的关于我们自己的事实,然后从理性的超然立场来考虑。海德格尔的存在分析提供了一种方法来解决对新亚里士多德自然主义的挑战,因此,一种捕捉自属的人类善的方法。我的目的是要说明,在《存在与时间》中,存在分析的概念在亚里士多德的解读中有其起源或相似之处,它们捕捉到了我们存在的独特特征,即我们是唯一的、完整的、作为一个整体的存在。我认为,基本本体论提供了一种方法来把握人类的整体统一性和不可替代性,这是新亚里士多德计划的核心。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
36
期刊介绍: The Southern Journal of Philosophy has long provided a forum for the expression of philosophical ideas and welcome articles written from all philosophical perspectives, including both the analytic and continental traditions, as well as the history of philosophy. This commitment to philosophical pluralism is reflected in the long list of notable figures whose work has appeared in the journal, including Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hubert Dreyfus, George Santayana, Wilfrid Sellars, and Richard Sorabji.
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