Prudential Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit

IF 1.1 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2023-09-11 DOI:10.1093/pq/pqad082

Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson, Olle Risberg

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract In this paper, we put forward two novel arguments against the counterfactual comparative account (CCA) of harm and benefit. In both arguments, the central theme is that CCA conflicts with plausible judgements about benefit and prudence.

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反事实比较损益核算的审慎问题

摘要本文针对损害与利益的反事实比较解释提出了两个新的论点。在这两个论点中，中心主题都是CCA与关于利益和审慎的合理判断相冲突。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PHILOSOPHY-

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1.70

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0.00%

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