Abstract Representationalists hold that perceptual experience is a conscious representational state with content, something which is accurate or inaccurate in certain conditions. The most common version of Representationalism takes perceptual content to be singular in the object-place and otherwise consisting of attribution of properties (Singularism/Attributionism). Schellenberg has recently developed a version on which perceptual content is singular even in the property-place in containing a de re mode of presentation of a property-instance (Particularism). In this paper, I show that Particularism faces a version of the problem of the Unity of Perceptual Content. Namely, its supporters haven’t told us how objects can be bound together with property-instances into a content such that it represents them and has accuracy-conditions. Furthermore, I argue that Particularists face an in-principle obstacle in solving it. In contrast, Attributionists can solve the problem and that establishes their view as the only game in town.
{"title":"The Unity of Perceptual Content","authors":"Indrek Reiland","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad105","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Representationalists hold that perceptual experience is a conscious representational state with content, something which is accurate or inaccurate in certain conditions. The most common version of Representationalism takes perceptual content to be singular in the object-place and otherwise consisting of attribution of properties (Singularism/Attributionism). Schellenberg has recently developed a version on which perceptual content is singular even in the property-place in containing a de re mode of presentation of a property-instance (Particularism). In this paper, I show that Particularism faces a version of the problem of the Unity of Perceptual Content. Namely, its supporters haven’t told us how objects can be bound together with property-instances into a content such that it represents them and has accuracy-conditions. Furthermore, I argue that Particularists face an in-principle obstacle in solving it. In contrast, Attributionists can solve the problem and that establishes their view as the only game in town.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135540526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Talking About: An Intentionalist Theory of Reference Get access Talking About: An Intentionalist Theory of Reference. By Elmar Unnsteinsson. (Oxford: OUP, 2022. Pp. xii + 202. Price £64.00.) Eliot Michaelson Eliot Michaelson King’s College London, UK https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2181-5423 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad089, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad089 Published: 06 November 2023 Article history Received: 29 August 2023 Accepted: 31 August 2023 Published: 06 November 2023
期刊文章《论:一种意向性指称理论》获取《论:一种意向性指称理论》。埃尔玛·昂斯坦松著。(牛津:牛津大学，2022年。Pp. xii + 202。价格£64.00)。艾略特·迈克尔森艾略特·迈克尔森英国伦敦国王学院https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2181-5423搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者哲学季刊，pqad089, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad089出版日期:2023年11月6日文章历史收稿日期:2023年8月29日接受日期:2023年8月31日出版日期:2023年11月6日
{"title":"Talking About: An Intentionalist Theory of Reference","authors":"Eliot Michaelson","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad089","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Talking About: An Intentionalist Theory of Reference Get access Talking About: An Intentionalist Theory of Reference. By Elmar Unnsteinsson. (Oxford: OUP, 2022. Pp. xii + 202. Price £64.00.) Eliot Michaelson Eliot Michaelson King’s College London, UK https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2181-5423 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad089, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad089 Published: 06 November 2023 Article history Received: 29 August 2023 Accepted: 31 August 2023 Published: 06 November 2023","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135723744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Philosophers and psychologists sometimes categorize emotions like surprise and curiosity as specifically epistemic. Is there some reasonably unified and interesting class of emotions here? If so, what unifies it? This paper proposes and defends an evaluative account of epistemic emotions: What it is to be an epistemic emotion is to have fittingness conditions that distinctively involve some epistemic evaluation. We argue that this view has significant advantages over alternative proposals and is a promising way to identify a limited and interesting class of emotions.
{"title":"A Fitting Definition of Epistemic Emotions","authors":"Michael Deigan, Juan S Piñeros Glasscock","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad096","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad096","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Philosophers and psychologists sometimes categorize emotions like surprise and curiosity as specifically epistemic. Is there some reasonably unified and interesting class of emotions here? If so, what unifies it? This paper proposes and defends an evaluative account of epistemic emotions: What it is to be an epistemic emotion is to have fittingness conditions that distinctively involve some epistemic evaluation. We argue that this view has significant advantages over alternative proposals and is a promising way to identify a limited and interesting class of emotions.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136232852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper, we focus on the moral responsibility of organized groups in light of historicism. Historicism is the view that any morally responsible agent must satisfy certain historical conditions, such as not having been manipulated. We set out four examples involving morally responsible organized groups that pose problems for existing accounts of historicism. We then pose a trilemma: one can reject group responsibility, reject historicism, or revise historicism. We pursue the third option. We formulate a Manipulation Condition and a Guarding Condition as addendums to historicism that are necessary to accommodate our cases of group responsibility.
{"title":"Group Responsibility and Historicism","authors":"Stephanie Collins, Niels de Haan","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad104","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, we focus on the moral responsibility of organized groups in light of historicism. Historicism is the view that any morally responsible agent must satisfy certain historical conditions, such as not having been manipulated. We set out four examples involving morally responsible organized groups that pose problems for existing accounts of historicism. We then pose a trilemma: one can reject group responsibility, reject historicism, or revise historicism. We pursue the third option. We formulate a Manipulation Condition and a Guarding Condition as addendums to historicism that are necessary to accommodate our cases of group responsibility.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135111480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract How should we respond to moral theories that put excessive demands on individual agents? Intramoral strategies concern the content of morality and set limits on how exacting moral demands may be. Extramoral strategies concern the normative status of morality and set limits on how significant moral demands may be. While both strategies are often discussed separately, I focus on a specific aspect of how they relate to each other: Do intramoral approaches assume that extramoral approaches fail, and if so, does that render them implausible? This challenge becomes apparent when the two strategies are considered together, and my goal is to show how it can be dealt with. In particular, I argue that intramoral strategies do not depend on the failure of extramoral strategies: Even if morality has limited practical significance (which I also doubt), moral theories can be criticised for being too demanding in terms of content.
{"title":"Two Ways of Limiting Moral Demands","authors":"Lukas Naegeli","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad103","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How should we respond to moral theories that put excessive demands on individual agents? Intramoral strategies concern the content of morality and set limits on how exacting moral demands may be. Extramoral strategies concern the normative status of morality and set limits on how significant moral demands may be. While both strategies are often discussed separately, I focus on a specific aspect of how they relate to each other: Do intramoral approaches assume that extramoral approaches fail, and if so, does that render them implausible? This challenge becomes apparent when the two strategies are considered together, and my goal is to show how it can be dealt with. In particular, I argue that intramoral strategies do not depend on the failure of extramoral strategies: Even if morality has limited practical significance (which I also doubt), moral theories can be criticised for being too demanding in terms of content.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135567840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Synthetic physicalism—understood as the view that while mental concepts are distinct from physical concepts, mental properties are nonetheless identical to physical properties—is the dominant type of reductive physicalism in the philosophy of mind. With a focus on phenomenal concepts, this article examines two competing versions of synthetic physicalism: the demonstrative approach and the constitutive approach, both of which attempt to cash out the common idea that phenomenal concepts directly refer to phenomenal properties. I aim to argue that the synthetic physicalist is impaled on a dilemma in addressing what I call the problem of double aspect: the mental-physical conceptual distinction seems to imply property dualism at a new level. Either she adopts the demonstrative approach or she goes for the constitutive approach, but neither option is acceptable.
{"title":"Phenomenal Concepts, Direct Reference, and the Problem of Double Aspect","authors":"Lei Zhong","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad100","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Synthetic physicalism—understood as the view that while mental concepts are distinct from physical concepts, mental properties are nonetheless identical to physical properties—is the dominant type of reductive physicalism in the philosophy of mind. With a focus on phenomenal concepts, this article examines two competing versions of synthetic physicalism: the demonstrative approach and the constitutive approach, both of which attempt to cash out the common idea that phenomenal concepts directly refer to phenomenal properties. I aim to argue that the synthetic physicalist is impaled on a dilemma in addressing what I call the problem of double aspect: the mental-physical conceptual distinction seems to imply property dualism at a new level. Either she adopts the demonstrative approach or she goes for the constitutive approach, but neither option is acceptable.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135567904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract A minimal constraint on normative reasons seems to be that if some fact is a reason for an agent to φ (act, believe, or feel), the agent could come to know that fact. This constraint is threatened by a well-known type of counterexamples. Self-effacing reasons are facts that intuitively constitute reasons for an agent to φ, but that if they were to become known, they would cease to be reasons for that agent. The challenge posed by self-effacing reasons bears important structural similarities with a range of epistemic paradoxes, most notably the Knowability Paradox. In this article, we investigate the similarities and differences between the two arguments. Moreover, we assess whether some of the approaches to the Knowability Paradox could help solve the challenge posed by self-effacing reasons. We argue that at least two popular approaches to the paradox can be turned into promising strategies for addressing the self-effacing reasons problem.
{"title":"Self-Effacing Reasons and Epistemic Constraints: Some Lessons from the Knowability Paradox","authors":"Massimiliano Carrara, Davide Fassio","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad095","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A minimal constraint on normative reasons seems to be that if some fact is a reason for an agent to φ (act, believe, or feel), the agent could come to know that fact. This constraint is threatened by a well-known type of counterexamples. Self-effacing reasons are facts that intuitively constitute reasons for an agent to φ, but that if they were to become known, they would cease to be reasons for that agent. The challenge posed by self-effacing reasons bears important structural similarities with a range of epistemic paradoxes, most notably the Knowability Paradox. In this article, we investigate the similarities and differences between the two arguments. Moreover, we assess whether some of the approaches to the Knowability Paradox could help solve the challenge posed by self-effacing reasons. We argue that at least two popular approaches to the paradox can be turned into promising strategies for addressing the self-effacing reasons problem.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135567837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The aim of this paper is to defend moral relativism from the accusation that it would make it irrational to classify past changes in public opinion as instances of moral progress, for they would constitute an improvement only from our current point of view. The argument is this. For our assessment of a change in public opinion as an instance of moral progress to be rational, we need to take the moral claims made before the change to be false simpliciter while being open to the possibility that we ourselves change our minds at some point. These two things can be made compatible if we construe moral relativism as taking the truth of moral claims to be relative to the context of assessment. Thus understood, moral relativism is in fact the only view that makes room for talk of moral progress, as the rest of candidate positions make it irrational.
{"title":"Friends with the Good: Moral Relativism and Moral Progress","authors":"Eduardo Pérez-Navarro","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad101","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The aim of this paper is to defend moral relativism from the accusation that it would make it irrational to classify past changes in public opinion as instances of moral progress, for they would constitute an improvement only from our current point of view. The argument is this. For our assessment of a change in public opinion as an instance of moral progress to be rational, we need to take the moral claims made before the change to be false simpliciter while being open to the possibility that we ourselves change our minds at some point. These two things can be made compatible if we construe moral relativism as taking the truth of moral claims to be relative to the context of assessment. Thus understood, moral relativism is in fact the only view that makes room for talk of moral progress, as the rest of candidate positions make it irrational.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135567901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Heidegger and the Contradiction of Being: An Analytic Interpretation of the Late Heidegger Get access Heidegger and the Contradiction of Being: An Analytic Interpretation of the Late Heidegger. By Filippo Casati. (New York & London: Routledge, 2022. Pp. 186. Price £31.19.) Marco Simionato Marco Simionato Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Philosophy and Cultural Heritage Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad102, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad102 Published: 18 October 2023 Article history Received: 27 September 2023 Published: 18 October 2023
《海德格尔与存在的矛盾:海德格尔晚期的分析解释》。菲利波·卡萨蒂著。(纽约和伦敦:劳特利奇出版社，2022年)186页。价格£31.19)。Marco Simionato Marco Simionato Ca' Foscari威尼斯大学，哲学和文化遗产搜索作者的其他作品上:牛津学术谷歌学者哲学季刊，pqad102, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad102发布:2023年10月18日文章历史收稿:2023年9月27日发布:2023年10月18日
{"title":"Heidegger and the Contradiction of Being: An Analytic Interpretation of the Late Heidegger","authors":"Marco Simionato","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad102","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Heidegger and the Contradiction of Being: An Analytic Interpretation of the Late Heidegger Get access Heidegger and the Contradiction of Being: An Analytic Interpretation of the Late Heidegger. By Filippo Casati. (New York & London: Routledge, 2022. Pp. 186. Price £31.19.) Marco Simionato Marco Simionato Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Philosophy and Cultural Heritage Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad102, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad102 Published: 18 October 2023 Article history Received: 27 September 2023 Published: 18 October 2023","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135824074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Quine's Philosophy: An Introduction Get access Quine's Philosophy: An Introduction. By Gary Kemp. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023. Pp. viii + 198. Price £19.99) Benjamin Marschall Benjamin Marschall Trinity College, University of Cambridge, UK Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad097, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad097 Published: 09 October 2023
期刊文章《奎因哲学导论》获取《奎因哲学导论》。加里·坎普著。(伦敦:布卢姆斯伯里学院，2023)p. viii + 198。(价格19.99英镑)本杰明·马歇尔本杰明·马歇尔英国剑桥大学三一学院搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术b谷歌学者哲学季刊，pqad097, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad097出版日期:2023年10月9日
{"title":"Quine's Philosophy: An Introduction","authors":"Benjamin Marschall","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad097","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Quine's Philosophy: An Introduction Get access Quine's Philosophy: An Introduction. By Gary Kemp. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023. Pp. viii + 198. Price £19.99) Benjamin Marschall Benjamin Marschall Trinity College, University of Cambridge, UK Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad097, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad097 Published: 09 October 2023","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135141964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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