Populations of Neurons and Rocks? Against a Generalization of the Selected Effects Theory of Functions

Abstract

Abstract Millikan’s (1984. Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism . MIT Press) selected effects theory of functions states that functions are effects for which the ancestors of a trait were selected for . As the function is an effect a thing’s ancestors produced, only things that are reproductions in some sense can have functions. Against this reproduction requirement, Garson (2019. What Biological Functions Are and Why They Matter . Cambridge University Press) argues that not only processes of differential reproduction but also processes of differential persistence can lead to new functions. Since such “persistence functions” have the same explanatory power as traditional selected effects functions, selected effects theorists should include them in their theory. In this paper, I will defend Millikan’s theory against this argument. I will show that the proponents of the generalized theory have yet to provide a working notion of populations that avoids a liberality problem. Further, I will argue that persistence functions are at best a marginal case of functions due to their restricted explanatory power.