Abstract Evolutionary psychology (EP) theorizes that contemporary women and men differ psychologically, particularly in mating and sexuality. It is further argued that EP research on gender-specific psychological differences is compatible with feminist perspectives. This paper analyzes if integrating EP scholarship on gender differences into feminist scholarship is possible by investigating EP’s core scientific commitments. I will argue that EP’s theories, hypotheses, and empirical findings that pertain to the study of gender do not align with its core values based on Longino’s feminist theoretical virtues as outlined in the 1996 article “Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Values in Science: Rethinking the Dichotomy.” I employ feminist theoretical virtues as tools for revealing how certain theories, models, and hypotheses rely upon, promote contentious norms, and suppress gender. I will defend the thesis that EP theories, hypotheses, and empirical findings are often empirically inadequate, androcentric, and ontologically too homogeneous. Further, EP employs single-factor control models, has no straightforward practical application, and might even be politically dangerous. These characteristics challenge a successful integration of EP into feminism.
摘要 进化心理学（EP）理论认为，当代女性和男性在心理上存在差异，尤其是在交配和性行为方面。本文还进一步论证了进化心理学关于性别差异的研究与女权主义观点是一致的。本文通过研究 EP 的核心科学承诺，分析将 EP 关于性别差异的学术研究融入女性主义学术研究是否可行。我将根据朗吉诺在 1996 年发表的文章《科学中的认知和非认知价值》中概述的女性主义理论美德，论证 EP 有关性别研究的理论、假设和实证结果与其核心价值不一致：重新思考二分法 "一文中所概述的女性主义理论美德。我将女性主义理论美德作为工具，揭示某些理论、模型和假设是如何依赖、促进有争议的规范并压制性别的。我将为以下论点辩护：EP 理论、假说和实证研究结果往往在经验上是不充分的，是以男性为中心的，而且在本体论上过于单一。此外，EP 采用单因素控制模型，没有直接的实际应用，甚至可能具有政治危险性。这些特点对 EP 成功融入女权主义提出了挑战。
{"title":"Why Evolutionary Psychology Is Not Feminist: Assessing the Core Values and Commitments of the Evolutionary Study of Gender Differences","authors":"Cristina Somcutean","doi":"10.1515/krt-2023-0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2023-0022","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Evolutionary psychology (EP) theorizes that contemporary women and men differ psychologically, particularly in mating and sexuality. It is further argued that EP research on gender-specific psychological differences is compatible with feminist perspectives. This paper analyzes if integrating EP scholarship on gender differences into feminist scholarship is possible by investigating EP’s core scientific commitments. I will argue that EP’s theories, hypotheses, and empirical findings that pertain to the study of gender do not align with its core values based on Longino’s feminist theoretical virtues as outlined in the 1996 article “Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Values in Science: Rethinking the Dichotomy.” I employ feminist theoretical virtues as tools for revealing how certain theories, models, and hypotheses rely upon, promote contentious norms, and suppress gender. I will defend the thesis that EP theories, hypotheses, and empirical findings are often empirically inadequate, androcentric, and ontologically too homogeneous. Further, EP employs single-factor control models, has no straightforward practical application, and might even be politically dangerous. These characteristics challenge a successful integration of EP into feminism.","PeriodicalId":484424,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"6 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139438936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Millikan’s (1984. Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism . MIT Press) selected effects theory of functions states that functions are effects for which the ancestors of a trait were selected for . As the function is an effect a thing’s ancestors produced, only things that are reproductions in some sense can have functions. Against this reproduction requirement, Garson (2019. What Biological Functions Are and Why They Matter . Cambridge University Press) argues that not only processes of differential reproduction but also processes of differential persistence can lead to new functions. Since such “persistence functions” have the same explanatory power as traditional selected effects functions, selected effects theorists should include them in their theory. In this paper, I will defend Millikan’s theory against this argument. I will show that the proponents of the generalized theory have yet to provide a working notion of populations that avoids a liberality problem. Further, I will argue that persistence functions are at best a marginal case of functions due to their restricted explanatory power.
{"title":"Populations of Neurons and Rocks? Against a Generalization of the Selected Effects Theory of Functions","authors":"Jakob Roloff","doi":"10.1515/krt-2023-0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2023-0011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Millikan’s (1984. Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism . MIT Press) selected effects theory of functions states that functions are effects for which the ancestors of a trait were selected for . As the function is an effect a thing’s ancestors produced, only things that are reproductions in some sense can have functions. Against this reproduction requirement, Garson (2019. What Biological Functions Are and Why They Matter . Cambridge University Press) argues that not only processes of differential reproduction but also processes of differential persistence can lead to new functions. Since such “persistence functions” have the same explanatory power as traditional selected effects functions, selected effects theorists should include them in their theory. In this paper, I will defend Millikan’s theory against this argument. I will show that the proponents of the generalized theory have yet to provide a working notion of populations that avoids a liberality problem. Further, I will argue that persistence functions are at best a marginal case of functions due to their restricted explanatory power.","PeriodicalId":484424,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136114455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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