Health insurance menu design for large employers

IF 2.8 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-28 DOI:10.1111/1756-2171.12452
Kate Ho, Robin S. Lee
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract We provide a framework for large employers designing a menu of health plan offerings that differ on both financial and nonfinancial dimensions. Using administrative data from Harvard University, we estimate a model of plan choice and utilization, and evaluate the benefits of cost sharing and plan variety. For this population of consumers, and a single plan with a generous out‐of‐pocket maximum and zero deductible, modest cost sharing of approximately 30% maximizes average employee surplus. Gains from offering choice are meaningful only if financial differentiation is paired with differentiation along other dimensions where consumer preferences are correlated with efficient coverage levels.
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为大型雇主设计健康保险菜单
摘要:我们为大型雇主提供了一个框架,用于设计在财务和非财务维度上不同的健康计划提供菜单。利用哈佛大学的管理数据,我们估计了一个计划选择和利用的模型,并评估了成本分担和计划多样性的效益。对于这样的消费者群体,以及一个拥有慷慨的自付最高额度和零免赔额的单一计划,适度的成本分摊约30%,使平均员工剩余最大化。只有当财务差异化与消费者偏好与有效覆盖水平相关的其他维度的差异化配对时,提供选择的收益才有意义。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.60
自引率
4.30%
发文量
28
期刊介绍: The RAND Journal of Economics publishes theoretical and empirical research on industrial organization and closely related topics, including contracts, organizations, law and economics, and regulation. The RAND Journal of Economics, formerly the Bell Journal of Economics, is published quarterly by The RAND Corporation, in conjunction with Blackwell Publishing.
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