Abstract We provide a framework for large employers designing a menu of health plan offerings that differ on both financial and nonfinancial dimensions. Using administrative data from Harvard University, we estimate a model of plan choice and utilization, and evaluate the benefits of cost sharing and plan variety. For this population of consumers, and a single plan with a generous out‐of‐pocket maximum and zero deductible, modest cost sharing of approximately 30% maximizes average employee surplus. Gains from offering choice are meaningful only if financial differentiation is paired with differentiation along other dimensions where consumer preferences are correlated with efficient coverage levels.
{"title":"Health insurance menu design for large employers","authors":"Kate Ho, Robin S. Lee","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12452","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We provide a framework for large employers designing a menu of health plan offerings that differ on both financial and nonfinancial dimensions. Using administrative data from Harvard University, we estimate a model of plan choice and utilization, and evaluate the benefits of cost sharing and plan variety. For this population of consumers, and a single plan with a generous out‐of‐pocket maximum and zero deductible, modest cost sharing of approximately 30% maximizes average employee surplus. Gains from offering choice are meaningful only if financial differentiation is paired with differentiation along other dimensions where consumer preferences are correlated with efficient coverage levels.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136158359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We model dynamic competition between firms which improve their products through learning from customer data, either by pooling different customers' data (across‐user learning) or by learning from repeated usage of the same customers (within‐user learning). We show how a firm's competitive advantage is affected by the shape of firms' learning functions, asymmetries between their learning functions, the extent of data accumulation, and customer beliefs. We also explore how public policies toward data sharing, user privacy, and killer data acquisitions affect competitive dynamics and efficiency. Finally, we show conditions under which a consumer coordination problem arises endogenously from data‐enabled learning.
{"title":"Data‐enabled learning, network effects, and competitive advantage","authors":"Andrei Hagiu, Julian Wright","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12453","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We model dynamic competition between firms which improve their products through learning from customer data, either by pooling different customers' data (across‐user learning) or by learning from repeated usage of the same customers (within‐user learning). We show how a firm's competitive advantage is affected by the shape of firms' learning functions, asymmetries between their learning functions, the extent of data accumulation, and customer beliefs. We also explore how public policies toward data sharing, user privacy, and killer data acquisitions affect competitive dynamics and efficiency. Finally, we show conditions under which a consumer coordination problem arises endogenously from data‐enabled learning.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136233305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Utilizing a novel dataset from an online travel intermediary, we study the effects of the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The opt‐in requirement of GDPR resulted in a 12.5% drop in the intermediary‐observed consumers, but the remaining consumers are trackable for a longer period of time. Our findings imply that privacy‐conscious consumers exert privacy externalities on opt‐in consumers, making them more predictable. Consistent with this finding, the average value of the remaining consumers to advertisers has increased, offsetting some of the losses from consumer opt‐outs.
{"title":"The effect of privacy regulation on the data industry: empirical evidence from GDPR","authors":"Guy Aridor, Yeon-Koo Che, Tobias Salz","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12455","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Utilizing a novel dataset from an online travel intermediary, we study the effects of the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The opt‐in requirement of GDPR resulted in a 12.5% drop in the intermediary‐observed consumers, but the remaining consumers are trackable for a longer period of time. Our findings imply that privacy‐conscious consumers exert privacy externalities on opt‐in consumers, making them more predictable. Consistent with this finding, the average value of the remaining consumers to advertisers has increased, offsetting some of the losses from consumer opt‐outs.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135666557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract A monopolist sells an object characterized by multiple attributes. A buyer can be one of many types, differing in their willingness to pay for each attribute. The seller can provide arbitrary attribute information in the form of a statistical experiment. To screen different types, the seller offers a menu of options that specify information prices, experiments, and object prices. I characterize revenue‐maximizing menus. All experiments belong to a class of linear disclosure rules. An optimal menu may be nondiscriminatory. The analysis highlights the importance of demand microstructure and the benefits of information control in trade settings.
{"title":"Disclosure and pricing of attributes","authors":"Alex Smolin","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12451","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A monopolist sells an object characterized by multiple attributes. A buyer can be one of many types, differing in their willingness to pay for each attribute. The seller can provide arbitrary attribute information in the form of a statistical experiment. To screen different types, the seller offers a menu of options that specify information prices, experiments, and object prices. I characterize revenue‐maximizing menus. All experiments belong to a class of linear disclosure rules. An optimal menu may be nondiscriminatory. The analysis highlights the importance of demand microstructure and the benefits of information control in trade settings.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135824302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This research studies the effects of mortgage subsidies and asymmetric information in the US mortgage market. I exploit discontinuities in interest rates generated by pricing rules and find patterns consistent with advantageous selection. I estimate an industry model that highlights the relationship between mortgage subsidies, intermediary lenders' incentives, and borrowers' advantageous selection. The model shows that mortgage subsidies enable advantageous selection, creating a deadweight loss of $7.90 billion. The counterfactual analysis reveals that pricing borrowers' private information eliminates advantageous selection only if mortgages are not subsidized. Without the mortgage subsidy, pricing borrowers' private information improves efficiency by $728.58 million.
{"title":"Advantageous selection with intermediaries: a study of GSE‐securitized mortgage loans","authors":"Hsin‐Tien Tsai","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12454","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This research studies the effects of mortgage subsidies and asymmetric information in the US mortgage market. I exploit discontinuities in interest rates generated by pricing rules and find patterns consistent with advantageous selection. I estimate an industry model that highlights the relationship between mortgage subsidies, intermediary lenders' incentives, and borrowers' advantageous selection. The model shows that mortgage subsidies enable advantageous selection, creating a deadweight loss of $7.90 billion. The counterfactual analysis reveals that pricing borrowers' private information eliminates advantageous selection only if mortgages are not subsidized. Without the mortgage subsidy, pricing borrowers' private information improves efficiency by $728.58 million.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135993336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We study efficient resolution of partnership disputes in which, departing from the partnership dissolution literature, dissolution need not be efficient. We characterize which disputes can be resolved efficiently under both one‐ and two‐sided private information, and show that unless a partnership is sufficiently ineffective, efficient resolution is impossible. We propose simple dispute‐resolution procedures implementing the efficient outcome whenever possible. Finally, we characterize second‐best mechanisms when efficient resolution is impossible and private information is one sided.
{"title":"Efficient resolution of partnership disputes","authors":"Daniel Fershtman, Béla Szabadi, Cédric Wasser","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12450","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study efficient resolution of partnership disputes in which, departing from the partnership dissolution literature, dissolution need not be efficient. We characterize which disputes can be resolved efficiently under both one‐ and two‐sided private information, and show that unless a partnership is sufficiently ineffective, efficient resolution is impossible. We propose simple dispute‐resolution procedures implementing the efficient outcome whenever possible. Finally, we characterize second‐best mechanisms when efficient resolution is impossible and private information is one sided.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135918047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dirk Engelmann, J. Frank, Alexander K. Koch, Marieta Valente
Winners in online auctions frequently fail to complete purchases. Major auction platforms therefore allow “second‐chance” offers (the runner‐up bidder pays his own bid price) and let sellers leave negative feedback on buyers who default. We show theoretically that (i) all else equal, the availability of second‐chance offers reduces bids; (ii) sellers have no incentive to exclude bidders, even if they are nearly certain to default; (iii) buyer reputation systems reward bidders known to default with a positive probability. Our experiments show that the economic forces identified in the theoretical model are important enough to have predictive power for bidder behavior.
{"title":"Second‐chance offers and buyer reputation systems: theory and evidence on auctions with default","authors":"Dirk Engelmann, J. Frank, Alexander K. Koch, Marieta Valente","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12448","url":null,"abstract":"Winners in online auctions frequently fail to complete purchases. Major auction platforms therefore allow “second‐chance” offers (the runner‐up bidder pays his own bid price) and let sellers leave negative feedback on buyers who default. We show theoretically that (i) all else equal, the availability of second‐chance offers reduces bids; (ii) sellers have no incentive to exclude bidders, even if they are nearly certain to default; (iii) buyer reputation systems reward bidders known to default with a positive probability. Our experiments show that the economic forces identified in the theoretical model are important enough to have predictive power for bidder behavior.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45345515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
José‐Antonio Espín‐Sánchez, Álvaro Parra, Yuzhou Wang
We study equilibria in static entry games with single‐dimensional private information. Our framework embeds many models commonly used in applied work, allowing for firm heterogeneity and selective entry. We introduce the notion of strength, which summarizes a firm's ability to endure competition. In environments of applied interest, an equilibrium in which entry strategies are ordered according to the firms' strengths always exists. We call this equilibrium herculean. We derive simple and testable sufficient conditions guaranteeing equilibrium uniqueness and, consequently, a unique counterfactual prediction.
{"title":"Equilibrium uniqueness in entry games with private information","authors":"José‐Antonio Espín‐Sánchez, Álvaro Parra, Yuzhou Wang","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12449","url":null,"abstract":"We study equilibria in static entry games with single‐dimensional private information. Our framework embeds many models commonly used in applied work, allowing for firm heterogeneity and selective entry. We introduce the notion of strength, which summarizes a firm's ability to endure competition. In environments of applied interest, an equilibrium in which entry strategies are ordered according to the firms' strengths always exists. We call this equilibrium herculean. We derive simple and testable sufficient conditions guaranteeing equilibrium uniqueness and, consequently, a unique counterfactual prediction.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41802352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Continuations allow inventors to add new claims to old patents, leading to concerns about unintended infringement and holdup. We study how continuations are used in standard essential patent (SEP) prosecution. Difference in differences estimates suggest that continuation filings increase by 80%–121% after a standard is published. This effect is larger for applicants with licensing‐based business models and for patent examiners with a higher allowance rate. Claim language is more similar for SEPs filed after standard publication, and late‐filing is positively correlated with litigation. These findings suggest widespread use of continuations to draft patents that are infringed by already‐published standards.
{"title":"Patenting inventions or inventing patents? Continuation practice at the USPTO","authors":"Cesare Righi, Timothy S. Simcoe","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12446","url":null,"abstract":"Continuations allow inventors to add new claims to old patents, leading to concerns about unintended infringement and holdup. We study how continuations are used in standard essential patent (SEP) prosecution. Difference in differences estimates suggest that continuation filings increase by 80%–121% after a standard is published. This effect is larger for applicants with licensing‐based business models and for patent examiners with a higher allowance rate. Claim language is more similar for SEPs filed after standard publication, and late‐filing is positively correlated with litigation. These findings suggest widespread use of continuations to draft patents that are infringed by already‐published standards.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43533882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article investigates the effect of lobbying on government contract allocation. I consider how lobbying affects both total contract spending and the distribution of contracts between firms. I solve a novel contest model which incorporates these two effects, and then I structurally estimate it using a panel of federal contractors. The results suggest that lobbying increases contract spending by $8.837 billion (3.22%) per year. However, its effects on the observed contract distribution and firm revenues are relatively small. Lastly, I find that increasing competition in procurement generally results in less lobbying.
{"title":"Lobbying for government appropriations","authors":"Christian Cox","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12447","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article investigates the effect of lobbying on government contract allocation. I consider how lobbying affects both total contract spending and the distribution of contracts between firms. I solve a novel contest model which incorporates these two effects, and then I structurally estimate it using a panel of federal contractors. The results suggest that lobbying increases contract spending by $8.837 billion (3.22%) per year. However, its effects on the observed contract distribution and firm revenues are relatively small. Lastly, I find that increasing competition in procurement generally results in less lobbying.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135015548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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