The Suspension Problem for Epistemic Democracy

Abstract

Abstract Recently, many normative theories of democracy have taken an epistemic turn. Rather than focus on democracy's morally desirable features, they argue that democracy is valuable (at least in part) because it tends to produce correct political decisions. I argue that these theories place epistemic demands on citizens that conflict with core democratic commitments. First, I discuss a well-known challenge to epistemic arguments for democracy that I call the ‘deference problem’. I then argue that framing debates about this deference problem in terms of work on epistemic defeat reveals a structurally similar but more serious challenge for epistemic arguments for democracy. Succinctly put, the problem is that if democracy tends to produce correct political decisions, then those in the minority might be required to suspend beliefs about political matters; however, this requirement conflicts with the pivotal democratic principle of self-government. Call this the ‘suspension problem’.