Politics versus Preparedness? How Electoral Incentives Affect the Provision of Local Disaster Public Goods in the Philippines

Abstract

There is an expectation that elections create responsive policymakers that provide optimal public services. However, does this hold true when it comes to non- particularistic and non-immediate goods like disaster preparedness projects? In this exploratory study, I argue that electoral incentives can discourage the provision of local disaster public goods due to their non-particularistic and non-immediate nature. Using datasets containing electoral data and government ratings of local disaster public goods in Philippine cities and municipalities from 2017 to 2021, I find evidence that local disaster public goods provision is affected by (1) the intensity of local electoral competition and (2) the timing of the elections. Estimates suggest that local disaster public goods decline in quality one year before elections. Furthermore, in municipalities, more intense electoral competition is linked to lower quality provision of these collective goods. The findings illustrate how electoral incentives distort leaders’ policymaking against their constituencies’ long-term, common needs.