'Til Dowry Do Us Part: Bargaining and Violence in Indian Families

IF 7.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Review of Economics and Statistics Pub Date : 2023-11-29 DOI:10.1162/rest_a_01399
Rossella Calvi, Ajinkya Keskar
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Abstract

We develop a non-cooperative bargaining model with incomplete information linking dowry payments, domestic violence, resource allocation between a husband and a wife, and separation. Our model generates several predictions, which we test empirically using amendments to the Indian anti-dowry law as a natural experiment. We document a decline in women's bargaining power and separations, and a surge in domestic violence following the amendments. These unintended effects are attenuated when social stigma against separation is low and, in some circumstances, when gains from marriage are high. Whenever possible, parents increase investment in their daughters' human capital to compensate for lower dowries.
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直到嫁妆将我们分开印度家庭中的讨价还价与暴力
我们建立了一个非合作讨价还价模型,该模型具有将嫁妆支付、家庭暴力、丈夫和妻子之间的资源分配以及分居联系起来的不完全信息。我们利用印度反嫁妆法修正案作为自然实验,对模型中的几项预测进行了实证检验。我们记录了修订后妇女议价能力和分居率的下降,以及家庭暴力的激增。当社会对分居的鄙视程度较低时,以及在某些情况下,当婚姻的收益较高时,这些意外影响就会减弱。只要有可能,父母就会增加对女儿人力资本的投资,以补偿较低的嫁妆。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
175
期刊介绍: The Review of Economics and Statistics is a 100-year-old general journal of applied (especially quantitative) economics. Edited at the Harvard Kennedy School, the Review has published some of the most important articles in empirical economics.
期刊最新文献
Human Capital and the Managerial Revolution in the United States: Evidence from General Electric Productivity Gains from Trade: Bunching Estimates from Trading Rights in China 'Til Dowry Do Us Part: Bargaining and Violence in Indian Families Are Negative Weights in Combining Forecasts So Bad? Assessing the Level of Consumption by Children in Households
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