{"title":"The groundlessness of sense: a critique of Husserl’s idea of grounding","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s11007-023-09626-y","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>This article critiques Husserl’s idea of grounding through an exploration of his notion of the lifeworld. First, it sketches different senses of the lifeworld in the <em>Crisis</em> and explains in what sense it is taken to be a universal foundation of all sense-formation. Second, it criticizes Husserl’s idea of grounding and shows that it fails because the alleged foundation—namely, the lifeworld as a perceptual world, or rather lifeworldly experience as perception—is inadequately determined. Perception cannot function as a universal foundation because it is always already interpretation. “The groundlessness of sense” means that the process of sense-formation can in no way rest upon an ultimate ground because contingent presuppositions and historical circumstances influence it from the very beginning. The paper concludes by discussing the consequence of this view for the relation between philosophy and sciences.</p>","PeriodicalId":45310,"journal":{"name":"CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY REVIEW","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY REVIEW","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-023-09626-y","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This article critiques Husserl’s idea of grounding through an exploration of his notion of the lifeworld. First, it sketches different senses of the lifeworld in the Crisis and explains in what sense it is taken to be a universal foundation of all sense-formation. Second, it criticizes Husserl’s idea of grounding and shows that it fails because the alleged foundation—namely, the lifeworld as a perceptual world, or rather lifeworldly experience as perception—is inadequately determined. Perception cannot function as a universal foundation because it is always already interpretation. “The groundlessness of sense” means that the process of sense-formation can in no way rest upon an ultimate ground because contingent presuppositions and historical circumstances influence it from the very beginning. The paper concludes by discussing the consequence of this view for the relation between philosophy and sciences.
期刊介绍：
The central purpose of Continental Philosophy Review is to foster a living dialogue within the international community on philosophical issues of mutual interest. It seeks to elicit, discussions of fundamental philosophical problems and original approaches to them. Broadly encompassing in its focus, the journal invites essays on both expressly theoretical topics and topics dealing with practical problems that extend to the wider domain of socio-political life. It encourages explorations in the domains of art, morality, science and religion as they relate to specific philosophical concerns. Although not an advocate of any one trend or school in philosophy, the journal is especially committed to keeping abreast of developments within phenomenology and contemporary continental philosophy and is interested in investigations that probe possible points of intersection between the continental European and the Anglo-American traditions. Continental Philosophy Review contains review articles of recent, original works in philosophy. It provides considerable space for such reviews, allowing critics to develop their comments and assessments at some length.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
