Mandatory corporate social responsibility spending, family control, and the cost of debt

Abstract

This paper examines how corporate compliance with the mandatory corporate social responsibility (CSR) spending regulation affects its cost of debt and how this effect varies with family control and ownership. Utilizing a longitudinal sample of Indian listed firms, we document that compliance with the CSR spending regulation leads to a lower cost of debt, and this relationship is more salient in non-family firms than in family firms. Moreover, the attenuation effect of family firms is stronger in firms both controlled and managed by families, with larger family ownership or managed by non-founder CEOs. We also find that the efficacy of compliance in reducing the cost of borrowing is stronger in firms engaged in CSR activities before the regulatory mandate. Our results are robust to endogeneity tests, different estimation methods, and alternative measures. Overall, we demonstrate that CSR compliance conveys valuable information on firm characteristics through both signaling and screening channels, consequently affecting debtholders' evaluation of firm risk and shaping their lending decisions. However, debtholders' assessments and decisions vary with firms’ ownership and control structure.