Exploring effective incentive policies for sustainable development of green buildings in China: based on evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation analysis

Chunmei Fan, Xiaoyue Li
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Abstract

PurposeThis study reveals the green building development path and analyzes the optimal government subsidy equilibrium through evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation. This was done to explore the feasible measures and optimal incentives to achieve higher levels of green building in China.Design/methodology/approachFirst, the practice of green building in China was analyzed, and the specific influencing factors and incentive measures for green building development were extracted. Second, China-specific evolutionary game models were constructed between developers and homebuyers under the market regulation and government incentive mechanism scenarios, and the evolutionary paths were analyzed. Finally, real-case numerical simulations were conducted, subsidy impacts were mainly analyzed and optimal subsidy equilibriums were solved.Findings(1) Simultaneously subsidizing developers and homebuyers proved to be the most effective measure to promote the sustainability of green buildings. (2) The sensitivity of developers and homebuyers to subsidies varied across scenarios, and the optimal subsidy level diminished marginally as building greenness and public awareness increased. (3) The optimal subsidy level for developers was intricately tied to the building greenness benchmark. A higher benchmark intensified the developer’s responsiveness to losses, at which point increasing subsidies were justified. Conversely, a reduction in subsidy might have been appropriate when the benchmark was set at a lower level.Practical implicationsThe expeditious advancement of green buildings holds paramount importance for the high-quality development of the construction industry. Nevertheless, the pace of green building expansion in China has experienced a recent deceleration. Drawing insights from the practices of green building in China, the exploration of viable strategies and the determination of optimal government subsidies stand as imperative initiatives. These endeavors aim to propel the acceleration of green building proliferation and materialize high-quality development at the earliest juncture possible.Originality/valueThe model is grounded in China’s green building practices, which makes the conclusions drawn more specific. Furthermore, research results provide practical references for governments to formulate green building incentive policies.
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探索中国绿色建筑可持续发展的有效激励政策:基于演化博弈论和数值模拟分析
目的 本研究通过进化博弈论和数值模拟,揭示了绿色建筑的发展路径,并分析了最优的政府补贴均衡。首先,分析了中国绿色建筑的实践,提取了绿色建筑发展的具体影响因素和激励措施。其次,构建了在市场调节和政府激励机制情景下,开发商与购房者之间具有中国特色的演化博弈模型,并对其演化路径进行了分析。结果(1)同时补贴开发商和购房者被证明是促进绿色建筑可持续发展的最有效措施。(2)开发商和购房者对补贴的敏感度因方案而异,最佳补贴水平随着建筑绿色程度和公众意识的提高而略有降低。(3)开发商的最佳补贴水平与建筑绿色程度基准密切相关。基准越高,开发商对损失的反应越强烈,此时增加补贴是合理的。反之,当基准设定在较低水平时,减少补贴可能是合适的。然而,近年来中国绿色建筑的发展速度有所放缓。从中国绿色建筑的实践中汲取启示,探索可行的策略和确定最佳的政府补贴是当务之急。原创性/价值该模型立足于中国的绿色建筑实践,使得出的结论更具针对性。此外,研究成果为政府制定绿色建筑激励政策提供了切实可行的参考。
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