One-bound core games

IF 0.6 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-03-10 DOI:10.1007/s00182-024-00889-0
Doudou Gong, Bas Dietzenbacher, Hans Peters
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper introduces the new class of one-bound core games, where the core can be described by either a lower bound or an upper bound on the payoffs of the players, named lower bound core games and upper bound core games, respectively. We study the relation of the class of one-bound core games with several other classes of games and characterize the new class by the structure of the core and in terms of Davis-Maschler reduced games. We also provide explicit expressions and axiomatic characterizations of the nucleolus for one-bound core games, and show that the nucleolus coincides with the Shapley value and the \(\tau\)-value when these games are convex.

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一键式核心游戏
本文介绍了一类新的单界核心博弈,其中核心可以用博弈者报酬的下限或上限来描述,分别命名为下限核心博弈和上限核心博弈。我们研究了单界核心博弈类与其他几类博弈的关系,并通过核心的结构和戴维斯-马斯勒还原博弈来描述这一类新博弈。我们还提供了一界核心博弈核子的明确表达式和公理化特征,并证明当这些博弈是凸时,核子与沙普利值和(\tau\)值重合。
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来源期刊
International Journal of Game Theory
International Journal of Game Theory 数学-数学跨学科应用
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
9
审稿时长
1 months
期刊介绍: International Journal of Game Theory is devoted to game theory and its applications. It publishes original research making significant contributions from a methodological, conceptual or mathematical point of view. Survey articles may also be considered if especially useful for the field.
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