Finitely additive behavioral strategies: when do they induce an unambiguous expected payoff?

IF 0.6 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-14 DOI:10.1007/s00182-024-00892-5
János Flesch, Dries Vermeulen, Anna Zseleva
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Abstract

We examine infinite horizon decision problems with arbitrary bounded payoff functions in which the decision maker uses finitely additive behavioral strategies. Since we only assume that the payoff function is bounded, it is well-known that these behavioral strategies generally do not induce unambiguously defined expected payoffs. Consequently, it is not clear how to compare behavioral strategies and define optimality. We address this problem by finding conditions on the payoff function that guarantee an unambiguous expected payoff regardless of which behavioral strategy the decision maker uses. To this end, we systematically consider various alternatives proposed in the literature on how to define the finitely additive probability measure on the set of infinite plays induced by a behavioral strategy.

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有限相加的行为策略:它们何时会产生明确的预期收益?
我们研究了具有任意有界报酬函数的无限期决策问题,在这些问题中,决策者使用的是有限相加的行为策略。由于我们只假设报酬函数是有界的,因此众所周知,这些行为策略一般不会产生明确定义的预期报酬。因此,如何比较行为策略和定义最优性并不清楚。为了解决这个问题,我们找到了报酬函数上的条件,无论决策者使用哪种行为策略,这些条件都能保证明确的预期报酬。为此,我们系统地考虑了文献中提出的关于如何定义行为策略所诱导的无限博弈集合上的有限相加概率度量的各种替代方案。
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来源期刊
International Journal of Game Theory
International Journal of Game Theory 数学-数学跨学科应用
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
9
审稿时长
1 months
期刊介绍: International Journal of Game Theory is devoted to game theory and its applications. It publishes original research making significant contributions from a methodological, conceptual or mathematical point of view. Survey articles may also be considered if especially useful for the field.
期刊最新文献
Buyers’ welfare maximizing auction design: comment The Shapley value in positional queueing problems Semidefinite games Vexing vexillological logic Finitely additive behavioral strategies: when do they induce an unambiguous expected payoff?
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