{"title":"Populist Jurisprudence? Examining Selected Case Law of the Polish Constitutional Court After 2016","authors":"Michał Stambulski","doi":"10.1007/s40803-024-00208-5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Since the parliamentary elections in 2015 and the subsequent change in the personal composition of the Polish Constitutional Court, this institution is in crisis. The Court, once one of the main guardians of the rule of law and a model for the constitutional judiciary in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, is criticized. Judges are accused of lack of proper appointment and party subordination. Court activities are perceived as part of illiberal democracy and populist constitutionalism, that is, introducing majority rule by “switching off” the checks and balances mechanisms by democratically elected parties and groups. However, what is often overlooked in this type of analysis is the more internal perspective of jurisprudence and legal reasoning. What kind of decisions does the “populist” constitutional court issue? How does it justify its decisions? The paper will discuss three cases of the Polish Constitutional Court. The first case is from 2017 and concerns the right of assembly in connection with the introduction of a special category of “cyclical assemblies”. The second, of 2019, is the so-called “printer case”, which concerned the possibility of refusing to provide a service for reasons of conscience (a refusal to print a poster because of opposition to “LGBT promotion”). The third case is the controversial ruling narrowing access to abortion from 2020. The aim of the analysis is to answer the question of whether the current jurisprudence of the Court is the breaking or continuation of the previously dominant liberal constitutionalism. I will be particularly interested in whether these decisions introduce any changes at the level of possible rights holders (legal subjects), the introduction of a new or changed scope of existing rights, and new ways of resolving conflicts between rights.</p>","PeriodicalId":45733,"journal":{"name":"Hague Journal on the Rule of Law","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Hague Journal on the Rule of Law","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-024-00208-5","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Since the parliamentary elections in 2015 and the subsequent change in the personal composition of the Polish Constitutional Court, this institution is in crisis. The Court, once one of the main guardians of the rule of law and a model for the constitutional judiciary in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, is criticized. Judges are accused of lack of proper appointment and party subordination. Court activities are perceived as part of illiberal democracy and populist constitutionalism, that is, introducing majority rule by “switching off” the checks and balances mechanisms by democratically elected parties and groups. However, what is often overlooked in this type of analysis is the more internal perspective of jurisprudence and legal reasoning. What kind of decisions does the “populist” constitutional court issue? How does it justify its decisions? The paper will discuss three cases of the Polish Constitutional Court. The first case is from 2017 and concerns the right of assembly in connection with the introduction of a special category of “cyclical assemblies”. The second, of 2019, is the so-called “printer case”, which concerned the possibility of refusing to provide a service for reasons of conscience (a refusal to print a poster because of opposition to “LGBT promotion”). The third case is the controversial ruling narrowing access to abortion from 2020. The aim of the analysis is to answer the question of whether the current jurisprudence of the Court is the breaking or continuation of the previously dominant liberal constitutionalism. I will be particularly interested in whether these decisions introduce any changes at the level of possible rights holders (legal subjects), the introduction of a new or changed scope of existing rights, and new ways of resolving conflicts between rights.
期刊介绍:
The Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (HJRL) is a multidisciplinary journal that aims to deepen and broaden our knowledge and understanding about the rule of law. Its main areas of interest are: current developments in rule of law in domestic, transnational and international contextstheoretical issues related to the conceptualization and implementation of the rule of law in domestic and international contexts;the relation between the rule of law and economic development, democratization and human rights protection;historical analysis of rule of law;significant trends and initiatives in rule of law promotion (practitioner notes).The HJRL is supported by HiiL Innovating Justice, The Hague, the Netherlands and the Paul Scholten Center for Jurisprudence at the Law School of the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.Editorial PolicyThe HJRL welcomes contributions from academics and practitioners with expertise in any relevant field, including law, anthropology, economics, history, philosophy, political science and sociology. It publishes two categories of articles: papers (appr. 6,000-10,000 words) and notes (appr. 2500 words). Papers are accepted on the basis of double blind peer-review. Notes are accepted on the basis of review by two or more editors of the journal. Manuscripts submitted to the HJRL must not be under consideration for publication elsewhere. Acceptance of the Editorial Board’s offer to publish, implies that the author agrees to an embargo on publication elsewhere for a period of two years following the date of publication in the HJRL.