{"title":"Purging the Judiciary After a Transition: Between a Rock and a Hard Place.","authors":"Katarína Šipulová, David Kosař","doi":"10.1007/s40803-024-00201-y","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Judges play a key role in the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms. Yet, less attention has been paid so far to the question of how to address their collaboration with non-democratic regimes. In theory, judges can be subjected to virtually all transitional justice mechanisms ranging from criminal prosecution and lustration to truth-seeking, or even amnesties. However, we show in a case study of Czechia that these mechanisms are not well equipped to address the complicity of judges in past crimes for three reasons: (1) judges usually play different roles in past crimes from political elites, (2) the principles of the separation of powers and judicial independence preclude the easy replacement of judges, and (3) pragmatic exigencies, such as the shortage of lawyers who are not tainted by cooperation with the previous regime, further complicate the renewal of the bench. Nevertheless, we argue that the lack of recognition of the role judges have played in non-democratic regimes is dangerous, as it may negatively affect public confidence in the judiciary and taint its legitimacy. Examples from Hungary, Poland and Romania, moreover, show that populist leaders are tempted to abuse the transitional justice rhetoric use the failure to deal with the past of judges as a justification for their court-curbing practices. Post-transition purges are therefore stuck between a rock (interfering in judicial independence and practical exigencies) and a hard place (mental dependence of the judiciary on the previous regime, low public trust in courts). When the democratic opposition defeats the populist leader, such as in Poland in 2023, it unfortunately faces the same dilemma. Thus, the Czech way of dealing with the past within the judiciary in transition from communism to democracy (transition 1.0) provides important insights also for today's undoing of populist judicial reforms and transition from authoritarian populism to democracy (transition 2.0).</p>","PeriodicalId":45733,"journal":{"name":"Hague Journal on the Rule of Law","volume":"17 1","pages":"61-93"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11753342/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Hague Journal on the Rule of Law","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-024-00201-y","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2024/3/4 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Judges play a key role in the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms. Yet, less attention has been paid so far to the question of how to address their collaboration with non-democratic regimes. In theory, judges can be subjected to virtually all transitional justice mechanisms ranging from criminal prosecution and lustration to truth-seeking, or even amnesties. However, we show in a case study of Czechia that these mechanisms are not well equipped to address the complicity of judges in past crimes for three reasons: (1) judges usually play different roles in past crimes from political elites, (2) the principles of the separation of powers and judicial independence preclude the easy replacement of judges, and (3) pragmatic exigencies, such as the shortage of lawyers who are not tainted by cooperation with the previous regime, further complicate the renewal of the bench. Nevertheless, we argue that the lack of recognition of the role judges have played in non-democratic regimes is dangerous, as it may negatively affect public confidence in the judiciary and taint its legitimacy. Examples from Hungary, Poland and Romania, moreover, show that populist leaders are tempted to abuse the transitional justice rhetoric use the failure to deal with the past of judges as a justification for their court-curbing practices. Post-transition purges are therefore stuck between a rock (interfering in judicial independence and practical exigencies) and a hard place (mental dependence of the judiciary on the previous regime, low public trust in courts). When the democratic opposition defeats the populist leader, such as in Poland in 2023, it unfortunately faces the same dilemma. Thus, the Czech way of dealing with the past within the judiciary in transition from communism to democracy (transition 1.0) provides important insights also for today's undoing of populist judicial reforms and transition from authoritarian populism to democracy (transition 2.0).
期刊介绍:
The Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (HJRL) is a multidisciplinary journal that aims to deepen and broaden our knowledge and understanding about the rule of law. Its main areas of interest are: current developments in rule of law in domestic, transnational and international contextstheoretical issues related to the conceptualization and implementation of the rule of law in domestic and international contexts;the relation between the rule of law and economic development, democratization and human rights protection;historical analysis of rule of law;significant trends and initiatives in rule of law promotion (practitioner notes).The HJRL is supported by HiiL Innovating Justice, The Hague, the Netherlands and the Paul Scholten Center for Jurisprudence at the Law School of the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.Editorial PolicyThe HJRL welcomes contributions from academics and practitioners with expertise in any relevant field, including law, anthropology, economics, history, philosophy, political science and sociology. It publishes two categories of articles: papers (appr. 6,000-10,000 words) and notes (appr. 2500 words). Papers are accepted on the basis of double blind peer-review. Notes are accepted on the basis of review by two or more editors of the journal. Manuscripts submitted to the HJRL must not be under consideration for publication elsewhere. Acceptance of the Editorial Board’s offer to publish, implies that the author agrees to an embargo on publication elsewhere for a period of two years following the date of publication in the HJRL.