Hague Journal on the Rule of Law最新文献

According to conventional wisdom, we are living in an era of constant emergencies. The subsequent crises cannot always be handled effectively within the normal legal system, so many countries have introduced some type of emergency, i.e., a special legal regime, to deal with them. However, exceptional power per se poses a threat to democracy, as those in government can use it for their own political gains, curb civil liberties, and subvert the rule of law. The article takes the principled position that emergency situations can be legally regulated, and argues that certain standards of the rule of law should not be waived even in a special legal order. The article discusses how to assess whether the exceptional power is being abused, i.e. whether it is illegitimately limiting the rule of law. For this purpose, it proposes an assessment framework whose criteria can be used in any constitutional democracy to check the legality of the extraordinary power exercised in a state of emergency. The study examines also the possible counter-arguments that could question the success of such an undertaking, and provides answers to these challenges. After that, it explains in detail the rule of law standards for the exercise of exceptional power, the separation of different emergency powers, the requirements of legality, temporariness, purpose-limitation, necessity and proportionality, and controllability, as well as those areas that are untouchable even for the extended power. The justification of these criteria also receives special attention in the study.

The preliminary reference procedure forms the foundation of judge-to-judge dialogue in the EU, which has been imperative to the inclusion of member state courts in the Union’s judicial system. In response to the Union’s ever-growing rule of law problem, the CJEU strengthened judicial independence criteria to fortify the Article 2 TEU value of the rule of law. Now, it seems the CJEU’s fight to save judicial independence is spilling over into the preliminary reference mechanism as it overhauls its judicial independence standards under Article 267 TFEU. In particular, the CJEU has chosen to treat traditional and non-traditional courts in a divergent way and introduced significant reliance on judicial decisions emanating from outside the immediate CJEU court structure; this multi-dimensional change to the operation of the preliminary reference mechanism has far-reaching consequences. As this article highlights, the most notable consequences are to the uniform application of EU law, the principle of subsidiarity and autonomy of EU law. Perhaps the most important point raised is the effect of the new limitation on Article 267 TFEU references on EU citizens and our right to access the ‘natural judge’ (the CJEU) in matters concerning EU law.

This article proposes an approach for conceptualizing and assessing the extent to which corporate actors impact the rule of law environment in different societies. To achieve this, the methodology for the Corporate Actors and the Rule of Law Index is developed based on a reimagined methodology derived from the Rule of Law Index by the World Justice Project, originally conceived in a state-centric manner. The methodology proposed in this article includes the following factors: preventing corporate capture and corporate contribution to structural inequality, corporate integrity and transparency, meaningful stakeholder engagement; order and security; impact on the regulatory sphere; corporate accountability for human rights abuses; access to grievance mechanisms. Measuring the influence of corporate actors on the rule of law and indicating the dynamic of this influence significantly contributes to the overall understanding of the rule of law environment. The absence of such measurement distorts the comprehension of the balance of power in a society, impedes the development of legal regulation, obstructs the identification of problematic issues in ensuring the rule of law, and hinders efforts to address them.

This paper engages with the routine normalisation of mass violations of human rights at the EU–Belarusian border. The direct and indirect victimisation of the racialised ‘other’ on the Eastern border of the Union is a direct extension of the EU-sponsored war on the racialised passport-poor in the Mediterranean. Together, the two form one clear and coherent picture of flagrant mass rights abuse. This EU law approach has claimed more than 27,000 lives over the last eight years and left more than 120,000 innocent people captured and imprisoned, or enslaved and sold for ransom by the criminal proxies enlisted by the EU and its Member States. This dramatic situation has not arisen by chance. An array of legal techniques is deployed by the EU, specifically by FRONTEX, the European Commission and, albeit incidentally and to a lesser extent, the European Court of Justice—to make sure that the full brunt of the denial of the right to life and other vital rights of non-citizens is never presented as a violation of EU law. We call these legal techniques ‘EU lawlessness law’. Focusing on the situation at the EU–Belarusian border allows us to zoom in on the bespoke lawlessness solutions crafted and deployed there by the EU and its Member States. The gross violations of the law are rhetorically justified by the alleged instrumentalisation of migrants by the dictatorial Belarusian regime. Paradoxically, the latter emerges as a de facto partner of the EU and its Member States, in torturing numerous people in complete disregard of any of the legal guarantees that the Union professes to provide.

The starting point of the paper is that the early constitutional changes after the populist transformation of Hungarian majority state politics (from 2010) and the application of the new Fundamental Law (since 2012) have created difficulty in achieving constitutional justice by judicial means. The fundamental populist constitutional transformation and, within this, the transformation of the regulation of the Constitutional Court have created great challenges for constitutional adjudication. Scholarship on the transformation of the Hungarian Constitutional Court regards the change of jurisprudence as a consequence of the constitutional environment, which ended up in institutional state capture. Basing my arguments on the classic competence-related issues of constitutional justice, activism and deference, I argue here that for constitutional courts, there is always a limited room for manoeuvre by interpretation except for in a ‘hard’ dictatorship. Populist Hungarian jurisprudence is, therefore, not only a consequence of constitutional change but a contribution per se—a cause of the construction of a populist constitution. This job has been done by constitutional interpretation in an activist or deferent manner with regard to specific politically sensitive issues. EU- and emergency-related constitutional conflicts are used here as examples to explain the proposed assessment criteria. The conclusion is that either the Court is activist or deferent, it contributes actively to the populist construction by constitutional interpretation.

The EU Treaties contain no provision akin to the clause in the United States Constitution empowering spending in the ‘general Welfare’, i.e., for the general public good. Nonetheless, supporters of a broad reading of the cohesion flexibility clause, Article 175(3) TFEU, now claim that the EU, in effect, already has that power. The claim is inspired by that clause serving as the sole legal basis for the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). This is the cornerstone of the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) Programme, the EU’s massive borrowing and spending initiative that has directed a large amount of money to national priorities to address not just economic consequences of Covid but also longer-term issues of climate change, energy transition, and digitalization. This contribution critically assesses whether Article 175(3) TFEU can serve as the basis for general spending authority in the EU, particularly at the expense of its traditional role in regional development in Europe’s economic periphery. The analysis draws on the historic purposes of cohesion policy, the existing case law on the limited scope of the cohesion flexibility clause, as well as legal opinions of the Council Legal Service on the same question. This contribution concludes that the crisis-driven reinterpretation of Article 175(3) TFEU not only undermines cohesion as developmental tool for the periphery, but it also raises serious concerns about democratic legitimacy and the rule of law at Europe’s core. The EU may well need a general spending power, but the way to achieve it is not through institutional lawyers engaging in strained crisis reinterpretation outside of public scrutiny. Instead, what is needed is democratic politics pure and simple, i.e., Treaty change.

In this paper, I investigate the attempts of the European Union to promote and entrench the rule of law standards in the Western Balkans countries. I examine the failures of legal reforms in key policy areas, such as the regulations of judicial independence, the legislative branch of government, vetting and suppression of corruption, that prevent progress in achieving the rule of law standards. I demonstrate how a narrow focus on the judiciary and its performance has harmed the standards. I propose a more specific focus on socio–economic reforms that, at first glance, appear less relevant to the rule of law. These are: higher education reforms, digitalization, decarbonization, and better targeting of anti-corruption measures. More focus on these areas allows a refocusing from a narrow conception of rule of law to other good governance reforms.

In a period of rising threats to constitutional government within countries and among them, it is a crucial time to study the rule of law in transnational context. This article defines core concepts, analyzes the relation of national and international law and institutions from a rule-of-law perspective, and assesses the extent to which rule-of-law practices are shifting at the domestic and international levels in parallel. Part I explains our conceptualization of the rule of law, necessary for the orientation of empirical study and policy responses. Following Martin Krygier, we formulate a teleological conception of the rule of law in terms of goals and practices, which, in turn, calls for an assessment of institutional mechanisms to advance these goals, given varying social conditions and contexts. Part II sets forth the ways in which international law and institutions are important for rule-of-law ends, as well as their pathologies, since power also is exercised beyond the state in an interconnected world. Part III examines empirical indicators of the decline of the rule of law at the national and international levels. It notes factors that could explain such decline, and why such factors appear to be transnationally linked. Part IV discusses what might be done given these shifts in rule-of-law protections. We then conclude, noting the implications of viewing the rule of law in transnational context for conceptual theory, empirical study, and policy response.

While much attention has been paid to the fact that corruption investigations and prosecutions may jail politicians and high echelons of the civil service, there has been less discussion about the institutional arrangements that may create incentives for prosecuting authorities, and whether and how these fit with the rule of law principle. The status of public prosecutors within the separation of powers principle varies from country to country, and so does the level of de jure and de facto independence. In most countries, prosecutors are part of the executive branch. This arrangement may be associated with lower levels of independence and less incentive to prosecute elected officials, raising a series of concerns about political influence in prosecutorial decisions. In contrast, if public prosecutors are independent from the executive branch, and are insulated from political influences, concerns with prosecutorial decisions that disregard their political, economic and social consequences come to the fore. In addition, different levels of discretion can be combined with different levels of independence, creating a multitude of possible scenarios that determine the incentives that may guide decisions to prosecute members of government for corruption. Brazilian public prosecutors’ offices illustrate how arrangements with high levels of independence and discretion raise concerns about the role of prosecutors in a rule of law system. We show how the institutional framework for Brazilian prosecutors impacted incentives to pursue corruption cases against politicians and high-ranked civil servants in the case of Operation Car Wash (Operação Lava Jato) in Brazil.

Regularly invoked but rarely defined, ‘the rule of law’ has over the last few decades been converted from a legal term of art into one of the most ambiguous slogans of contemporary public policy. Political scientists claim it as a crucial test of a regime’s legitimacy. Economists maintain that it provides an essential foundation of a flourishing market economy. Philosophers suggest it captures the essence of the state as a moral association. Historians acknowledge that, even if they might distrust such an abstract notion, the imposition of effective inhibitions on power is an ‘unqualified human good’. And lawyers, of course, have treated it as the foundation of their discipline ever since the mid-thirteenth century when Bracton asserted that ‘there is no rex where will rules rather than lex’. Those who extend its usage beyond the confines of professional legal discourse commonly give it a positive valence. But the rule of law also has its detractors. These critics assert that it promotes purely formal, individualistic values at the expense of substantive justice, or that it is a smokescreen preventing us from seeing the impact of recent global developments that signal the rule of lawyers. Some anthropologists even denounce it as an imperial ideology that legitimates European conquest and the plunder of the rest of the world. But given the fact that almost every state in the world now claims to act in compliance with the rule of law, these critics seem to have done little to dent its appeal. Yet, the sheer range of views and perspectives that now exist about the meaning, purpose, and value of the rule of law considerably complicates any inquiry into its current standing. In this paper, I will try to bring some clarity to the issue by providing a sketch of the main varieties of ways in which the term is being invoked. The paper comprises five sections, which each address a specific aspect of the term’s usage: (1) its coinage in English law, (2) the adoption of a superficially similar terminology in the German concept of the Rechtsstaat, (3) the jurisprudential innovations that complicate its meaning, and finally its most recent invocation (4) first in development work and (5) secondly in constitutional rejuvenation.