`I-know-it-when-I-see-it' - Motivating Examples in the Psychology of Conspiracy Theory Theory

Abstract

Looking at 76 representative articles published in pyschology between 2017 and 2023 (reviewed between December 2022 and February 2023), I examine the role of motivating examples—a kind of illustrative example, typically used by researchers at the beginning of their work to motivate the issue or problem they want to resolve or address in that work—in the psychological work on conspiracy theory theory (the academic study of conspiracy theory). Through an examination of how motivating examples are both introduced and used in the psychological literature, I argue that the way psychologists employ such examples ends up relying on what Joseph Uscinski and Adam Enders deem as an unviable and easily abused ‘I-know-it-when-I-see-it’ standard. As will be demonstrated, much of the recent work in the psychology of conspiracy theory assumes and thus fails to establish what is supposedly problematic about belief in the conspiracy theories. As a consequence the surveyed work typically fails to adequately capture belief in actual conspiracy theories. I propose two solutions to help move the psychological work on conspiracy theory theory to safer conceptual grounds.