{"title":"Impairment Arguments, Interests, and Circularity.","authors":"Stephen Napier","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhae023","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A common justification for abortion rights is that the death of the fetus does not violate any of the fetus's time-relative interests. The time-relative interest account (TRIA) of harm and wrongdoing tells us that a necessary condition for harming someone is that his or her time-relative interests are frustrated. Regarding the justification for abortion, this account falls prey to impairment arguments. Impairment arguments entertain cases of prenatal injury, such as the mother using illicit drugs that disable the child. The intuition is that the child who is born with such disabilities is harmed by the mother's drug use. But it is unclear what time-relative interest is violated in cases of prenatal harm. Typical responses to impairment arguments point out that the abortion case is different because the child does not exist to experience such harms; but in prenatal injury + survival cases, the child does live to experience those harms. Thus, the TRIA justification for abortion is not impugned by impairment counter-examples. This article argues that this response to impairment arguments is viciously circular. The response must say that so long as you kill the child, no harm is done. But this assumes that killing itself is morally inconsequential and is not itself a case of harm. The response to impairment arguments, then, assumes the permissibility of abortion.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11369812/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"3","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhae023","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
A common justification for abortion rights is that the death of the fetus does not violate any of the fetus's time-relative interests. The time-relative interest account (TRIA) of harm and wrongdoing tells us that a necessary condition for harming someone is that his or her time-relative interests are frustrated. Regarding the justification for abortion, this account falls prey to impairment arguments. Impairment arguments entertain cases of prenatal injury, such as the mother using illicit drugs that disable the child. The intuition is that the child who is born with such disabilities is harmed by the mother's drug use. But it is unclear what time-relative interest is violated in cases of prenatal harm. Typical responses to impairment arguments point out that the abortion case is different because the child does not exist to experience such harms; but in prenatal injury + survival cases, the child does live to experience those harms. Thus, the TRIA justification for abortion is not impugned by impairment counter-examples. This article argues that this response to impairment arguments is viciously circular. The response must say that so long as you kill the child, no harm is done. But this assumes that killing itself is morally inconsequential and is not itself a case of harm. The response to impairment arguments, then, assumes the permissibility of abortion.
堕胎权的一个常见理由是,胎儿的死亡不会侵犯胎儿的任何时间相关利益。关于伤害和不法行为的时间相关利益论(TRIA)告诉我们,伤害某人的必要条件是他或她的时间相关利益受挫。关于堕胎的正当性,这一观点成为损害论点的牺牲品。损害论点认为存在产前伤害的情况,例如母亲使用违禁药物使孩子丧失能力。其直觉是,天生残疾的孩子受到了母亲使用毒品的伤害。但是,在产前伤害的情况下,什么时间相关利益受到侵犯还不清楚。对损伤论点的典型回应指出,堕胎的情况不同,因为孩子并不存在,不会经历这些伤害;但在产前损伤+存活的情况下,孩子确实活着经历了这些伤害。因此,堕胎的 TRIA 理由不会受到损伤反例的质疑。本文认为,这种对损害论点的回应是恶性循环。回应必须说,只要你杀死了孩子,就没有伤害。但这是假定杀人本身在道德上无足轻重,其本身并不是一种伤害。因此,对损害论点的回应假定了堕胎的可允许性。
期刊介绍:
This bimonthly publication explores the shared themes and concerns of philosophy and the medical sciences. Central issues in medical research and practice have important philosophical dimensions, for, in treating disease and promoting health, medicine involves presuppositions about human goals and values. Conversely, the concerns of philosophy often significantly relate to those of medicine, as philosophers seek to understand the nature of medical knowledge and the human condition in the modern world. In addition, recent developments in medical technology and treatment create moral problems that raise important philosophical questions. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy aims to provide an ongoing forum for the discussion of such themes and issues.