Evolutionary game of incentive strategy for Chinese prefabricated buildings based on system dynamics from the perspective of prospect theory

Abstract

PurposeAs an effective measure for reducing energy consumption and achieving carbon neutrality, prefabricated building projects (PBPs) have attracted considerable attention in China. Although the Chinese Government has vigorously promoted PBPs, neither developers nor consumers have high recognition of PBPs. This study aimed to explore the decision-making behaviour of governments, developers and consumers in promoting the development of prefabricated buildings in China and to better optimise the incentive strategies for prefabricated buildings in China.Design/methodology/approachBased on prospect and evolutionary game theories, an evolutionary game model of three stakeholders in the development of PBPs – government, developers and consumers – was constructed. Combined with the system dynamics theory, the incentive policy behaviour and influencing factors of the three parties in the evolutionary game model were analysed.FindingsThe results showed that the initial probability of the three parties affects the decision-making behaviour of each party and that of other stakeholders. Government subsidies to developers are more sensitive than developers themselves. There is a certain threshold for the scope of government subsidies to consumers, and exceeding this threshold does not promote the development of PBPs. Based on the results, policy recommendations to the government, developers and consumers were proposed to enhance PBP development.Originality/valueThis study provides suggestions for governments to formulate reasonable incentive policies for prefabricated buildings and a specific theoretical basis for the sound development of prefabricated buildings.