{"title":"No Place Like Home? Alienage, Popular Sovereignty and an Implied Freedom of Entry into Australia Under the Constitution","authors":"Benjamin Durkin","doi":"10.1177/0067205x241255445","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Does the Constitution protect the ability of an Australian to enter the country? This article investigates that question. Whilst the Constitution provides no express guarantee of a citizen’s right to enter Australia, a series of recent cases — particularly Love v Commonwealth 1 and Alexander v Minister for Home Affairs 2 — give occasion to consider whether a freedom of entry forms an implied part of Australia’s constitutional framework. Early scholarly attempts to establish a freedom of entry have relied upon the definition of non-alienage to ground this implication. This article commences by reviewing the effect of the High Court’s recent alienage jurisprudence on these arguments. After concluding that fatal difficulties attend this approach, I investigate an alternative foundation for an implied freedom of entry: an implication drawn from a constitutional principle of popular sovereignty. Focusing on a recent thread of High Court jurisprudence which has placed an increasing emphasis on the constitutional protection afforded to popular sovereignty, I conclude that this alternative basis provides a viable foundation upon which an implied freedom of entry could be recognised in the Constitution.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"80 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Federal Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205x241255445","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Does the Constitution protect the ability of an Australian to enter the country? This article investigates that question. Whilst the Constitution provides no express guarantee of a citizen’s right to enter Australia, a series of recent cases — particularly Love v Commonwealth 1 and Alexander v Minister for Home Affairs 2 — give occasion to consider whether a freedom of entry forms an implied part of Australia’s constitutional framework. Early scholarly attempts to establish a freedom of entry have relied upon the definition of non-alienage to ground this implication. This article commences by reviewing the effect of the High Court’s recent alienage jurisprudence on these arguments. After concluding that fatal difficulties attend this approach, I investigate an alternative foundation for an implied freedom of entry: an implication drawn from a constitutional principle of popular sovereignty. Focusing on a recent thread of High Court jurisprudence which has placed an increasing emphasis on the constitutional protection afforded to popular sovereignty, I conclude that this alternative basis provides a viable foundation upon which an implied freedom of entry could be recognised in the Constitution.
宪法》是否保护澳大利亚人入境的能力?本文对这一问题进行了探讨。虽然《宪法》没有明确保障公民进入澳大利亚的权利,但最近的一系列案件--尤其是 Love 诉联邦案 1 和 Alexander 诉内政部长案 2 --使我们有机会考虑入境自由是否构成澳大利亚宪法框架的一个隐含部分。学术界早期试图确立入境自由的努力依赖于非外国人的定义来为这一含义提供依据。本文首先回顾了高等法院最近的外国人判例对这些论点的影响。在得出这一方法存在致命困难的结论后,我研究了隐含入境自由的另一种基础:从人民主权的宪法原则中得出的含义。最近高等法院的判例越来越强调对人民主权的宪法保护,我将重点放在这一判例上,并得出结论:这一替代依据提供了一个可行的基础,在此基础上,默示的入境自由可以在宪法中得到承认。