Economics of Analytics Services on a Marketplace Platform

IF 7 2区 管理学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS Mis Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI:10.25300/misq/2023/16452
Zhe Wang, Hong Guo, Dengpan Liu
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Abstract

Analytics services provided by marketplace platforms have become increasingly important for sellers seeking market insights. In this paper, we examine a scenario in which an analytics service plays a vital role in enhancing sellers’ understanding of market size and improving their decision-making. Using a game-theoretic model, we analyze the pricing strategies of the platform and the adoption strategies of sellers for the analytics service. Our study identifies two distinct effects of analytics services: the competition effect and the accuracy effect. Specifically, the competition effect manifests in opposing ways across different market scenarios, with a competition-intensifying effect in low-demand markets and a competition-weakening effect in high-demand markets. Consequently, sellers using an analytics service command lower prices in low-demand markets and higher prices in high-demand markets. More interestingly, our results reveal that offering an analytics service could potentially hurt the total market demand, subsequently impacting the platform’s revenue from the marketplace service and potentially leaving the platform worse off. Additionally, driven by both the accuracy and competition effects, adopting an analytics service may adversely affect seller profitability and consumer surplus without necessarily improving overall welfare. Moreover, the transaction fee for the marketplace service plays a crucial role in the interplay between the analytics and marketplace services. Specifically, in low-demand (high-demand) markets, as the transaction fee increases, platforms should consider reducing (increasing) the subscription fee to encourage more (fewer) sellers to adopt the analytics service, thereby enhancing overall market demand and increasing revenue from the marketplace service. Our findings also suggest that platforms should refrain from offering analytics services in high-demand markets when the transaction fee is relatively high. Furthermore, policymakers (sellers) should be mindful of the potential negative consequences associated with the adoption of analytics services in high-demand (low-demand) markets.
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市场平台上分析服务的经济性
#html-body [data-pb-style=T85P88U]{justify-content:flex-start;display:flex;flex-direction:column;background-position:left top;background-size:cover;background-repeat:no-repeat;background-attachment:scroll} 对于寻求市场洞察力的卖家来说,市场平台提供的分析服务变得越来越重要。在本文中,我们研究了分析服务在增强卖家对市场规模的了解和改善其决策方面发挥重要作用的情景。我们利用博弈论模型分析了平台的定价策略和卖家采用分析服务的策略。我们的研究发现了分析服务的两种不同效应:竞争效应和准确性效应。具体来说,竞争效应在不同的市场场景中表现截然相反,在低需求市场中,竞争效应加剧,而在高需求市场中,竞争效应减弱。因此,使用分析服务的卖家在低需求市场上会获得更低的价格,而在高需求市场上会获得更高的价格。更有趣的是,我们的研究结果表明,提供分析服务可能会损害市场总需求,从而影响平台从市场服务中获得的收入,并有可能使平台陷入困境。此外,在准确性效应和竞争效应的双重驱动下,采用分析服务可能会对卖方的盈利能力和消费者剩余产生不利影响,但不一定会提高整体福利。此外,市场服务的交易费在分析服务和市场服务的相互作用中起着至关重要的作用。具体来说,在低需求(高需求)市场中,随着交易费的增加,平台应考虑降低(增加)订阅费,以鼓励更多的卖家(更少的卖家)采用分析服务,从而提高整体市场需求,增加市场服务的收入。我们的研究结果还表明,当交易费相对较高时,平台应避免在高需求市场提供分析服务。此外,决策者(卖家)应注意在高需求(低需求)市场采用分析服务可能带来的负面影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Mis Quarterly
Mis Quarterly 工程技术-计算机:信息系统
CiteScore
13.30
自引率
4.10%
发文量
36
审稿时长
6-12 weeks
期刊介绍: Journal Name: MIS Quarterly Editorial Objective: The editorial objective of MIS Quarterly is focused on: Enhancing and communicating knowledge related to: Development of IT-based services Management of IT resources Use, impact, and economics of IT with managerial, organizational, and societal implications Addressing professional issues affecting the Information Systems (IS) field as a whole Key Focus Areas: Development of IT-based services Management of IT resources Use, impact, and economics of IT with managerial, organizational, and societal implications Professional issues affecting the IS field as a whole
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